feasibility analysis in Washington

2010It does so on the ground that the foundational case, Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 103 Wash.2d 131 , 691 P.2d 190 (1984), which adopted the feasibility standard, considered "possibility" and "practicality" but did not include the best interests of the child as part of a feasibility determination.

2010It does so on the ground that the foundational case, Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 103 Wash.2d 131 , 691 P.2d 190 (1984), which adopted the feasibility standard, considered "possibility" and "practicality" but did not include the best interests of the child as part of a feasibility determination.

2002Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1269 (11th Cir.1999) (OSHA's choice to limit rule making by excluding certain policy pertaining to atmospheric contamination from consideration, regardless of feasibility, found to be a valid exercise of the agency's authority to set priorities); AFL CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 , 985 (11th Cir.1992) (OSHA's decision to defer issuing standards on permissible exposure limits to air contaminants within discretion of agency to set priorities for the use of the agency's resources, and to promulgate standards sequentially).

2002Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (OSHA’s choice to limit rule making by excluding certain policy pertaining to atmospheric contamination from consideration, regardless of feasibility, found to be a valid exercise of the agency’s authority to set priorities); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 , 985 (11th Cir. 1992) (OSHA’s decision to defer issuing standards on permissible exposure limits to air contami nants within discretion of agency to set priorities for the use of the agency’s resources, and to promulgate standards sequentially).

2002Applicable to the Department’s feasibility analysis is but one standard of review—whether its feasibility decision was “arbitrary and capricious.” 11 We have explained that “[algency action is arbitrary and capricious if it is willful and unreasoning and taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.” Hillis v. Dep’t of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 383 , 932 P.2d 139 (1997).

2002Applicable to the Department’s feasibility analysis is but one standard of review—whether its feasibility decision was “arbitrary and capricious.” 11 We have explained that “[algency action is arbitrary and capricious if it is willful and unreasoning and taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.” Hillis v. Dep’t of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 383 , 932 P.2d 139 (1997).

2002ATMI, 452 U.S. at 514 n.32.

2002ATMI, 452 U.S. at 514 n.32.

1973See O’Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Reil v. State, 4 Wn.

1973Reil v. State, 4 Wn.

2002Trades Dep't v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258 , 1271 (D.C.Cir.1988) (the feasibility principle may not be applied in a way which would deprive OSHA of the almost unlimited discretion to devise means to achieve the goal mandated by Congress; nor is there any requirement that every possible tightening of a regulation must be made); Am.

1984Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, supra. Because the standard of design defectiveness is premised on the reasonableness of the design, industry custom has some bearing on the feasibility factors that the jury considers.

1984Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, supra. Because the standard of design defectiveness is premised on the reasonableness of the design, industry custom has some bearing on the feasibility factors that the jury considers.