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64 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.red2 sentences2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app 2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app | 4 | 11 |
Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp.red2 sentences2007See Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus (“Absent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim”), overruled by Painter; Provens v. Stark Cty. 2007See Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus (“Absent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim”), overruled by Painter; Provens v. Stark Cty. | 1 | 17 |
Painter v. Graleygreen2 sentences2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app 2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app | 1 | 12 |
Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.green2 sentences2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app 2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app | 1 | 8 |
Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs. (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2025However, “an exception to the traditional doctrine of employment-at-will should be recognized only where the public policy alleged to have been violated is of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Painter at 384 , citing Greeley at 234 . {¶ 28} “To be successful in a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) Clarity - That clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in common law; (2) Jeopardy – That dismissing employees under these circumstances woul 2021Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 157 Ohio St.3d 413 , 2019-Ohio-3308 , 137 N.E.3d 1110 , ¶ 12. {¶ 10} The clarity and jeopardy elements are questions of law for the court to decide, and the elements of causation and justification are questions of fact to be determined by the fact-finder. | 1 | 3 |
Trimbach v. Bath Twp.green1 sentence2025However, “an exception to the traditional doctrine of employment-at-will should be recognized only where the public policy alleged to have been violated is of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Painter at 384 , citing Greeley at 234 . {¶ 28} “To be successful in a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) Clarity - That clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in common law; (2) Jeopardy – That dismissing employees under these circumstances woul | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Mid-Ohio Emergency Serv L.L.C., Unpublished Decision (9-30-2004)green1 sentence2023See Mitchell v. Mid-Ohio Emergency Services, L.L.C., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-981, 2004-Ohio-5264, fn. 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Fitch v. U.S. Foodservice Corp., Ca2007-03-068 (1-28-2008)green1 sentence2022“Many appellate districts have * * * held that a wrongful-discharge claim based on a violation of R.C. 4112.02 must fail if the 17 plaintiff does not establish a violation of R.C. 4112.02.” Bicudo v. Lexford Properties, Inc., 157 Ohio App.3d 509 , 2004-Ohio-3202 , 812 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 93 (7th Dist.) (cases cited); Fitch v. U.S. Foodservice Corp., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-03-068, 2008-Ohio-282, ¶ 22 (“based on the evidence presented [in support of his statutory claims], Fitch has failed to raise any issue of material fact to prove his dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public po | 1 | 1 |
Bicudo v. Lexford Properties, Inc.green2 sentences2022“Many appellate districts have * * * held that a wrongful-discharge claim based on a violation of R.C. 4112.02 must fail if the 17 plaintiff does not establish a violation of R.C. 4112.02.” Bicudo v. Lexford Properties, Inc., 157 Ohio App.3d 509 , 2004-Ohio-3202 , 812 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 93 (7th Dist.) (cases cited); Fitch v. U.S. Foodservice Corp., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-03-068, 2008-Ohio-282, ¶ 22 (“based on the evidence presented [in support of his statutory claims], Fitch has failed to raise any issue of material fact to prove his dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public po 2022“Many appellate districts have * * * held that a wrongful-discharge claim based on a violation of R.C. 4112.02 must fail if the 17 plaintiff does not establish a violation of R.C. 4112.02.” Bicudo v. Lexford Properties, Inc., 157 Ohio App.3d 509 , 2004-Ohio-3202 , 812 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 93 (7th Dist.) (cases cited); Fitch v. U.S. Foodservice Corp., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-03-068, 2008-Ohio-282, ¶ 22 (“based on the evidence presented [in support of his statutory claims], Fitch has failed to raise any issue of material fact to prove his dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public po | 1 | 1 |
Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc.green2 sentences2022In one case, we stated that Dohme I had been “reversed” (rather than vacated) and rejected an employee’s claim because the cited Ohio Building Codes did not establish a “clear public policy.” McGlothen v. City of Fairborn, 2019-Ohio-141 , 127 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 19-20 (2d Dist.). {¶ 52} In the second case, we quoted Dohme I only for the proposition that “ ‘to prevail on his claim, [the employee] must carry his burden to prove the remaining elements of a wrongful-discharge claim.’ ” Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 186 Ohio App.3d 757 , 2010-Ohio-830 , 930 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 40 (2d Dist.), quoting Dohme I 2022In one case, we stated that Dohme I had been “reversed” (rather than vacated) and rejected an employee’s claim because the cited Ohio Building Codes did not establish a “clear public policy.” McGlothen v. City of Fairborn, 2019-Ohio-141 , 127 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 19-20 (2d Dist.). {¶ 52} In the second case, we quoted Dohme I only for the proposition that “ ‘to prevail on his claim, [the employee] must carry his burden to prove the remaining elements of a wrongful-discharge claim.’ ” Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 186 Ohio App.3d 757 , 2010-Ohio-830 , 930 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 40 (2d Dist.), quoting Dohme I | 1 | 1 |
McGlothen v. City of Fairborngreen2 sentences2022In one case, we stated that Dohme I had been “reversed” (rather than vacated) and rejected an employee’s claim because the cited Ohio Building Codes did not establish a “clear public policy.” McGlothen v. City of Fairborn, 2019-Ohio-141 , 127 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 19-20 (2d Dist.). {¶ 52} In the second case, we quoted Dohme I only for the proposition that “ ‘to prevail on his claim, [the employee] must carry his burden to prove the remaining elements of a wrongful-discharge claim.’ ” Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 186 Ohio App.3d 757 , 2010-Ohio-830 , 930 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 40 (2d Dist.), quoting Dohme I 2022In one case, we stated that Dohme I had been “reversed” (rather than vacated) and rejected an employee’s claim because the cited Ohio Building Codes did not establish a “clear public policy.” McGlothen v. City of Fairborn, 2019-Ohio-141 , 127 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 19-20 (2d Dist.). {¶ 52} In the second case, we quoted Dohme I only for the proposition that “ ‘to prevail on his claim, [the employee] must carry his burden to prove the remaining elements of a wrongful-discharge claim.’ ” Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 186 Ohio App.3d 757 , 2010-Ohio-830 , 930 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 40 (2d Dist.), quoting Dohme I | 1 | 1 |
| Gessner v. City of Uniongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hoops v. United Telephone Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Vargo-Adams v. United States Postal Servicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp.red2 sentences2007See Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus (“Absent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim”), overruled by Painter; Provens v. Stark Cty. 2007See Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus (“Absent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim”), overruled by Painter; Provens v. Stark Cty. | 1 | 17 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Collins v. Rizkana
green
2 sentences2007Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 70 , 652 N.E.2d 653 . {¶ 17} Three years after the Kulch decision, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 . 2007Id. {¶ 25} Like Collins, Kulch presented a case in which there were multiple sources indicating a public policy against the type of wrongful termination alleged. | 4 | 1997–2007 |
Dohme v. Eurand America, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022In one case, we stated that Dohme I had been “reversed” (rather than vacated) and rejected an employee’s claim because the cited Ohio Building Codes did not establish a “clear public policy.” McGlothen v. City of Fairborn, 2019-Ohio-141 , 127 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 19-20 (2d Dist.). {¶ 52} In the second case, we quoted Dohme I only for the proposition that “ ‘to prevail on his claim, [the employee] must carry his burden to prove the remaining elements of a wrongful-discharge claim.’ ” Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 186 Ohio App.3d 757 , 2010-Ohio-830 , 930 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 40 (2d Dist.), quoting Dohme I 2022In one case, we stated that Dohme I had been “reversed” (rather than vacated) and rejected an employee’s claim because the cited Ohio Building Codes did not establish a “clear public policy.” McGlothen v. City of Fairborn, 2019-Ohio-141 , 127 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 19-20 (2d Dist.). {¶ 52} In the second case, we quoted Dohme I only for the proposition that “ ‘to prevail on his claim, [the employee] must carry his burden to prove the remaining elements of a wrongful-discharge claim.’ ” Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 186 Ohio App.3d 757 , 2010-Ohio-830 , 930 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 40 (2d Dist.), quoting Dohme I | 2 | 2010–2022 |
Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022“Many appellate districts have * * * held that a wrongful-discharge claim based on a violation of R.C. 4112.02 must fail if the 17 plaintiff does not establish a violation of R.C. 4112.02.” Bicudo v. Lexford Properties, Inc., 157 Ohio App.3d 509 , 2004-Ohio-3202 , 812 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 93 (7th Dist.) (cases cited); Fitch v. U.S. Foodservice Corp., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-03-068, 2008-Ohio-282, ¶ 22 (“based on the evidence presented [in support of his statutory claims], Fitch has failed to raise any issue of material fact to prove his dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public po 2022“Many appellate districts have * * * held that a wrongful-discharge claim based on a violation of R.C. 4112.02 must fail if the 17 plaintiff does not establish a violation of R.C. 4112.02.” Bicudo v. Lexford Properties, Inc., 157 Ohio App.3d 509 , 2004-Ohio-3202 , 812 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 93 (7th Dist.) (cases cited); Fitch v. U.S. Foodservice Corp., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-03-068, 2008-Ohio-282, ¶ 22 (“based on the evidence presented [in support of his statutory claims], Fitch has failed to raise any issue of material fact to prove his dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public po | 2 | 2019–2022 |
Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts
green
2 sentences2018Chapter 4112 “adequately protects the state’s policy against age discrimination in employment through the remedies it offers to aggrieved employees”); Wiles, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 , at ¶ 14-22 (refusing to recognize a common-law claim for wrongful discharge for violation of the public policy manifested in the Family and Medical Leave Act, concluding that “statutory remedies provide an effectivevehicle for vindicating the statute’s policy, obviating recognition of a wrongful discharge claim based on the same statute”). {¶32} Because Shingler did not satisfy the jeo 2018Chapter 4112 “adequately protects the state’s policy against age discrimination in employment through the remedies it offers to aggrieved employees”); Wiles, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 , at ¶ 14-22 (refusing to recognize a common-law claim for wrongful discharge for violation of the public policy manifested in the Family and Medical Leave Act, concluding that “statutory remedies provide an effectivevehicle for vindicating the statute’s policy, obviating recognition of a wrongful discharge claim based on the same statute”). {¶32} Because Shingler did not satisfy the jeo | 2 | 2007–2018 |
Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts
green
2 sentences2018Chapter 4112 “adequately protects the state’s policy against age discrimination in employment through the remedies it offers to aggrieved employees”); Wiles, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 , at ¶ 14-22 (refusing to recognize a common-law claim for wrongful discharge for violation of the public policy manifested in the Family and Medical Leave Act, concluding that “statutory remedies provide an effectivevehicle for vindicating the statute’s policy, obviating recognition of a wrongful discharge claim based on the same statute”). {¶32} Because Shingler did not satisfy the jeo 2007Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 70 , 652 N.E.2d 653 . {¶ 17} Three years after the Kulch decision, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 . | 2 | 2007–2018 |
Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School District
green
2 sentences2012In relevant part, Bickers alleged that she had been wrongfully terminated from Western & Southern in violation of the state’s public policy as expressed in the 1 Throughout the opinion, we refer to “common-law public policy wrongful discharge claims.” We use this term as a short-hand for a specific type of common-law wrongful discharge claims; to wit: a wrongful discharge claim in violation of the public policy underlying R.C. 4123.90, protecting employees from retaliation for pursuing workers’ compensation benefits. -5- Case No. 2-11-25 workers compensation statutes, citing Coolidge v. Riverd 2007He instead referred to Todd’s case as a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, citing cases including Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio St.3d 141 , 2003-Ohio-5357 , 797 N.E.2d 61 , syllabus (“An employee who is receiving temporary total disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56 may not be discharged solely on the basis of absenteeism or inability to work, when the absence or inability to work is directly related to an allowed condition”) and advising that a four-year statute of limitations applied. | 2 | 2007–2012 |
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Id. {¶ 33} In contrast, the Workers’ Compensation Act plainly provides limited, exclusive remedies. 2011Id. {¶ 33} In contrast, the Workers’ Compensation Act plainly provides limited, exclusive remedies. | 2 | 1997–2011 |
