8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Balmer v. Hawkeye Steelgreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1102, n.7 (Alaska 2000) ("Constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action, but merely satisfies the discharge element in a wrongful discharge claim."); Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1030 (Cal. 1994) ("Even after establishing constructive discharge, an employee must independently prove a breach of contract or tort in connection with employment termination in order to obtain damages for wrongful discharge."); Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Iowa 2000) ("[C]onstructive discharge is actionable only when | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.green1 sentence2018See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1102, n.7 (Alaska 2000) ("Constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action, but merely satisfies the discharge element in a wrongful discharge claim."); Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1030 (Cal. 1994) ("Even after establishing constructive discharge, an employee must independently prove a breach of contract or tort in connection with employment termination in order to obtain damages for wrongful discharge."); Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Iowa 2000) ("[C]onstructive discharge is actionable only when | 1 | 1 |
City of Fairbanks v. Ricegreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1102, n.7 (Alaska 2000) ("Constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action, but merely satisfies the discharge element in a wrongful discharge claim."); Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1030 (Cal. 1994) ("Even after establishing constructive discharge, an employee must independently prove a breach of contract or tort in connection with employment termination in order to obtain damages for wrongful discharge."); Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Iowa 2000) ("[C]onstructive discharge is actionable only when | 1 | 1 |
National Broker Associates, Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Nat'l Broker Assocs., Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 211 Ariz. 210, 216 , 119 P.3d 477, 483 (App. 2005) (“We will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal.”). 4 CHANDLER v. RANCHO Decision of the Court specified period of time or otherwise restricted the right of either party to terminate the employment relationship, and the termination was a breach of that contract; (2) the termination was in violation of an Arizona statute; or (3) the termination was in retaliation for the refusal to violate the Arizona Constitution or an Arizona statute. 2015See Nat'l Broker Assocs., Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 211 Ariz. 210, 216 , 119 P.3d 477, 483 (App. 2005) (“We will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal.”). 4 CHANDLER v. RANCHO Decision of the Court specified period of time or otherwise restricted the right of either party to terminate the employment relationship, and the termination was a breach of that contract; (2) the termination was in violation of an Arizona statute; or (3) the termination was in retaliation for the refusal to violate the Arizona Constitution or an Arizona statute. | 1 | 1 |
MacKey v. Spanglergreen2 sentences2002Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 197, 427 P.2d 335, 337 (1967); Mackey v. Spangler, 81 Ariz. 113, 115 , 301 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1956). . 2002Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 197, 427 P.2d 335, 337 (1967); Mackey v. Spangler, 81 Ariz. 113, 115 , 301 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1956). . | 1 | 1 |
Veach v. City of Phoenixgreen2 sentences2002Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 197, 427 P.2d 335, 337 (1967); Mackey v. Spangler, 81 Ariz. 113, 115 , 301 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1956). . 2002Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 197, 427 P.2d 335, 337 (1967); Mackey v. Spangler, 81 Ariz. 113, 115 , 301 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1956). . | 1 | 1 |
Shoen v. Shoengreen2 sentences2001Shoen v. Shoen, 191 Ariz. 64, 65 , 952 P.2d 302, 303 (App.1997). 2001Shoen v. Shoen, 191 Ariz. 64, 65 , 952 P.2d 302, 303 (App.1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cronin v. Sheldon
green
1 sentence2023Comm’n, 254 Ariz. 157 , 175 ¶ 36 (2022) (construing workers’ compensation rights for accidents and injuries as those recognized when the Arizona Constitution was adopted); Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531 , 539 ¶ 37 (1999) (rejecting anti-abrogation clause protection for a wrongful discharge claim that “neither existed in 1912 when statehood was achieved, nor [evolved] from common law antecedents”); see also A.R.S. § 1-201 (adopting the common law “only so far as it is . . . not repugnant to or inconsistent with the . . . laws of this state”). ¶39 Hamman did not base its holding in any establi | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Najar v. State
green
1 sentence2018A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i)–(ii). ¶12 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802–04 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that, if an employee establishes a prima facie case for employment discrimination based on race under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s termination; if the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer’s proffered explanation was pretextual. ¶13 This court has applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-sh | 1 | 2018–2018 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
1 sentence2018A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i)–(ii). ¶12 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802–04 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that, if an employee establishes a prima facie case for employment discrimination based on race under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s termination; if the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer’s proffered explanation was pretextual. ¶13 This court has applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-sh | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Guertin v. Pinal County
green
2 sentences2004This court found that the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim was “squarely within the jurisdiction of the county merit system” and that his exclusive remedy was to appeal the decision in accordance with the Administrative Review Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-901 through 12-914. 178 Ariz. at 612 , 875 P.2d at 845 . 2004This court found that the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim was “squarely within the jurisdiction of the county merit system” and that his exclusive remedy was to appeal the decision in accordance with the Administrative Review Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-901 through 12-914. 178 Ariz. at 612 , 875 P.2d at 845 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty
green
1 sentence1988More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bernstein v. Aetna Life and Casualty, 843 F.2d 359 (9th Cir.1988), in a summary judgment context, ruled that the Arizona Civil Rights Act did not preempt the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.