wrongful discharge claim in West Virginia

2000We previously explained the application of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of employment discharge in Syllabus point 2 of Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W.Va. 278 , 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994): The prevailing rule in distinguishing a wrongful discharge claim from an outrage claim is this: when the employee’s distress results from the fact of his discharge — e.g., the embarrassment and financial loss stemming from the plaintiffs firing — rather than from any improper conduct on the part of the employer in effecting the discharge, then no claim

2000We previously explained the application of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of employment discharge in Syllabus point 2 of Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W.Va. 278 , 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994): The prevailing rule in distinguishing a wrongful discharge claim from an outrage claim is this: when the employee’s distress results from the fact of his discharge — e.g., the embarrassment and financial loss stemming from the plaintiffs firing — rather than from any improper conduct on the part of the employer in effecting the discharge, then no claim

2016Ctr., Inc., 203 W.Va. 111 , 506 S.E.2d 554 (1997), this Court stated: [T]he prevailing rule in distinguishing a wrongful discharge claim from an outrage claim is this: when the employee’s distress results from the fact of his discharge-e.g., the embarrassment and financial loss stemming from the plaintiff’s firing-rather than from any improper conduct on the part of the employer in effecting the discharge, then no claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can attach.

2016Ctr., Inc., 203 W.Va. 111 , 506 S.E.2d 554 (1997), this Court stated: [T]he prevailing rule in distinguishing a wrongful discharge claim from an outrage claim is this: when the employee’s distress results from the fact of his discharge-e.g., the embarrassment and financial loss stemming from the plaintiff’s firing-rather than from any improper conduct on the part of the employer in effecting the discharge, then no claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can attach.

2023Va. 116 , 246 S.E.2d 270 .

2023Pursuant to our holding in Harless, an employee may assert a wrongful discharge claim against his employer, despite the customary at-will employment doctrine, if the employee proves that “the employer’s motivation for the discharge is to contravene some substantial public policy princip[le].” Syl., in part, id., 162 W.

2019West Virginia’s criminal statutes reflect myriad expressions of the public policy to encourage the reporting of crimes and correction of activities harmful to our citizenry.2 In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981), the Illinois Supreme Court addressed this very issue and expanded its common law to protect 1 Margaret C.

1998The Code section provides: “No employer shall discriminate in any manner against any of his present or former employees because of such present or former employee’s receipt of or attempt to receive benefits under this chapter [The Workers’ Compensation Act].” In Powell v. Wyoming Cablevision, Inc., 184 W.Va. 700 , 403 S.E.2d 717 (1991), we discussed the proof required to establish a prima facie case for wrongful discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim.

1998The Code section provides: “No employer shall discriminate in any manner against any of his present or former employees because of such present or former employee’s receipt of or attempt to receive benefits under this chapter [The Workers’ Compensation Act].” In Powell v. Wyoming Cablevision, Inc., 184 W.Va. 700 , 403 S.E.2d 717 (1991), we discussed the proof required to establish a prima facie case for wrongful discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim.

1997As previously stated `[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.' Syl. pt. 4, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189 , 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

1997As previously stated `[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.' Syl. pt. 4, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189 , 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).