universal malice doctrine in Alabama

2010Napier v. State, 357 So.2d 1001, 1007 (Ala.Cr.App.1977), reversed on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala.1978).

1991Ex parte Washington, 448 So.2d 404 (Ala. 1984); Napier v. State, 357 So.2d 1001 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala.1978).

1987Napier v. State , 357 So.2d 1001 , 1007 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977), reversed on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala. 1978). 'The element of "extreme indifference to human life" by definition, does not address itself to the life of the victim, but to human life generally.' People By and Through Russel v. District Court For Fourth Judicial District , 185 Colo. 78 , 521 P.2d 1254 , 1256 (1974)." The appellant's argument, if true, probably would have resulted in a different outcome in his trial and his representation might have fallen below an objective standard; thus, the appellant has met the requirement

1987Napier v. State , 357 So.2d 1001 , 1007 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977), reversed on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala. 1978). 'The element of "extreme indifference to human life" by definition, does not address itself to the life of the victim, but to human life generally.' People By and Through Russel v. District Court For Fourth Judicial District , 185 Colo. 78 , 521 P.2d 1254 , 1256 (1974)." The appellant's argument, if true, probably would have resulted in a different outcome in his trial and his representation might have fallen below an objective standard; thus, the appellant has met the requirement

2010Ex parte Simmons, supra; Ex parte McCormack, supra. When considered with the evidence in its entirety, the State’s arguments that Sheffield “did not have a specific intent to harm or injure any person,” but instead “intended to scare or send a message” and that a jury could have found that he acted recklessly with a depraved indifference to human life because he lacked knowledge of who, if anyone, was inside the residence when the fire was started” are not persuasive.

1984Napier v. State , 357 So.2d 1001 , 1007 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977), reversed on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala. 1978). `The element of "extreme indifference to human life," by definition, does not address itself to the life of the victim, but to human life generally.' People By And Through Russel v. District Court For Fourth Judicial District , 185 Colo. 78 , 521 P.2d 1254 , 1256 (1974)." See also McCormack v. State , 431 So.2d 1340 (Ala. 1983) (where this Court adopted the Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation).

2025See, e.g., Sheffield v. State, 87 So. 3d 607, 625-26 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (explaining that the doctrine of universal malice "is intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual"); Sockwell v. State, 675 So. 2d 4, 26 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Northington v. State, 413 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)); Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027, 1033 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Phelps v. State, 435 So. 2d 158 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), and Northington, 413 So. 2d 1169 ) (explaining that, because "the evidence in [this] case clear

2025See, e.g., Sheffield v. State, 87 So. 3d 607, 625-26 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (explaining that the doctrine of universal malice "is intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual"); Sockwell v. State, 675 So. 2d 4, 26 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Northington v. State, 413 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)); Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027, 1033 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Phelps v. State, 435 So. 2d 158 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), and Northington, 413 So. 2d 1169 ) (explaining that, because "the evidence in [this] case clear

2025See, e.g., Sheffield v. State, 87 So. 3d 607, 625-26 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (explaining that the doctrine of universal malice "is intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual"); Sockwell v. State, 675 So. 2d 4, 26 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Northington v. State, 413 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)); Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027, 1033 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Phelps v. State, 435 So. 2d 158 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), and Northington, 413 So. 2d 1169 ) (explaining that, because "the evidence in [this] case clear

2010Ex parte Simmons, supra; Ex parte McCormack, supra. When considered with the evidence in its entirety, the State’s arguments that Sheffield “did not have a specific intent to harm or injure any person,” but instead “intended to scare or send a message” and that a jury could have found that he acted recklessly with a depraved indifference to human life because he lacked knowledge of who, if anyone, was inside the residence when the fire was started” are not persuasive.

1991Ex parte Washington, 448 So.2d 404 (Ala. 1984); Napier v. State, 357 So.2d 1001 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala.1978).

1987Napier v. State , 357 So.2d 1001 , 1007 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977), reversed on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala. 1978). 'The element of "extreme indifference to human life" by definition, does not address itself to the life of the victim, but to human life generally.' People By and Through Russel v. District Court For Fourth Judicial District , 185 Colo. 78 , 521 P.2d 1254 , 1256 (1974)." The appellant's argument, if true, probably would have resulted in a different outcome in his trial and his representation might have fallen below an objective standard; thus, the appellant has met the requirement

1987Napier v. State , 357 So.2d 1001 , 1007 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977), reversed on other grounds, 357 So.2d 1011 (Ala. 1978). 'The element of "extreme indifference to human life" by definition, does not address itself to the life of the victim, but to human life generally.' People By and Through Russel v. District Court For Fourth Judicial District , 185 Colo. 78 , 521 P.2d 1254 , 1256 (1974)." The appellant's argument, if true, probably would have resulted in a different outcome in his trial and his representation might have fallen below an objective standard; thus, the appellant has met the requirement

1978And, if proven, was the conduct so reckless as to create a grave risk of death and cause the death of that person? . ." ( 329 N.Y.S.2d at 267 ) In Bowden , the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed a conviction of second degree murder where the death was caused by an overdose of heroin, and refused to apply the universal malice doctrine because there was no reasonable anticipation of death involved.