analogous federal clause (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

analogous federal clause in California

8 California opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Olson v. Corygreen
cal · 1980 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018As the United States Supreme Court has explained with respect to the analogous federal clause, 9 "the Compensation Clause ... helps to guarantee what Alexander Hamilton called the 'complete independence of the courts of justice.' [Citation.] Hamilton thought these guarantees necessary *568 because the Judiciary is 'beyond comparison the weakest of the three' branches of government. [Citation.] It has 'no influence over either the sword or the purse,' ... 'no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society.' [Citation.] It has 'neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.' " ( U

2018As the United States Supreme Court has explained with respect to the analogous federal clause, 9 "the Compensation Clause ... helps to guarantee what Alexander Hamilton called the 'complete independence of the courts of justice.' [Citation.] Hamilton thought these guarantees necessary *568 because the Judiciary is 'beyond comparison the weakest of the three' branches of government. [Citation.] It has 'no influence over either the sword or the purse,' ... 'no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society.' [Citation.] It has 'neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.' " ( U

22
Southern California Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractor Inc. v. California Apprenticeship Councilgreen
cal · 1992 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009The ruling on both grounds is the judgment of the court and is of equal validity. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" ( Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 431, fn. 3 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 491 , 841 P.2d 1011 ], quoting Bank of Italy etc. Assn. v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 650 [ 20 P.2d 940 ].) [22] Interestingly, the analogous federal rule does not require that the statement (or even the writing) must have been acted on as true.

2009The ruling on both grounds is the judgment of the court and is of equal validity. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" ( Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 431, fn. 3 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 491 , 841 P.2d 1011 ], quoting Bank of Italy etc. Assn. v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 650 [ 20 P.2d 940 ].) [22] Interestingly, the analogous federal rule does not require that the statement (or even the writing) must have been acted on as true.

22
Bank of Italy National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Bentleygreen
cal · 1933 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009The ruling on both grounds is the judgment of the court and is of equal validity. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" ( Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 431, fn. 3 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 491 , 841 P.2d 1011 ], quoting Bank of Italy etc. Assn. v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 650 [ 20 P.2d 940 ].) [22] Interestingly, the analogous federal rule does not require that the statement (or even the writing) must have been acted on as true.

2009The ruling on both grounds is the judgment of the court and is of equal validity. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" ( Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 431, fn. 3 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 491 , 841 P.2d 1011 ], quoting Bank of Italy etc. Assn. v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 650 [ 20 P.2d 940 ].) [22] Interestingly, the analogous federal rule does not require that the statement (or even the writing) must have been acted on as true.

22
In Re Marilyn Hgreen
cal · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998The federal and state Constitutions “guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ]), although the state due process clause sweeps more broadly than the analogous federal clause (San Jose Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Jose (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1471 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 728 ]).

1998The federal and state Constitutions “guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ]), although the state due process clause sweeps more broadly than the analogous federal clause (San Jose Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Jose (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1471 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 728 ]).

11
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Councilgreen
scotus · 1989 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993The federal Supreme Court has held that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies to an agency's decision not to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement under NEPA. ( Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council (1989) 490 U.S. 360, 376-378 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 377, 394-395 , 109 S.Ct. 1851 ].) [23] While giving lip service to applying the substantial evidence standard, the concurring and dissenting opinion in effect discards it, fails to give proper weight to the public agency's decision, and proceeds to reweigh the evidence, engaging in rank speculation and failing to "reso

1993The federal Supreme Court has held that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies to an agency's decision not to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement under NEPA. ( Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council (1989) 490 U.S. 360, 376-378 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 377, 394-395 , 109 S.Ct. 1851 ].) [23] While giving lip service to applying the substantial evidence standard, the concurring and dissenting opinion in effect discards it, fails to give proper weight to the public agency's decision, and proceeds to reweigh the evidence, engaging in rank speculation and failing to "reso

11
People v. Newsomegreen
calctapp · 1982 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986The test of materiality that appellant must preliminarily satisfy merely requires a showing that there is “ ‘a reasonable possibility that the evidence, if preserved, would have constituted favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. [Citation omitted.]’” (People v. Moore, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 220 ; People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 649 ; People v. Newsome (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 992, 1001 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 676 ].) The Supreme Court in Moore further went on to state that the burden of the defense is satisfied when the “evidence by its nature could reasonably be used to impeach t

1986The test of materiality that appellant must preliminarily satisfy merely requires a showing that there is “ ‘a reasonable possibility that the evidence, if preserved, would have constituted favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. [Citation omitted.]’” (People v. Moore, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 220 ; People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 649 ; People v. Newsome (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 992, 1001 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 676 ].) The Supreme Court in Moore further went on to state that the burden of the defense is satisfied when the “evidence by its nature could reasonably be used to impeach t

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
United States v. Hatter green
scotus · 2001
2 sentences

2018As the United States Supreme Court has explained with respect to the analogous federal clause, 9 "the Compensation Clause ... helps to guarantee what Alexander Hamilton called the 'complete independence of the courts of justice.' [Citation.] Hamilton thought these guarantees necessary *568 because the Judiciary is 'beyond comparison the weakest of the three' branches of government. [Citation.] It has 'no influence over either the sword or the purse,' ... 'no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society.' [Citation.] It has 'neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.' " ( U

