61 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.green2 sentences2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app 2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app | 4 | 11 |
Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp.red2 sentences2012In Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 62 Ohio St.3d 541, 546 , 584 N.E.2d 729 (1992), the Court expressly stated that absent statutory authority, there is no common law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim. 2012In Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 62 Ohio St.3d 541, 546 , 584 N.E.2d 729 (1992), the Court expressly stated that absent statutory authority, there is no common law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim. | 1 | 17 |
Painter v. Graleygreen2 sentences2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app 2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app | 1 | 12 |
Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.green2 sentences2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app 2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app | 1 | 8 |
Boyd v. Winton Hills Medical & Health Center, Inc.green2 sentences2005See, e.g., Boyd v. Winton Hills Med. & Health Ctr., Inc. (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 150 , 727 N.E.2d 137 ; Balog v. Matteo Aluminum, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 82090, 2003-Ohio-4937 , 2003 WL 22145842 . {¶ 29} Schramm’s statutory claim under R.C. 4123.90 and her wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy set forth in R.C. 4123.90 are distinct claims that must be addressed separately. 2005See, e.g., Boyd v. Winton Hills Med. & Health Ctr., Inc. (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 150 , 727 N.E.2d 137 ; Balog v. Matteo Aluminum, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 82090, 2003-Ohio-4937 , 2003 WL 22145842 . {¶ 29} Schramm’s statutory claim under R.C. 4123.90 and her wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy set forth in R.C. 4123.90 are distinct claims that must be addressed separately. | 1 | 2 |
Trimbach v. Bath Twp.green1 sentence2025However, “an exception to the traditional doctrine of employment-at-will should be recognized only where the public policy alleged to have been violated is of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Painter at 384 , citing Greeley at 234 . {¶ 28} “To be successful in a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) Clarity - That clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in common law; (2) Jeopardy – That dismissing employees under these circumstances woul | 1 | 1 |
Fitch v. U.S. Foodservice Corp., Ca2007-03-068 (1-28-2008)green1 sentence2022Butler No. CA2007-03-068, 2008-Ohio-282, ¶ 22 (“based on the evidence presented [in support of his statutory claims], Fitch has failed to raise any issue of material fact to prove his dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy, the causation element; and therefore, his [public policy] argument is without merit”). {¶58} The plaintiffs further argue that Natural Essentials’ “termination of Ms. Jones in retaliation for her pursuing a workers’ compensation claim violates Ohio public policy embodied in R.C. §4123.90.” Appellants’ brief at 27. {¶59} In Sutton v. Tomco Machining, | 1 | 1 |
Bicudo v. Lexford Properties, Inc.green2 sentences2022“Many appellate districts have * * * held that a wrongful-discharge claim based on a violation of R.C. 4112.02 must fail if the 17 Case No. 2021-P-0066 plaintiff does not establish a violation of R.C. 4112.02.” Bicudo v. Lexford Properties, Inc., 157 Ohio App.3d 509 , 2004-Ohio-3202 , 812 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 93 (7th Dist.) (cases cited); Fitch v. U.S. Foodservice Corp., 12th Dist. 2022“Many appellate districts have * * * held that a wrongful-discharge claim based on a violation of R.C. 4112.02 must fail if the 17 Case No. 2021-P-0066 plaintiff does not establish a violation of R.C. 4112.02.” Bicudo v. Lexford Properties, Inc., 157 Ohio App.3d 509 , 2004-Ohio-3202 , 812 N.E.2d 315, ¶ 93 (7th Dist.) (cases cited); Fitch v. U.S. Foodservice Corp., 12th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Gessner v. City of Uniongreen2 sentences2011See Gessner v. Union 159 Ohio App.3d 43 , 2004-Ohio-5770 , 823 N.E.2d 1, ¶35 (stating that “wrongful discharge appears to be precisely the type of situation contemplated by R.C. 2744.09"). 2011See Gessner v. Union 159 Ohio App.3d 43 , 2004-Ohio-5770 , 823 N.E.2d 1, ¶35 (stating that “wrongful discharge appears to be precisely the type of situation contemplated by R.C. 2744.09"). | 1 | 1 |
| Hoops v. United Telephone Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Vargo-Adams v. United States Postal Servicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp.red2 sentences2012In Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 62 Ohio St.3d 541, 546 , 584 N.E.2d 729 (1992), the Court expressly stated that absent statutory authority, there is no common law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim. 2012In Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 62 Ohio St.3d 541, 546 , 584 N.E.2d 729 (1992), the Court expressly stated that absent statutory authority, there is no common law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim. | 1 | 17 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Collins v. Rizkana
green
