8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hamptongreen2 sentences2024Such a waiver by conduct can occur only after a court both warns the [party] that further disruptive conduct may result in the loss of the right to counsel and explains the implications of such a waiver.” State v. Hampton, 208 Ariz. 241, 244, ¶ 7 (2004) (citations omitted); accord Tammy M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 242 Ariz. 457, 461, ¶ 17 (App. 2017) (citing Hampton). 2017Thus, before the juvenile court could find Tammy had waived her right to counsel, Arizona law required that she be advised of “the dangers of self-representation, and tlie difficulties involved in defending oneself without formal legal training." Id. ¶ 15, quoting State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, ¶ 23 , 959 P.2d 1274, 1282 (1998). ¶17 In addition, although “persistent disruptive or dilatory conduct” may support a determination that the right to counsel has been waived, “[s]uch a waiver by conduct can occur only after a court both warns the [party] that further disruptive conduct may result in th | 2 | 4 |
Daniel Y. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2017Thus, before the juvenile court could find Tammy had waived her right to counsel, Arizona law required that she be advised of “the dangers of self-representation, and tlie difficulties involved in defending oneself without formal legal training." Id. ¶ 15, quoting State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, ¶ 23 , 959 P.2d 1274, 1282 (1998). ¶17 In addition, although “persistent disruptive or dilatory conduct” may support a determination that the right to counsel has been waived, “[s]uch a waiver by conduct can occur only after a court both warns the [party] that further disruptive conduct may result in th 2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda | 1 | 2 |
Tammy M. v. Department of Child Safetygreen1 sentence2024Such a waiver by conduct can occur only after a court both warns the [party] that further disruptive conduct may result in the loss of the right to counsel and explains the implications of such a waiver.” State v. Hampton, 208 Ariz. 241, 244, ¶ 7 (2004) (citations omitted); accord Tammy M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 242 Ariz. 457, 461, ¶ 17 (App. 2017) (citing Hampton). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Djerfgreen2 sentences2017Thus, before the juvenile court could find Tammy had waived her right to counsel, Arizona law required that she be advised of “the dangers of self-representation, and tlie difficulties involved in defending oneself without formal legal training." Id. ¶ 15, quoting State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, ¶ 23 , 959 P.2d 1274, 1282 (1998). ¶17 In addition, although “persistent disruptive or dilatory conduct” may support a determination that the right to counsel has been waived, “[s]uch a waiver by conduct can occur only after a court both warns the [party] that further disruptive conduct may result in th 2017Thus, before the juvenile court could find Tammy had waived her right to counsel, Arizona law required that she be advised of “the dangers of self-representation, and tlie difficulties involved in defending oneself without formal legal training." Id. ¶ 15, quoting State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, ¶ 23 , 959 P.2d 1274, 1282 (1998). ¶17 In addition, although “persistent disruptive or dilatory conduct” may support a determination that the right to counsel has been waived, “[s]uch a waiver by conduct can occur only after a court both warns the [party] that further disruptive conduct may result in th | 1 | 1 |
State v. Moodygreen1 sentence2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda | 1 | 1 |
King v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2004Sec., 206 Ariz. 257 , 260-61 ¶¶ 15-17, 77 P.3d 55, 58-59 (App.2003) (noting that a defendant must first be warned of the consequences of misconduct and the risks of self-representation before he can be deemed to have waived his right to counsel by his misconduct); King v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App.4th 929 , 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 585, 592 (2003) (concluding that implied waiver of counsel by conduct is possible once the defendant “has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he engages in dilatory tactics”). ¶ 8 Case law suggests a third method by which a defendant can lose his right to counsel 2004Sec., 206 Ariz. 257 , 260-61 ¶¶ 15-17, 77 P.3d 55, 58-59 (App.2003) (noting that a defendant must first be warned of the consequences of misconduct and the risks of self-representation before he can be deemed to have waived his right to counsel by his misconduct); King v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App.4th 929 , 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 585, 592 (2003) (concluding that implied waiver of counsel by conduct is possible once the defendant “has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he engages in dilatory tactics”). ¶ 8 Case law suggests a third method by which a defendant can lose his right to counsel | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Ronald J. Goldberg
green
2 sentences2015Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 13 Here, as early as August 2012, after Coven’s second privately retained attorney withdrew, the trial court informed him that if he did not retain new counsel, he would be representing himself. 2004Such a waiver by conduct can occur only after a court both warns the defendant that further disruptive conduct may result in the loss of the right to counsel and explains the implications of such a waiver. 3 Id. at 1100-01 ; Daniel Y. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. | 2 | 2004–2015 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1983They concede that the statute is "per se" in nature and creates no presumption; they argue that the admission of test results which may be scientifically inaccurate subjects a defendant to "conviction by machine" despite the fact that the test results do not necessarily indicate the true blood-alcohol level of the test subject. [3] The amici contend that allowing a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of test results which, according to the weight of scientific evidence, are subject to considerable inaccuracy, violates the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct 1983They concede that the statute is "per se" in nature and creates no presumption; they argue that the admission of test results which may be scientifically inaccurate subjects a defendant to "conviction by machine" despite the fact that the test results do not necessarily indicate the true blood-alcohol level of the test subject. [3] The amici contend that allowing a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of test results which, according to the weight of scientific evidence, are subject to considerable inaccuracy, violates the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct | 2 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Moody
green
1 sentence2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Henry
green
2 sentences2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda 2017Thus, where it appeal’s a party may have an unavoidable, recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex- ample, because he insists on an impermissible defense—a trial court must make “very clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict develops as a result,” he “will have to choose between his [presently assigned] lawyer or self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, ¶ 26 , 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concurring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206 Ariz. 257, ¶ 17 , 77 P.3d at 59 . ¶ 18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme court’s approval of the choice afforded in Henry , requiring a defenda | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.