infringement rule in Alabama

1999Parol evidence, however, "is always admissible to show that an instrument is void or to show a lack or failure of consideration." Parker v. McGaha, 294 Ala. 702, 707 , 321 So.2d 182, 185 (1975). "`The consideration of contracts in writing is in general open to inquiry, and it is not an infringement of the rule excluding parol evidence, to add to, vary, or contradict writings, to receive parol evidence of the actual consideration, for the purpose of determining its validity, or its failure, or that from any cause it is sufficient or insufficient to support the contract.'" Chandler v. Lamar Coun

1988The following is well settled: "The consideration of contracts in writing is in general open to inquiry, and it is not an infringement of the rule excluding parol evidence, to add to, vary, or contradict writings, to receive parol evidence of the actual consideration, for the purpose of determining its validity, or its failure, or that from any cause it is sufficient or insufficient to support the contract. [Citations omitted.]" Hamaker v. Coons , 117 Ala. 603 , 610 , 23 So. 655 , 658 (1908).

1897“The consideration of contracts in writing is in general open to inquiry, and it is not an infringement of the rule excluding parol evidence, to add to, vary, or contradict writings, to receive parol evidence of the actual consideration, for the purpose of determining its validity, or its failure, or that from any cause it is sufficient or "insufficient to support the contract.” — Ramsay v. Young, 69 Ala. 157 ; Davis v. Snider, 70 Ala. 315 .

1892In Ramsey v. Young, 69 Ala. 157 , it is said, “that the consideration of contracts in writing is in general open to enquiry, and it is not an infringement of the rule excluding parol evidence to add to, vary or contradict writings, to receive parol evidence of the actual consideration for the purpose of determining its validity, or its failure, or that from any cause it is sufficient or insufficient to support the contract.”—Tisdale v. Maxwell, 58 Ala. 40 ; Holland v. Barnes, 53 Ala. 83 .

1999In the trial court, Crimson cited Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 991 F.Supp. 1410 (M.D.Ala.1997), for the proposition that "no severable or identical consideration is required for an arbitration provision to be enforceable." 991 F.Supp. at 1422 (citing Northcom, Ltd. v. James, 694 So.2d 1329, 1335-36 (Ala.1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So.2d 592 (Ala. 1998)).

1999In the trial court, Crimson cited Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 991 F.Supp. 1410 (M.D.Ala.1997), for the proposition that "no severable or identical consideration is required for an arbitration provision to be enforceable." 991 F.Supp. at 1422 (citing Northcom, Ltd. v. James, 694 So.2d 1329, 1335-36 (Ala.1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So.2d 592 (Ala. 1998)).

1999In the trial court, Crimson cited Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 991 F.Supp. 1410 (M.D.Ala.1997), for the proposition that "no severable or identical consideration is required for an arbitration provision to be enforceable." 991 F.Supp. at 1422 (citing Northcom, Ltd. v. James, 694 So.2d 1329, 1335-36 (Ala.1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So.2d 592 (Ala. 1998)).

1973Griffin v. State, supra; Williams v. State, 18 Ala.App. 573 , 93 So. 284 ; Holland v. State, supra. However, each case rests upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances.

1973Griffin v. State, supra; Williams v. State, 18 Ala.App. 573 , 93 So. 284 ; Holland v. State, supra. However, each case rests upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances.

1970It may be thought that the criticism of the court is too restricted and technical; but the principle involved is of such paramount importance it would be dangerous to permit the least infringement of the rule to pass without correction. * * *'" Id., at 463 , 126 So., at 893 .

1970It may be thought that the criticism of the court is too restricted and technical; but the principle involved is of such paramount importance it would be dangerous to permit the least infringement of the rule to pass without correction. * * * ’ ” Id., at 463 , 126 So., at 893 .

1970It may be thought that the criticism of the court is too restricted and technical; but the principle involved is of such paramount importance it would be dangerous to permit the least infringement of the rule to pass without correction. * * *'" Id., at 463 , 126 So., at 893 .

1970It may be thought that the criticism of the court is too restricted and technical; but the principle involved is of such paramount importance it would be dangerous to permit the least infringement of the rule to pass without correction. * * * ’ ” Id., at 463 , 126 So., at 893 .

1897“The consideration of contracts in writing is in general open to inquiry, and it is not an infringement of the rule excluding parol evidence, to add to, vary, or contradict writings, to receive parol evidence of the actual consideration, for the purpose of determining its validity, or its failure, or that from any cause it is sufficient or "insufficient to support the contract.” — Ramsay v. Young, 69 Ala. 157 ; Davis v. Snider, 70 Ala. 315 .

1892In Ramsey v. Young, 69 Ala. 157 , it is said, “that the consideration of contracts in writing is in general open to enquiry, and it is not an infringement of the rule excluding parol evidence to add to, vary or contradict writings, to receive parol evidence of the actual consideration for the purpose of determining its validity, or its failure, or that from any cause it is sufficient or insufficient to support the contract.”—Tisdale v. Maxwell, 58 Ala. 40 ; Holland v. Barnes, 53 Ala. 83 .

1892There is nothing in the plea to show that the^ payment was to be postponed or that the note could be discharged in any particular manner, and the cases of Lakeside v. Dromgoole, 89 Ala. 505 ; Doss v. Peterson, 82 Ala. 253 ; Hart v. Clark, 54 Ala. 490 , have no application.

1892In Ramsey v. Young, 69 Ala. 157 , it is said, “that the consideration of contracts in writing is in general open to enquiry, and it is not an infringement of the rule excluding parol evidence to add to, vary or contradict writings, to receive parol evidence of the actual consideration for the purpose of determining its validity, or its failure, or that from any cause it is sufficient or insufficient to support the contract.”—Tisdale v. Maxwell, 58 Ala. 40 ; Holland v. Barnes, 53 Ala. 83 .

1892There is nothing in the plea to show that the^ payment was to be postponed or that the note could be discharged in any particular manner, and the cases of Lakeside v. Dromgoole, 89 Ala. 505 ; Doss v. Peterson, 82 Ala. 253 ; Hart v. Clark, 54 Ala. 490 , have no application.

1892There is nothing in the plea to show that the^ payment was to be postponed or that the note could be discharged in any particular manner, and the cases of Lakeside v. Dromgoole, 89 Ala. 505 ; Doss v. Peterson, 82 Ala. 253 ; Hart v. Clark, 54 Ala. 490 , have no application.

1877The admission of the evidence, was an infringement of the rule, that contracts in writing can not be varied or contradicted by parol evidence of prior or cotemporaneous inconsistent or repugnant stipulations.— West v. Kelley, 19 Ala. 353 ; Litchfield v. Falconer, 2 Ala. 280 .

1877The admission of the evidence, was an infringement of the rule, that contracts in writing can not be varied or contradicted by parol evidence of prior or cotemporaneous inconsistent or repugnant stipulations.— West v. Kelley, 19 Ala. 353 ; Litchfield v. Falconer, 2 Ala. 280 .