Pytlinski v. Brocar Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003She further asserts that, in Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc. , 94 Ohio St.3d 77 , 760 N.E.2d 385 , 2002-Ohio-66 , the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed its holdings in Kulch and Greeley, and that under Greeley and its progeny she is entitled to bring both a statutory claim under R.C. 4112 and a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy tort claim, based on violations of that statute. 2003She further asserts that, in Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc. , 94 Ohio St.3d 77 , 760 N.E.2d 385 , 2002-Ohio-66 , the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed its holdings in Kulch and Greeley, and that under Greeley and its progeny she is entitled to bring both a statutory claim under R.C. 4112 and a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy tort claim, based on violations of that statute. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 77 , 2002-Ohio-66 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 2003She further asserts that, in Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc. , 94 Ohio St.3d 77 , 760 N.E.2d 385 , 2002-Ohio-66 , the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed its holdings in Kulch and Greeley, and that under Greeley and its progeny she is entitled to bring both a statutory claim under R.C. 4112 and a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy tort claim, based on violations of that statute. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
Boyd v. Winton Hills Medical & Health Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005See, e.g., Boyd v. Winton Hills Med. & Health Ctr., Inc. (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 150 , 727 N.E.2d 137 ; Balog v. Matteo Aluminum, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 82090, 2003-Ohio-4937 , 2003 WL 22145842 . {¶ 29} Schramm’s statutory claim under R.C. 4123.90 and her wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy set forth in R.C. 4123.90 are distinct claims that must be addressed separately. 2005See, e.g., Boyd v. Winton Hills Med. & Health Ctr., Inc. (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 150 , 727 N.E.2d 137 ; Balog v. Matteo Aluminum, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 82090, 2003-Ohio-4937 , 2003 WL 22145842 . {¶ 29} Schramm’s statutory claim under R.C. 4123.90 and her wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy set forth in R.C. 4123.90 are distinct claims that must be addressed separately. | 2 | 2004–2005 |
Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 151 , 1997-Ohio-219 . 2003Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 151 , 1997-Ohio-219 . | 2 | 2003–2005 |
House v. Iacovelli (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2025“The clarity and jeopardy elements are questions of law for the court to decide, and the elements of causation and justification are questions of fact to be determined by the fact- finder.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 10, citing House v. Iacovelli, 2020-Ohio-435, ¶ 12 . {¶ 29} Logan’s wrongful termination claim was grounded in common law tort. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Rowe v. Hoist & Crane Serv. Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024We expressly stated in Rowe, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110921, 2022-Ohio-3130, at ¶ 30 , that R.C. 4101.11 and 4101.12, taken together, establish that there is a clear public policy in Ohio favoring workplace safety. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bear v. Geetronics, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Cuyahoga Nos. 64394, 64424, and 64883, 1993 Ohio App.LEXIS 5218, * 20-21 (Oct. 28, 1993), citing Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 639, 648 , 633 N.E.2d 551 (8th Dist.1993), Bear v. Geetronics, Inc., 83 Ohio App.3d 163 , 614 N.E.2d 803 (12th Dist.1992); Ungrady v. Burns Internatl. 2023Cuyahoga Nos. 64394, 64424, and 64883, 1993 Ohio App.LEXIS 5218, * 20-21 (Oct. 28, 1993), citing Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 639, 648 , 633 N.E.2d 551 (8th Dist.1993), Bear v. Geetronics, Inc., 83 Ohio App.3d 163 , 614 N.E.2d 803 (12th Dist.1992); Ungrady v. Burns Internatl. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Cuyahoga Nos. 64394, 64424, and 64883, 1993 Ohio App.LEXIS 5218, * 20-21 (Oct. 28, 1993), citing Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 639, 648 , 633 N.E.2d 551 (8th Dist.1993), Bear v. Geetronics, Inc., 83 Ohio App.3d 163 , 614 N.E.2d 803 (12th Dist.1992); Ungrady v. Burns Internatl. 2023Cuyahoga Nos. 64394, 64424, and 64883, 1993 Ohio App.LEXIS 5218, * 20-21 (Oct. 28, 1993), citing Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 639, 648 , 633 N.E.2d 551 (8th Dist.1993), Bear v. Geetronics, Inc., 83 Ohio App.3d 163 , 614 N.E.2d 803 (12th Dist.1992); Ungrady v. Burns Internatl. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Shovelin v. CENTRAL NM ELEC. CO-OP.
