24 California opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gantt v. Sentry Insurancegreen2 sentences2009(Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1090 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ] (Gantt), overruled on other grounds in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ]; Tameny, supra, at pp. 174—177.) A wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is commonly referred to as a “Tameny” claim. 2009(Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1090 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ] (Gantt), overruled on other grounds in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ]; Tameny, supra, at pp. 174—177.) A wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is commonly referred to as a “Tameny” claim. | 4 | 7 |
Stevenson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015Thus, there can be no Tameny cause of action without the prior existence of an employment relationship between the parties.” (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 900 .) 13 “[F]or a policy to support a wrongful discharge claim, it must be: (1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental.” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Ca 2008First, only four pages after the quoted passage appears, the Supreme Court restated the test, and explained that "for a policy to support a wrongful discharge claim, it must be: ... (3) well established at the time of the discharge." ( Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 894 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 .) And only two paragraphs before the passage in question, Stevenson had noted the requirement set out in Gantt that the policy be "`well established' at the time of the discharge." ( Stevenson, at p. 889, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 , citing Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1090, 4 | 3 | 6 |
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences1994An employee who states a wrongful discharge claim for having refused to join a criminal conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws (cf. Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167 ), or for having resisted efforts to induce him to give false information in a public investigation of sexual harassment charges filed by a co-worker (cf. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1083 ), is provided a remedy in tort not only to compensate the individual plaintiff for the loss of employment but as an indirect means of vindicating the underlying fundamental public policy itself. 1985The doctrine of wrongful discharge holds that “when an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, *444 the discharged employee may maintain a tort action.” (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 ].) More recently, another division of this court has held that the public policy violation must have statutory support. | 1 | 6 |
Rojo v. Kligergreen2 sentences2007(Id. at pp. 665-666 [“Because we find [the plaintiff’s] communications [about suspected embezzlement] with the officers did not serve any interest other than the company’s, under Foley his reports will not support a wrongful termination claim”].) As noted in Collier, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at page 1125 , however, American Computer is inconsistent with the later case of Hentzel, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 290 , and “one of the principles upon which [American Computer] was based [absence of the employer’s attempt to coerce an employee to engage in criminal conduct] is no longer tenable in light of a r 1997Thus, Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d 65 , although it does define important aspects of the relationship between the FEHA and common law wrongful discharge claims, did not expressly decide whether the FEHA may itself be a source of fundamental public policy. (7) Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th 121 , a post- Gantt decision, examined whether the FEHA's prohibition against age discrimination in employment sufficiently established a fundamental public policy against such discrimination for purposes of a wrongful discharge claim against an employer who was statutorily exempt from that same FEHA prohibition. | 1 | 3 |
Green v. Ralee Engineering Co.green2 sentences2009(Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1090 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ] (Gantt), overruled on other grounds in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ]; Tameny, supra, at pp. 174—177.) A wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is commonly referred to as a “Tameny” claim. 2009(Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1090 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ] (Gantt), overruled on other grounds in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ]; Tameny, supra, at pp. 174—177.) A wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is commonly referred to as a “Tameny” claim. | 1 | 2 |
Hentzel v. Singer Co.green2 sentences2014(See Freund v. Nycomed Amersham (2003) 347 F.3d 752, 758-759 ; Hentzel v. Singer Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 290, 299-300 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 159 ].) Ferrick claims that she was entitled to a safe workplace free of unlicensed drivers. 2014(See Freund v. Nycomed Amersham (2003) 347 F.3d 752, 758-759 ; Hentzel v. Singer Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 290, 299-300 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 159 ].) Ferrick claims that she was entitled to a safe workplace free of unlicensed drivers. | 1 | 2 |
T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporationgreen1 sentence2026DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review “‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’” (Matthews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768 ; accord, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162 .) When evaluating the complaint, “we assume the truth of the allegations.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 , 209; accord, Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230 .) “‘“‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly ple | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Hanleygreen1 sentence2026DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review “‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’” (Matthews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768 ; accord, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162 .) When evaluating the complaint, “we assume the truth of the allegations.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 , 209; accord, Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230 .) “‘“‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly ple | 1 | 1 |
Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc.green1 sentence2026DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review “‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’” (Matthews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768 ; accord, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162 .) When evaluating the complaint, “we assume the truth of the allegations.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 , 209; accord, Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230 .) “‘“‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly ple | 1 | 1 |
Solin v. O' Melveny & Myers, LLP.green1 sentence2009(General Dynamics, supra, at p. 1190.)” ( Solin, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 457-458, italics added.) *791 The italicized portion of this quotation suggests that the Solin court was simply reiterating the General Dynamics court’s statement that an attorney plaintiff may not establish a claim through the disclosure of privileged information. ( Solin, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 457-458.) This is made clear by the Solin court’s citation to that portion of the General Dynamics opinion in which the Supreme Court stated: “[W]here the elements of a wrongful discharge in violation of fundamental pu | 1 | 1 |
Jersey v. John Muir Medical Centergreen2 sentences2007If [plaintiff] had reported the illegal activities of his co-workers, [he] may have achieved the ‘laudable goal’ of preventing crime, but this is not enough to fit within the narrow confines of wrongful termination in violation of public policy”].) 14 In sum, Carter’s “failure to identify a statutory or constitutional policy that would be thwarted by his . . . discharge dooms his cause of action.” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1257.) “Even if [EUHSD’s] decision was misguided or based on an erroneous factual premise, that would not eliminate the need for a clear expression of legislative poli 2007If [plaintiff] had reported the illegal activities of his co-workers, [he] may have achieved the ‘laudable goal’ of preventing crime, but this is not enough to fit within the narrow confines of wrongful termination in violation of public policy”].) 14 In sum, Carter’s “failure to identify a statutory or constitutional policy that would be thwarted by his . . . discharge dooms his cause of action.” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1257.) “Even if [EUHSD’s] decision was misguided or based on an erroneous factual premise, that would not eliminate the need for a clear expression of legislative poli | 1 | 1 |
Silo v. CHW Medical Foundationgreen2 sentences2004(Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1104 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 45 P.3d 1162 ].) The cases in which the courts have allowed a tortious claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy generally fall into one of four categories, where the employee is discharged for: (1) refusal to violate a statute; (2) performing a statutory obligation; (3) exercising a statutory or constitutional right or privilege; or (4) reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public significance. 2004(Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1104 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 45 P.3d 1162 ].) The cases in which the courts have allowed a tortious claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy generally fall into one of four categories, where the employee is discharged for: (1) refusal to violate a statute; (2) performing a statutory obligation; (3) exercising a statutory or constitutional right or privilege; or (4) reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public significance. | 1 | 1 |
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks International Ass'ngreen2 sentences1998Gantt considered whether an employee stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge against public policy after his employer terminated him in retaliation for supporting a coworker's sexual harassment claim. ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1087-1089, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 .) The court recognized that public policy cases fall into one of four categories: the employee (1) refused to violate a statute; (2) performed a statutory obligation; (3) exercised a constitutional or statutory right or privilege; or (4) reported a statutory violation for the public's benefit. ( Id. at pp. 1090- 1998Gantt considered whether an employee stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge against public policy after his employer terminated him in retaliation for supporting a coworker's sexual harassment claim. ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1087-1089, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 .) The court recognized that public policy cases fall into one of four categories: the employee (1) refused to violate a statute; (2) performed a statutory obligation; (3) exercised a constitutional or statutory right or privilege; or (4) reported a statutory violation for the public's benefit. ( Id. at pp. 1090- | 1 | 1 |
Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1997But “[o]ur function is not to judge the wisdom of statutes.” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1099 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 811 P.2d 1025 ].) Indeed, when this court established that only those public policies that had been articulated in a constitutional or statutory provision could support a wrongful discharge claim, one reason this court gave was “that courts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care and due deference to the judgment of the legislative branch, ‘lest they mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at la 1997But “[o]ur function is not to judge the wisdom of statutes.” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1099 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 811 P.2d 1025 ].) Indeed, when this court established that only those public policies that had been articulated in a constitutional or statutory provision could support a wrongful discharge claim, one reason this court gave was “that courts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care and due deference to the judgment of the legislative branch, ‘lest they mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at la | 1 | 1 |
| Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2014(Ibid.) Our Supreme Court concluded that the in-house attorney could pursue a wrongful discharge claim against his employer based on both theories: a violation of an implied agreement not to terminate except for cause; and a violation of public policy, based on retaliation, “provided it can be established without breaching the attorney-client privilege or unduly endangering the values lying at the heart of the professional relationship.” (General Dynamics, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1169, 1179, 1189.) As to the effect of attorney-client confidences on an in-house counsel’s ability to prove a reta 2009In any event, where the elements of a wrongful discharge in violation of fundamental public policy claim cannot, for reasons peculiar to the particular case, be fully established without breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit must be dismissed in the interest of preserving the privilege.” (General Dynamics, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1190 .) The General Dynamics court also stressed that trial courts should employ various equitable measures to enable attorney plaintiffs to bring such claims, while at the same time protecting their former client’s confidences: “[T]he trial courts can and | 3 | 2001–2014 |
Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023First, the actionable adverse employment decision in a wrongful discharge case is the actual discharge, not the communication of the decision. ( Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 492-493.) Second, concluding 18 that the statute of limitations runs from the time of discharge “has the obvious benefit of simplicity” because, unlike the date of notification, the date of discharge is not likely to be the subject of dispute. 2021In Romano, we declined to apply Ricks’s holding under Title VII to a wrongful discharge claim under the FEHA. ( Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 495–499.) But nothing we said in Romano casts doubt on Ricks’s persuasive value in a FEHA failure to promote case. | 2 | 2021–2023 |
Mathews v. Becerra
green
1 sentence2026DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review “‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’” (Matthews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768 ; accord, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162 .) When evaluating the complaint, “we assume the truth of the allegations.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 , 209; accord, Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230 .) “‘“‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly ple | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical Center
green
1 sentence2021Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy (Fifth Cause of Action) The fifth cause of action is for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. “ ‘The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff’s employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.’ ” (Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical Center (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1224 , 1234–1235.) “[A] policy may support a wrongful di | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015(See Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 74 .) 43 (See Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 641 ; Yau v. Allen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154 ; CACI No. 2430; cf. Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) Thus, “[t]o establish a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, an employee must prove causation. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Harris v. City of Santa Monica
green
2 sentences2015(See Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 74 .) 43 (See Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 641 ; Yau v. Allen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154 ; CACI No. 2430; cf. Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) Thus, “[t]o establish a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, an employee must prove causation. 2015(See Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 74 .) 43 (See Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 641 ; Yau v. Allen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154 ; CACI No. 2430; cf. Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) Thus, “[t]o establish a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, an employee must prove causation. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Miklosy v. Regents of the University of California
green
1 sentence2015Thus, there can be no Tameny cause of action without the prior existence of an employment relationship between the parties.” (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 900 .) 13 “[F]or a policy to support a wrongful discharge claim, it must be: (1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental.” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Ca | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford
green
1 sentence2015(See Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 74 .) 43 (See Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 641 ; Yau v. Allen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154 ; CACI No. 2430; cf. Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 232 .) Thus, “[t]o establish a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, an employee must prove causation. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino
green
1 sentence2014(Fox Searchlight, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 .) “If the employer can stifle even this limited disclosure, then General Dynamics is nothing more than a judicial practical joke . . . .” (Id. at p. 314.) Once the disclosure is made to the attorney, it is “up to the attorneys, in consultation with the plaintiff, to determine if, when and how this information can be utilized in conformity with the rules laid down in General Dynamics.” (Id. at p. 315.) 6 *1108 D. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Freund v. Nycomed Amersham
green
