Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cherry v. Stategreen2 sentences2009The supreme court has held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released, and the “special needs of the parole process call for intensive supervision of the parolee making the warrant requirement impractical.” McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 678-679 , 42 S.W.3d 529, 534 (2001) (quoting Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 467 , 791 S.W.2d 354, 357 (1990)). 2009The supreme court has held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released, and the “special needs of the parole process call for intensive supervision of the parolee making the warrant requirement impractical.” McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 678-679 , 42 S.W.3d 529, 534 (2001) (quoting Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 467 , 791 S.W.2d 354, 357 (1990)). | 4 | 4 |
Lane v. Stategreen2 sentences2024We explained that waivers granting consent in advance to such searches “do not violate the Fourth Amendment because the special needs of the parole [probation] process call for intensive supervision of the parolee making the warrant requirement impractical and because parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy.” Lane, 2017 Ark. 34, at 3 , 513 S.W.3d at 233 (cleaned up).4 We hold that law enforcement need only have a reasonable suspicion that the probationer is residing in the place to be searched for officers to execute a warrantless search pursuant to a residence-search waiver. 2024We explained that waivers granting consent in advance to such searches “do not violate the Fourth Amendment because the special needs of the parole [probation] process call for intensive supervision of the parolee making the warrant requirement impractical and because parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy.” Lane, 2017 Ark. 34, at 3 , 513 S.W.3d at 233 (cleaned up).4 We hold that law enforcement need only have a reasonable suspicion that the probationer is residing in the place to be searched for officers to execute a warrantless search pursuant to a residence-search waiver. | 2 | 2 |
McFerrin v. Stategreen2 sentences2009The supreme court has held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released, and the “special needs of the parole process call for intensive supervision of the parolee making the warrant requirement impractical.” McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 678-679 , 42 S.W.3d 529, 534 (2001) (quoting Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 467 , 791 S.W.2d 354, 357 (1990)). 2009The supreme court has held that a parolee’s advance consent is valid because the parolee remains in the custody of the penal institution from which he is released, and the “special needs of the parole process call for intensive supervision of the parolee making the warrant requirement impractical.” McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 678-679 , 42 S.W.3d 529, 534 (2001) (quoting Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 467 , 791 S.W.2d 354, 357 (1990)). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Griffin v. Wisconsin
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Brummell
green
1 sentence2017As part of his “Conditions of Release” from the Arkansas Department of Correction, Lane consented to a warrantless search and seizure of his “person, place of residence, and motor vehicles.” In Cherry, we held that such consents-in-advance do not violate the Fourth Amendment because “[t]he special needs of the parole process call for intensive supervision of the parolee making the warrant requirement impractical” and because parolees have a “diminished expectation of privacy.” Id at 467, 731 S.W.2d at 357 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.