green
2 sentences2019Co-op, Inc. , 115 N.M. 293 , 850 P.2d 996 , 1006 (1993). {¶ 17} A wrongful-discharge claim protects employees only when the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action expressed in statutory enactments, administrative rules, et cetera. 2019Co-op, Inc. , 115 N.M. 293 , 850 P.2d 996 , 1006 (1993). {¶ 17} A wrongful-discharge claim protects employees only when the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action expressed in statutory enactments, administrative rules, et cetera. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Durgan v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services
green
2 sentences2017Id., citing Durgan, 110 Ohio App.3d at 549 , 674 N.E.2d 1208 . {¶31} Reid’s subpoena requests for evidence to show that MetroHealth had a motive to falsely allege that his work was incompetent to conceal financial improprieties, and for evidence to impugn the credibility of the coworkers who complained about him, are nothing more than an improper attempt to convert his unemployment compensation claim to a wrongful discharge claim. 2017Id., citing Durgan, 110 Ohio App.3d at 549 , 674 N.E.2d 1208 . {¶31} Reid’s subpoena requests for evidence to show that MetroHealth had a motive to falsely allege that his work was incompetent to conceal financial improprieties, and for evidence to impugn the credibility of the coworkers who complained about him, are nothing more than an improper attempt to convert his unemployment compensation claim to a wrongful discharge claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Wilson v. Matlack, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2017Id., citing Durgan, 110 Ohio App.3d at 549 , 674 N.E.2d 1208 . {¶31} Reid’s subpoena requests for evidence to show that MetroHealth had a motive to falsely allege that his work was incompetent to conceal financial improprieties, and for evidence to impugn the credibility of the coworkers who complained about him, are nothing more than an improper attempt to convert his unemployment compensation claim to a wrongful discharge claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Bradley v. Dollar Gen.
green
1 sentence2017Thus, the issue before this Court is whether the notice of voluntary dismissal as to the wrongful discharge claim, which undisputedly is the first dismissal filed of that particular claim, dissolved the summary judgment entered on that claim or rendered it a final, appealable order. {¶ 17} In Bradley v. Dollar General, 975 N.E.2d 515 , 2012-Ohio-3700 (5th Dist. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Wright v. Mar-Bal, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Nagel v. Horner green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Celsete v. Wiseco Piston, Unpublished Decision (12-23-2005) green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Anderson v. Lorain County Title Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Maracz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., Unpublished Decision (12-16-2004) green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Doody v. Centerior Energy Corp. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Simonelli v. Anderson Concrete Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Sidenstricker v. Miller Pavement Maintenance, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Contreras v. Ferro Corp. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Vitatoe v. Lawrence Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Brunecz v. Houdaille Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Berge v. Columbus Community Cable Access green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Pflanz v. City of Cincinnati green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Kent v. Chester Labs, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Barlowe v. Aaaa International Driving, Unpublished Decision (10-24-2003) green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Cochran v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Ferraro v. B.F. Goodrich Company green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Temple v. Wean United, Inc. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Diefenthaler v. Diefenthaler neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.