1 sentence2014(See Freund v. Nycomed Amersham (2003) 347 F.3d 752, 758-759 ; Hentzel v. Singer Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 290, 299-300 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 159 ].) Ferrick claims that she was entitled to a safe workplace free of unlicensed drivers. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Collier v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2007(Id. at pp. 665-666 [“Because we find [the plaintiff’s] communications [about suspected embezzlement] with the officers did not serve any interest other than the company’s, under Foley his reports will not support a wrongful termination claim”].) As noted in Collier, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at page 1125 , however, American Computer is inconsistent with the later case of Hentzel, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 290 , and “one of the principles upon which [American Computer] was based [absence of the employer’s attempt to coerce an employee to engage in criminal conduct] is no longer tenable in light of a r 2007(Id. at pp. 665-666 [“Because we find [the plaintiff’s] communications [about suspected embezzlement] with the officers did not serve any interest other than the company’s, under Foley his reports will not support a wrongful termination claim”].) As noted in Collier, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at page 1125 , however, American Computer is inconsistent with the later case of Hentzel, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 290 , and “one of the principles upon which [American Computer] was based [absence of the employer’s attempt to coerce an employee to engage in criminal conduct] is no longer tenable in light of a r | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Harriet Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, a Business Entity, Form Unknown, Michael Beavers and Does 1-25, Inclusive
green
1 sentence2006(Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343 (9th Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 597, 604-605 .) The Ninth Circuit held that, since the plaintiff had obtained a favorable workers’ compensation settlement based on her assertion that she could not work, she was judicially estopped from asserting a wrongful discharge claim against her employer. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Southern California Rapid Transit District v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2004(See ARAMARK, Investor Relations—SEC Filings <http://www.corporate-ir.net/ireye/ir_site.zhtml?ticker=RMK&script=1901> [as of June 23, 2004].) 14 Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 713 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 ] (discharge of employees by transportation district in retaliation for reporting fraud in connection with certification of minority contractor violated public policy). 15 This opinion does not hold, and should not be read to imply, that an employee who is discharged for complaining about breaches of contract committed by the employer is able to state a 2004(See ARAMARK, Investor Relations—SEC Filings <http://www.corporate-ir.net/ireye/ir_site.zhtml?ticker=RMK&script=1901> [as of June 23, 2004].) 14 Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 713 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 ] (discharge of employees by transportation district in retaliation for reporting fraud in connection with certification of minority contractor violated public policy). 15 This opinion does not hold, and should not be read to imply, that an employee who is discharged for complaining about breaches of contract committed by the employer is able to state a | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.
green
2 sentences1998Because here the employer and employee could have agreed that the employee had no duty to disclose such information, it cannot be said that an employer, in discharging an employee on this basis, violates a fundamental duty imposed on all employers for the protection of the public interest." ( Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 670-671, fn. 12, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 .) In Gantt, we discussed further the requirements for a wrongful discharge claim alleging a public policy violation. 1998Because here the employer and employee could have agreed that the employee had no duty to disclose such information, it cannot be said that an employer, in discharging an employee on this basis, violates a fundamental duty imposed on all employers for the protection of the public interest." ( Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 670-671, fn. 12, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 .) In Gantt, we discussed further the requirements for a wrongful discharge claim alleging a public policy violation. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396
green
2 sentences1997Citing Petermann, supra, 174 Cal.App.2d 184 , we reversed the judgment, holding that a wrongful discharge claim may sound in tort. 1997Citing Petermann, supra, 174 Cal. App.2d 184 , we reversed the judgment, holding that a wrongful discharge claim may sound in tort. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jennings v. Marralle
green
2 sentences1997Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th 121 , a post -Gantt decision, examined whether the FEHA’s prohibition against age discrimination in employment sufficiently established a fundamental public policy against such discrimination for purposes of a wrongful discharge claim against an employer who was statutorily exempt from that same FEHA prohibition. 1997Thus, Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d 65 , although it does define important aspects of the relationship between the FEHA and common law wrongful discharge claims, did not expressly decide whether the FEHA may itself be a source of fundamental public policy. (7) Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th 121 , a post- Gantt decision, examined whether the FEHA's prohibition against age discrimination in employment sufficiently established a fundamental public policy against such discrimination for purposes of a wrongful discharge claim against an employer who was statutorily exempt from that same FEHA prohibition. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Fracasse v. Brent green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Suzanne J. GOSS, Appellant in No. 83-1598 v. EXXON OFFICE SYSTEMS COMPANY, Appellant in No. 83-1557 green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Shoemaker v. Myers green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Malone green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.