2 sentences2007Id. {¶ 25} Like Collins, Kulch presented a case in which there were multiple sources indicating a public policy against the type of wrongful termination alleged. 2007Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 70 , 652 N.E.2d 653 . {¶ 17} Three years after the Kulch decision, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 . | 4 | 1997–2007 |
Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2025However, “an exception to the traditional doctrine of employment-at-will should be recognized only where the public policy alleged to have been violated is of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Painter at 384 , citing Greeley at 234 . {¶ 28} “To be successful in a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) Clarity - That clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in common law; (2) Jeopardy – That dismissing employees under these circumstances woul 2021Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 157 Ohio St.3d 413 , 2019-Ohio-3308 , 137 N.E.3d 1110 , ¶ 12. {¶ 10} The clarity and jeopardy elements are questions of law for the court to decide, and the elements of causation and justification are questions of fact to be determined by the fact-finder. | 2 | 2021–2025 |
Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Butler No. CA2007-03-068, 2008-Ohio-282, ¶ 22 (“based on the evidence presented [in support of his statutory claims], Fitch has failed to raise any issue of material fact to prove his dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy, the causation element; and therefore, his [public policy] argument is without merit”). {¶58} The plaintiffs further argue that Natural Essentials’ “termination of Ms. Jones in retaliation for her pursuing a workers’ compensation claim violates Ohio public policy embodied in R.C. §4123.90.” Appellants’ brief at 27. {¶59} In Sutton v. Tomco Machining, 2022Butler No. CA2007-03-068, 2008-Ohio-282, ¶ 22 (“based on the evidence presented [in support of his statutory claims], Fitch has failed to raise any issue of material fact to prove his dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy, the causation element; and therefore, his [public policy] argument is without merit”). {¶58} The plaintiffs further argue that Natural Essentials’ “termination of Ms. Jones in retaliation for her pursuing a workers’ compensation claim violates Ohio public policy embodied in R.C. §4123.90.” Appellants’ brief at 27. {¶59} In Sutton v. Tomco Machining, | 2 | 2019–2022 |
Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts
green
2 sentences2018Chapter 4112 “adequately protects the state’s policy against age discrimination in employment through the remedies it offers to aggrieved employees”); Wiles, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 , at ¶ 14-22 (refusing to recognize a common-law claim for wrongful discharge for violation of the public policy manifested in the Family and Medical Leave Act, concluding that “statutory remedies provide an effectivevehicle for vindicating the statute’s policy, obviating recognition of a wrongful discharge claim based on the same statute”). {¶32} Because Shingler did not satisfy the je 2007Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 70 , 652 N.E.2d 653 . {¶ 17} Three years after the Kulch decision, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 . | 2 | 2007–2018 |
Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts
green
2 sentences2018Chapter 4112 “adequately protects the state’s policy against age discrimination in employment through the remedies it offers to aggrieved employees”); Wiles, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 , at ¶ 14-22 (refusing to recognize a common-law claim for wrongful discharge for violation of the public policy manifested in the Family and Medical Leave Act, concluding that “statutory remedies provide an effectivevehicle for vindicating the statute’s policy, obviating recognition of a wrongful discharge claim based on the same statute”). {¶32} Because Shingler did not satisfy the je 2007Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 70 , 652 N.E.2d 653 . {¶ 17} Three years after the Kulch decision, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 . | 2 | 2007–2018 |
Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School District
green
2 sentences2012In relevant part, Bickers alleged that she had been wrongfully terminated from Western & Southern in violation of the state’s public policy as expressed in the 1 Throughout the opinion, we refer to “common-law public policy wrongful discharge claims.” We use this term as a short-hand for a specific type of common-law wrongful discharge claims; to wit: a wrongful discharge claim in violation of the public policy underlying R.C. 4123.90, protecting employees from retaliation for pursuing workers’ compensation benefits. -5- Case No. 2-11-25 workers compensation statutes, citing Coolidge v. Riverd 2007He instead referred to Todd’s case as a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, citing cases including Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio St.3d 141 , 2003-Ohio-5357 , 797 N.E.2d 61 , syllabus (“An employee who is receiving temporary total disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56 may not be discharged solely on the basis of absenteeism or inability to work, when the absence or inability to work is directly related to an allowed condition”) and advising that a four-year statute of limitations applied. | 2 | 2007–2012 |
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Id. {¶ 33} In contrast, the Workers’ Compensation Act plainly provides limited, exclusive remedies. 2011Id. {¶ 33} In contrast, the Workers’ Compensation Act plainly provides limited, exclusive remedies. | 2 | 1997–2011 |
Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 77 , 2002-Ohio-66 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 2003She further asserts that, in Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc. , 94 Ohio St.3d 77 , 760 N.E.2d 385 , 2002-Ohio-66 , the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed its holdings in Kulch and Greeley, and that under Greeley and its progeny she is entitled to bring both a statutory claim under R.C. 4112 and a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy tort claim, based on violations of that statute. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
Pytlinski v. Brocar Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003She further asserts that, in Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc. , 94 Ohio St.3d 77 , 760 N.E.2d 385 , 2002-Ohio-66 , the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed its holdings in Kulch and Greeley, and that under Greeley and its progeny she is entitled to bring both a statutory claim under R.C. 4112 and a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy tort claim, based on violations of that statute. 2003She further asserts that, in Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc. , 94 Ohio St.3d 77 , 760 N.E.2d 385 , 2002-Ohio-66 , the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed its holdings in Kulch and Greeley, and that under Greeley and its progeny she is entitled to bring both a statutory claim under R.C. 4112 and a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy tort claim, based on violations of that statute. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 151 , 1997-Ohio-219 . 2003Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 151 , 1997-Ohio-219 . | 2 | 2003–2005 |
House v. Iacovelli (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2025“The clarity and jeopardy elements are questions of law for the court to decide, and the elements of causation and justification are questions of fact to be determined by the fact- finder.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 10, citing House v. Iacovelli, 2020-Ohio-435, ¶ 12 . {¶ 29} Logan’s wrongful termination claim was grounded in common law tort. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs.
neutral
1 sentence2023As I explain below, it is unnecessary to directly reach the constitutional issues raised, although I view it presents a much more significant obstacle to the denial of benefits than stated by the majority. [Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299 .] {¶ 92} The proximate conduct at issue here is Evans's overheard COVID comment: "Can you believe the coronavirus came from China and that China is making money from the sales of PPE to the United States?" The school district's concern was not so much that this statement was made, but rather its impact on a particular | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Cuyahoga Nos. 64394, 64424, and 64883, 1993 Ohio App.LEXIS 5218, * 20-21 (Oct. 28, 1993), citing Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 639, 648 , 633 N.E.2d 551 (8th Dist.1993), Bear v. Geetronics, Inc., 83 Ohio App.3d 163 , 614 N.E.2d 803 (12th Dist.1992); Ungrady v. Burns Internatl. 2023Cuyahoga Nos. 64394, 64424, and 64883, 1993 Ohio App.LEXIS 5218, * 20-21 (Oct. 28, 1993), citing Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 639, 648 , 633 N.E.2d 551 (8th Dist.1993), Bear v. Geetronics, Inc., 83 Ohio App.3d 163 , 614 N.E.2d 803 (12th Dist.1992); Ungrady v. Burns Internatl. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bear v. Geetronics, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Cuyahoga Nos. 64394, 64424, and 64883, 1993 Ohio App.LEXIS 5218, * 20-21 (Oct. 28, 1993), citing Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 639, 648 , 633 N.E.2d 551 (8th Dist.1993), Bear v. Geetronics, Inc., 83 Ohio App.3d 163 , 614 N.E.2d 803 (12th Dist.1992); Ungrady v. Burns Internatl. 2023Cuyahoga Nos. 64394, 64424, and 64883, 1993 Ohio App.LEXIS 5218, * 20-21 (Oct. 28, 1993), citing Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 639, 648 , 633 N.E.2d 551 (8th Dist.1993), Bear v. Geetronics, Inc., 83 Ohio App.3d 163 , 614 N.E.2d 803 (12th Dist.1992); Ungrady v. Burns Internatl. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Shovelin v. CENTRAL NM ELEC. CO-OP.
green
2 sentences2019Co-op, Inc. , 115 N.M. 293 , 850 P.2d 996 , 1006 (1993). {¶ 17} A wrongful-discharge claim protects employees only when the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action expressed in statutory enactments, administrative rules, et cetera. 2019Co-op, Inc. , 115 N.M. 293 , 850 P.2d 996 , 1006 (1993). {¶ 17} A wrongful-discharge claim protects employees only when the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action expressed in statutory enactments, administrative rules, et cetera. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Wilson v. Matlack, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2017Id., citing Durgan, 110 Ohio App.3d at 549 , 674 N.E.2d 1208 . {¶31} Reid’s subpoena requests for evidence to show that MetroHealth had a motive to falsely allege that his work was incompetent to conceal financial improprieties, and for evidence to impugn the credibility of the coworkers who complained about him, are nothing more than an improper attempt to convert his unemployment compensation claim to a wrongful discharge claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Bradley v. Dollar Gen.
