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8 California opinions name it 3 courts 1956–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Easleygreen2 sentences1994Automobile dismantling is a closely regulated industry for the protection of the public. ( People v. Shope (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 816, 823-824 [ 180 Cal. Rptr. 567 ]; People v. Easley (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 440, 445 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 396 ].) As such, an automobile dismantler is subject to strict compliance with numerous statutes and regulations (see Veh. 1994Automobile dismantling is a closely regulated industry for the protection of the public. ( People v. Shope (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 816, 823-824 [ 180 Cal. Rptr. 567 ]; People v. Easley (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 440, 445 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 396 ].) As such, an automobile dismantler is subject to strict compliance with numerous statutes and regulations (see Veh. | 1 | 1 |
M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1994Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 762, 768 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 814 ].) As we shall explain, our review of California’s statutory method for serving notice of an accusation and hearing seeking to revoke an automobile dismantler’s license leads us to conclude that the method is reasonably calculated to give the licensee notice of the accusation and hearing and, thus, satisfies due process of law. 1994Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 762, 768 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 814 ].) As we shall explain, our review of California’s statutory method for serving notice of an accusation and hearing seeking to revoke an automobile dismantler’s license leads us to conclude that the method is reasonably calculated to give the licensee notice of the accusation and hearing and, thus, satisfies due process of law. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shopegreen2 sentences1994Automobile dismantling is a closely regulated industry for the protection of the public. ( People v. Shope (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 816, 823-824 [ 180 Cal. Rptr. 567 ]; People v. Easley (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 440, 445 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 396 ].) As such, an automobile dismantler is subject to strict compliance with numerous statutes and regulations (see Veh. 1994Automobile dismantling is a closely regulated industry for the protection of the public. ( People v. Shope (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 816, 823-824 [ 180 Cal. Rptr. 567 ]; People v. Easley (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 440, 445 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 396 ].) As such, an automobile dismantler is subject to strict compliance with numerous statutes and regulations (see Veh. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Baingreen2 sentences1992Defendant also complains about the prosecutor's repeated references to defense counsel's reaction to particular testimony. (18) "A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case, marshalling the facts and arguing inferences to be drawn therefrom. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 580 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].) We have held he may not express a personal belief in defendant's guilt, in part because of the danger that jurors may assume there is other evidence at his command on which he bases this conclusion. ( People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848 [ 97 Cal. Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2 1992Defendant also complains about the prosecutor's repeated references to defense counsel's reaction to particular testimony. (18) "A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case, marshalling the facts and arguing inferences to be drawn therefrom. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 580 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].) We have held he may not express a personal belief in defendant's guilt, in part because of the danger that jurors may assume there is other evidence at his command on which he bases this conclusion. ( People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848 [ 97 Cal. Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fosselmangreen2 sentences1992Defendant also complains about the prosecutor's repeated references to defense counsel's reaction to particular testimony. (18) "A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case, marshalling the facts and arguing inferences to be drawn therefrom. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 580 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].) We have held he may not express a personal belief in defendant's guilt, in part because of the danger that jurors may assume there is other evidence at his command on which he bases this conclusion. ( People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848 [ 97 Cal. Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2 1992Defendant also complains about the prosecutor's repeated references to defense counsel's reaction to particular testimony. (18) "A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case, marshalling the facts and arguing inferences to be drawn therefrom. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 580 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].) We have held he may not express a personal belief in defendant's guilt, in part because of the danger that jurors may assume there is other evidence at his command on which he bases this conclusion. ( People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848 [ 97 Cal. Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Beckergreen2 sentences1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 | 1 | 1 |
Fitts v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Elliottgreen2 sentences1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harbygreen2 sentences1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 | 1 | 1 |
Coffey v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018In response, Guarino made multiple arguments, including an argument that defendants had not shown their action arose from protected activity, relying heavily on McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent and Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169 , 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( McConnell ). 2018In response, Guarino made multiple arguments, including an argument that defendants had not shown their action arose from protected activity, relying heavily on McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent and Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169 (McConnell). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Schifando v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2015(Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1082 .) Employees who receive a “‘right to sue’” letter from the DFEH may then pursue their statutory causes of action in superior court. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences2004Defense counsel also asserted that because of the purported lack of specificity in the details of the crimes, the evidence would violate what People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ] refers to as a defendant’s “right to present a defense” (id. at p. 317, italics omitted), arising from the accusation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, evidently, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *586 The trial court ruled that the evidence of other violent criminal activity by defendant involving lewd acts committed against Lis 2004Defense counsel also asserted that because of the purported lack of specificity in the details of the crimes, the evidence would violate what People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 792 P.2d 643 ] refers to as a defendant’s “right to present a defense” (id. at p. 317, italics omitted), arising from the accusation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, evidently, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *586 The trial court ruled that the evidence of other violent criminal activity by defendant involving lewd acts committed against Lis | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Mullin
green
1 sentence1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 | 1 | 1965–1965 |
In the Matter of Burleigh
green
2 sentences1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 1965It only determines whether, by reason of existing facts and circumstances, he should be removed from his present office. [4] The Supreme Court has held unmistakably that an accusation is not an indictment (Fitts v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 6 Cal.2d 230, 235 [ 57 P.2d 510 ]). [5, 6] The act or omission for which an officer may be removed does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent or the commission of a crime (People v. Harby, 51 Cal.App.2d 759, 767 [ 125 P.2d 874 ]; People v. Elliott, 115 Cal.App.2d 410, 414 [ 252 P.2d 661 ]; In re Burleigh, supra, *119 145 Cal. 35, 3 | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Terminix Co. v. Contractors' State License Board
green
2 sentences1956The hearing officer apparently interpreted Terminix Co. v. Contractors’ State License Board, 84 Cal.App.2d 167 [ 190 P.2d 24 ], as requiring only a consideration of those defects which still exist at the date of the hearing. 1956The hearing officer apparently interpreted Terminix Co. v. Contractors’ State License Board, 84 Cal.App.2d 167 [ 190 P.2d 24 ], as requiring only a consideration of those defects which still exist at the date of the hearing. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.