implications analysis in Oregon

2024In that context, we have indicated that “courts should strive to demonstrate on the record that a defendant understands the implications of the waiver.” Meyrick, 313 Or at 133 n 9.

2015The court also noted that “[heading questions put to a defendant may be answered in the affirmative without actual understanding,” and stated that “courts should strive to demonstrate on the record that a defendant understands the implications of the waiver.” Id. at 133 n 9.

1992We emphasize, however, that a trial court’s failure to follow this suggestion does not require an automatic reversal of a defendant’s conviction. 10 See Mansfield v. Gladden, 249 Or 504, 507 , 439 P2d 611 (1968) (where defendant represents to trial court that he had been advised by his attorney concerning his rights and does not wish to be represented by counsel at trial, it may be inferred that he had knowledge of those things necessary to a “knowing” wavier of counsel). 11 The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1992We emphasize, however, that a trial court’s failure to follow this suggestion does not require an automatic reversal of a defendant’s conviction. 10 See Mansfield v. Gladden, 249 Or 504, 507 , 439 P2d 611 (1968) (where defendant represents to trial court that he had been advised by his attorney concerning his rights and does not wish to be represented by counsel at trial, it may be inferred that he had knowledge of those things necessary to a “knowing” wavier of counsel). 11 The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1989Additionally, "[w]e should not write dicta where we do not fully foresee the implications of our analysis or advice." Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or. 75, 97 , 619 P.2d 632 (1980) (Tanzer, J., specially concurring).

1989Additionally, "[w]e should not write dicta where we do not fully foresee the implications of our analysis or advice." Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or. 75, 97 , 619 P.2d 632 (1980) (Tanzer, J., specially concurring).

1981In Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, supra, 280 Or. at 651 , 575 P.2d 620 this court said: "* * * According to Thompson [ 277 Or. 299 , 560 P.2d 620 (1977)], the elimination of applied assumption of risk leaves only a defense based on some form of knowing consent or waiver expressed between the parties, or perhaps based on plaintiff's agreement to join in a sport or similar activity in which the particular risk is a known element of the activity when properly conducted. * * *" The case under consideration directly involves the question left open in Thompson and Hornbeck.

1981In Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, supra 280 Or at 651 , this court said: “ * * * According to Thompson [ 277 Or 299 , 560 P2d 620 (1977)], the elimination of applied assumption of risk leaves only a defense based on some form of knowing consent or waiver expressed between the parties, or perhaps based on plaintiffs agreement to join in a sport or similar activity in which the particular risk is a known element of the activity when properly conducted. * * *” The case under consideration directly involves the question left open in Thompson and Hornbeck .

1981In Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, supra, 280 Or. at 651 , 575 P.2d 620 this court said: "* * * According to Thompson [ 277 Or. 299 , 560 P.2d 620 (1977)], the elimination of applied assumption of risk leaves only a defense based on some form of knowing consent or waiver expressed between the parties, or perhaps based on plaintiff's agreement to join in a sport or similar activity in which the particular risk is a known element of the activity when properly conducted. * * *" The case under consideration directly involves the question left open in Thompson and Hornbeck.

1981We specifically left for the future the implications of our analysis of ORS 18.475(2) for situations where a "plaintiff has agreed to join in an activity (such as a sporting event) in which the particular hazard is a known element of the activity even when properly conducted, i.e., when dangerous conduct that would be `fault' in other contexts is not fault at all." Thompson v. Weaver, supra 277 at 305, 560 P.2d 620 .

1981In Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, supra 280 Or at 651 , this court said: “ * * * According to Thompson [ 277 Or 299 , 560 P2d 620 (1977)], the elimination of applied assumption of risk leaves only a defense based on some form of knowing consent or waiver expressed between the parties, or perhaps based on plaintiffs agreement to join in a sport or similar activity in which the particular risk is a known element of the activity when properly conducted. * * *” The case under consideration directly involves the question left open in Thompson and Hornbeck .