green
1 sentence2017Thus, the issue before this Court is whether the notice of voluntary dismissal as to the wrongful discharge claim, which undisputedly is the first dismissal filed of that particular claim, dissolved the summary judgment entered on that claim or rendered it a final, appealable order. {¶ 17} In Bradley v. Dollar General, 975 N.E.2d 515 , 2012-Ohio-3700 (5th Dist. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Durgan v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services
green
2 sentences2017Id., citing Durgan, 110 Ohio App.3d at 549 , 674 N.E.2d 1208 . {¶31} Reid’s subpoena requests for evidence to show that MetroHealth had a motive to falsely allege that his work was incompetent to conceal financial improprieties, and for evidence to impugn the credibility of the coworkers who complained about him, are nothing more than an improper attempt to convert his unemployment compensation claim to a wrongful discharge claim. 2017Id., citing Durgan, 110 Ohio App.3d at 549 , 674 N.E.2d 1208 . {¶31} Reid’s subpoena requests for evidence to show that MetroHealth had a motive to falsely allege that his work was incompetent to conceal financial improprieties, and for evidence to impugn the credibility of the coworkers who complained about him, are nothing more than an improper attempt to convert his unemployment compensation claim to a wrongful discharge claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Wright v. Mar-Bal, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016Geauga No. 2012-G-3112, 2013-Ohio-5647, ¶28 , (inadequate training and the lack of adequate safety guards are insufficient to show a deliberate intent to cause an injury). {¶32} As the trial court correctly granted summary judgment, appellants’ first assignment lacks merit. 9 {¶33} Under their second assignment, appellants argue that summary judgment should not have been granted on the wrongful discharge claim because their evidentiary materials create an issue of fact as to whether appellee violated R.C. 4113.52, the whistleblower statute. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Nagel v. Horner
green
2 sentences2011Chapter 2744 does not apply to “[c]ivil actions by an employee * * * against his political subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and LAWRENCE, 09CA30 15 the political subdivision[.]” “[C]laims that are causally connected to an individual’s employment fit into the category of actions that are ‘relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship.’” Nagel v. Horner, 162 Ohio App.3d 221 , 833 N.E.2d 300 , 2005-Ohio-3574, ¶19 , quoting R.C. 2744.09(B). {¶ 29} A wrongful discharge claim is the type of civil action tha 2011Chapter 2744 does not apply to “[c]ivil actions by an employee * * * against his political subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and LAWRENCE, 09CA30 15 the political subdivision[.]” “[C]laims that are causally connected to an individual’s employment fit into the category of actions that are ‘relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship.’” Nagel v. Horner, 162 Ohio App.3d 221 , 833 N.E.2d 300 , 2005-Ohio-3574, ¶19 , quoting R.C. 2744.09(B). {¶ 29} A wrongful discharge claim is the type of civil action tha | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dohme v. Eurand America, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010However, “[i]n order to prevail on his claim, [Sutton] must carry his burden to prove the remaining elements of a wrongful-discharge claim.” Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 170 Ohio App.3d 593 , 2007-Ohio-865 , 868 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 38 . {¶ 41} The first assignment of error is sustained. 2010However, “[i]n order to prevail on his claim, [Sutton] must carry his burden to prove the remaining elements of a wrongful-discharge claim.” Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 170 Ohio App.3d 593 , 2007-Ohio-865 , 868 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 38 . {¶ 41} The first assignment of error is sustained. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Celsete v. Wiseco Piston, Unpublished Decision (12-23-2005) green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Simonelli v. Anderson Concrete Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Anderson v. Lorain County Title Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Maracz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., Unpublished Decision (12-16-2004) green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Doody v. Centerior Energy Corp. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Sidenstricker v. Miller Pavement Maintenance, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Contreras v. Ferro Corp. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Cochran v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Ferraro v. B.F. Goodrich Company green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Vitatoe v. Lawrence Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Brunecz v. Houdaille Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Berge v. Columbus Community Cable Access green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Pflanz v. City of Cincinnati green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Kent v. Chester Labs, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Barlowe v. Aaaa International Driving, Unpublished Decision (10-24-2003) green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Temple v. Wean United, Inc. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Diefenthaler v. Diefenthaler green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.