2018As the United States Supreme Court has explained with respect to the analogous federal clause, 9 "the Compensation Clause ... helps to guarantee what Alexander Hamilton called the 'complete independence of the courts of justice.' [Citation.] Hamilton thought these guarantees necessary *568 because the Judiciary is 'beyond comparison the weakest of the three' branches of government. [Citation.] It has 'no influence over either the sword or the purse,' ... 'no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society.' [Citation.] It has 'neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.' " ( U

22018–2018
People v. Lewis green
calctapp · 1983
1 sentence

2001(Id. at p. 709.) We conclude the test adopted in People v. Lewis, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d 267 for when the “trial has commenced” produces the most reasonable interpretation of section 1043, particularly when the defendant is in custody. 5 Accordingly, we reject the interpretation of section 1043 adopted in People v. Molina, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 173 .

12001–2001
People v. Molina green
calctapp · 1976
1 sentence

2001(Id. at p. 709.) We conclude the test adopted in People v. Lewis, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d 267 for when the “trial has commenced” produces the most reasonable interpretation of section 1043, particularly when the defendant is in custody. 5 Accordingly, we reject the interpretation of section 1043 adopted in People v. Molina, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 173 .

12001–2001
San Jose Police Officers Ass'n v. City of San Jose green
calctapp · 1988
2 sentences

1998The federal and state Constitutions “guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ]), although the state due process clause sweeps more broadly than the analogous federal clause (San Jose Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Jose (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1471 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 728 ]).

1998The federal and state Constitutions “guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ]), although the state due process clause sweeps more broadly than the analogous federal clause (San Jose Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Jose (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1471 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 728 ]).

11998–1998
Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of University of California green
cal · 1988
1 sentence

1993The federal Supreme Court has held that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies to an agency's decision not to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement under NEPA. ( Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council (1989) 490 U.S. 360, 376-378 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 377, 394-395 , 109 S.Ct. 1851 ].) [23] While giving lip service to applying the substantial evidence standard, the concurring and dissenting opinion in effect discards it, fails to give proper weight to the public agency's decision, and proceeds to reweigh the evidence, engaging in rank speculation and failing to "reso

11993–1993
California v. Trombetta green
scotus · 1984
1 sentence

1986The test of materiality that appellant must preliminarily satisfy merely requires a showing that there is “ ‘a reasonable possibility that the evidence, if preserved, would have constituted favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. [Citation omitted.]’” (People v. Moore, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 220 ; People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 649 ; People v. Newsome (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 992, 1001 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 676 ].) The Supreme Court in Moore further went on to state that the burden of the defense is satisfied when the “evidence by its nature could reasonably be used to impeach t

11986–1986
People v. Moore green
cal · 1983
2 sentences

1986The test of materiality that appellant must preliminarily satisfy merely requires a showing that there is “ ‘a reasonable possibility that the evidence, if preserved, would have constituted favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. [Citation omitted.]’” (People v. Moore, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 220 ; People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 649 ; People v. Newsome (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 992, 1001 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 676 ].) The Supreme Court in Moore further went on to state that the burden of the defense is satisfied when the “evidence by its nature could reasonably be used to impeach t

1986The test of materiality that appellant must preliminarily satisfy merely requires a showing that there is “ ‘a reasonable possibility that the evidence, if preserved, would have constituted favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. [Citation omitted.]’” (People v. Moore, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 220 ; People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 649 ; People v. Newsome (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 992, 1001 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 676 ].) The Supreme Court in Moore further went on to state that the burden of the defense is satisfied when the “evidence by its nature could reasonably be used to impeach t

11986–1986
People v. Hitch green
cal · 1974
1 sentence

1986The test of materiality that appellant must preliminarily satisfy merely requires a showing that there is “ ‘a reasonable possibility that the evidence, if preserved, would have constituted favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. [Citation omitted.]’” (People v. Moore, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 220 ; People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 649 ; People v. Newsome (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 992, 1001 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 676 ].) The Supreme Court in Moore further went on to state that the burden of the defense is satisfied when the “evidence by its nature could reasonably be used to impeach t

11986–1986

Where else courts name it

MA 13 (1984–2026) NV 12 (2014–2025) RI 11 (1983–2016) OH 11 (1983–2024) TN 10 (2002–2020) UT 9 (2007–2026) CT 9 (2000–2020) CA 8 (1986–2018) CO 8 (2003–2022) VT 8 (2012–2026) AL 8 (1999–2024) IA 8 (1979–2022) MD 8 (2003–2018) DE 7 (1983–2023) ID 6 (1997–2015) DC 6 (1981–2024) OR 6 (1989–2025) PA 6 (1992–2023) WI 5 (1985–2022) GA 5 (2015–2025) FL 5 (1984–2024) NJ 4 (2008–2024) AZ 4 (1979–2019) NM 4 (2006–2023) MI 4 (1982–2024) MS 4 (1989–1998) IN 3 (1986–2020) HI 3 (1998–2018) TX 3 (2004–2024) LA 3 (1984–2016) ME 3 (1983–2019) WA 2 (2006–2019) KY 2 (2015–2024) IL 2 (2023–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check