implications waiver in Ohio

2000In his tenth proposition of law, Green argues that his jury trial waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court did not explain “all of the implications of that waiver including the limited right to appeal erroneous rulings by the three-judge panel.” However, a “trial court is not required to inform the defendant of all the possible implications of waiver [of trial by jury].” State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 20 , 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1135 , citing State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22 , 559 N.E.2d 464 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2000In his tenth proposition of law, Green argues that his jury trial waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court did not explain “all of the implications of that waiver including the limited right to appeal erroneous rulings by the three-judge panel.” However, a “trial court is not required to inform the defendant of all the possible implications of waiver [of trial by jury].” State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 20 , 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1135 , citing State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22 , 30 559 N.E.2d 464 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2000In his tenth proposition of law, Green argues that his jury trial waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court did not explain “all of the implications of that waiver including the limited right to appeal erroneous rulings by the three-judge panel.” However, a “trial court is not required to inform the defendant of all the possible implications of waiver [of trial by jury].” State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 20 , 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1135 , citing State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22 , 559 N.E.2d 464 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2000In his tenth proposition of law, Green argues that his jury trial waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court did not explain “all of the implications of that waiver including the limited right to appeal erroneous rulings by the three-judge panel.” However, a “trial court is not required to inform the defendant of all the possible implications of waiver [of trial by jury].” State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 20 , 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1135 , citing State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22 , 30 559 N.E.2d 464 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

1999Baston cites this court’s decision in State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754, 759 , which reaffirmed that “this court indulges ! * * * in the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ” Id., quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151 , 44 O.O.2d 132, 136 , 239 N.E.2d 65, 70 .

1999Baston cites this court’s decision in State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754, 759 , which reaffirmed that “this court indulges ! * * * in the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ” Id., quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151 , 44 O.O.2d 132, 136 , 239 N.E.2d 65, 70 .

2001The implications of this analysis are an affront to law enforcement and could, in future cases, undermine the usefulness of the procedural safeguards established by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , and Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 .

2001The implications of this analysis are an affront to law enforcement and could, in future cases, undermine the usefulness of the procedural safeguards established by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , and Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 .

2001The implications of this analysis are an affront to law enforcement and could, in future cases, undermine the usefulness of the procedural safeguards established by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , and Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 .

2001The implications of this analysis are an affront to law enforcement and could, in future cases, undermine the usefulness of the procedural safeguards established by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , and Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 .

2001The implications of this analysis are an affront to law enforcement and could, in future cases, undermine the usefulness of the procedural safeguards established by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , and Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 .

2001The implications of this analysis are an affront to law enforcement and could, in future cases, undermine the usefulness of the procedural safeguards established by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , and Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 .

2001The implications of this analysis are an affront to law enforcement and could, in future cases, undermine the usefulness of the procedural safeguards established by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , and Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 .

2001The implications of this analysis are an affront to law enforcement and could, in future cases, undermine the usefulness of the procedural safeguards established by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , and Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 .

2000In his tenth proposition of law, Green argues that his jury trial waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court did not explain “all of the implications of that waiver including the limited right to appeal erroneous rulings by the three-judge panel.” However, a “trial court is not required to inform the defendant of all the possible implications of waiver [of trial by jury].” State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 20 , 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1135 , citing State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22 , 30 559 N.E.2d 464 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2000In his tenth proposition of law, Green argues that his jury trial waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court did not explain “all of the implications of that waiver including the limited right to appeal erroneous rulings by the three-judge panel.” However, a “trial court is not required to inform the defendant of all the possible implications of waiver [of trial by jury].” State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 20 , 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1135 , citing State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22 , 30 559 N.E.2d 464 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

1999Baston cites this court’s decision in State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754, 759 , which reaffirmed that “this court indulges ! * * * in the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ” Id., quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151 , 44 O.O.2d 132, 136 , 239 N.E.2d 65, 70 .

1999Baston cites this court’s decision in State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754, 759 , which reaffirmed that “this court indulges ! * * * in the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ” Id., quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151 , 44 O.O.2d 132, 136 , 239 N.E.2d 65, 70 .

2017Koons, supra, at ¶46 . {¶18} The need for the discussion on the record is readily apparent.

2017The record in this case supports the trial court’s determination that Mother’s refusal to answer was justified. {¶37} Our decision is further supported by the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Kirk, 72 Ohio St.3d 564 , 651 N.E.2d 981 (1995).

2017The record in this case supports the trial court’s determination that Mother’s refusal to answer was justified. {¶37} Our decision is further supported by the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Kirk, 72 Ohio St.3d 564 , 651 N.E.2d 981 (1995).

2008The Shindler court held that, in order to be entitled to a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, a defendant "must state the motion's legal and factual bases with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the issues to be decided." Id. at syllabus. {¶ 11} Once a defendant satisfies his initial burden and thereby places the prosecutor and the court on sufficient notice of the issues to be determined at the suppression hearing, the burden of proof shifts to the state.

2008Initially, we observe that Crim.R. 47 provides that a motion in a criminal proceeding "shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought." The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the implications of this rule on motions to suppress evidence in driving under the influence cases in State v. Shindler , 70 Ohio St.3d 54 , 1994-Ohio-452 .

2008Initially, we observe that Crim.R. 47 provides that a motion in a criminal proceeding "shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought." The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the implications of this rule on motions to suppress evidence in driving under the influence cases in State v. Shindler , 70 Ohio St.3d 54 , 1994-Ohio-452 .