Bixby rule in California

1982Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 780 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 608 P.2d 707 ].) *231 As the Supreme Court noted in Harlow v. Carleson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at page 736 , “[a]pplying the Bixby principle we have held to be not so fundamental as to necessitate application of the independent judgment test, various rights and interests including the interest of an applicant in a zoning variance (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 510, fn. 1 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 836 , 522 P.2d 12 ]), a corporation’s right to obtain approval of a recapitalization plan (Bixby v. Pi

1982Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 780 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 608 P.2d 707 ].) *231 As the Supreme Court noted in Harlow v. Carleson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at page 736 , “[a]pplying the Bixby principle we have held to be not so fundamental as to necessitate application of the independent judgment test, various rights and interests including the interest of an applicant in a zoning variance (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 510, fn. 1 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 836 , 522 P.2d 12 ]), a corporation’s right to obtain approval of a recapitalization plan (Bixby v. Pi

1991The Bixby rule was restated as follows: “ ‘The essence to be distilled is this: When an administrative decision affects a right which has been legitimately acquired or is otherwise “vested,” and when that right is of a fundamental nature from the standpoint of its economic aspect or its “effect ... in *1297 human terms and the importance ... to the individual in the life situation,” then a full and independent judicial review of that decision is indicated. . . .’ (Strumsky [v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 ,] 34 [( 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 )], first ita

1991The Bixby rule was restated as follows: “ ‘The essence to be distilled is this: When an administrative decision affects a right which has been legitimately acquired or is otherwise “vested,” and when that right is of a fundamental nature from the standpoint of its economic aspect or its “effect ... in *1297 human terms and the importance ... to the individual in the life situation,” then a full and independent judicial review of that decision is indicated. . . .’ (Strumsky [v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 ,] 34 [( 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 )], first ita

1991The Bixby rule was restated as follows: “ ‘The essence to be distilled is this: When an administrative decision affects a right which has been legitimately acquired or is otherwise “vested,” and when that right is of a fundamental nature from the standpoint of its economic aspect or its “effect ... in *1297 human terms and the importance ... to the individual in the life situation,” then a full and independent judicial review of that decision is indicated. . . .’ (Strumsky [v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 ,] 34 [( 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 )], first ita

1991The Bixby rule was restated as follows: “ ‘The essence to be distilled is this: When an administrative decision affects a right which has been legitimately acquired or is otherwise “vested,” and when that right is of a fundamental nature from the standpoint of its economic aspect or its “effect ... in *1297 human terms and the importance ... to the individual in the life situation,” then a full and independent judicial review of that decision is indicated. . . .’ (Strumsky [v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 ,] 34 [( 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 )], first ita

1991In so holding, the court relied on Harlow v. Carleson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 731, 737 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 298 , 548 P.2d 698 ], which held that the right of a welfare recipient to continued welfare benefits is fundamental “ ‘both in economic terms, and in terms of its “effect... in human terms and . . . [its] importance ... to the individual in the life situation.” (Bixby v. Pierno, supra, at p. 144 .) ....

1982Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 780 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 608 P.2d 707 ].) *231 As the Supreme Court noted in Harlow v. Carleson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at page 736 , “[a]pplying the Bixby principle we have held to be not so fundamental as to necessitate application of the independent judgment test, various rights and interests including the interest of an applicant in a zoning variance (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 510, fn. 1 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 836 , 522 P.2d 12 ]), a corporation’s right to obtain approval of a recapitalization plan (Bixby v. Pi

1982Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 780 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 608 P.2d 707 ].) *231 As the Supreme Court noted in Harlow v. Carleson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at page 736 , “[a]pplying the Bixby principle we have held to be not so fundamental as to necessitate application of the independent judgment test, various rights and interests including the interest of an applicant in a zoning variance (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 510, fn. 1 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 836 , 522 P.2d 12 ]), a corporation’s right to obtain approval of a recapitalization plan (Bixby v. Pi

1979(See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., supra, 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, 45 ; Bixby v. Pierno, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, 144-147; see also Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1979) ante, pp. 12, 15-16, fn. 3 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 506 ].) In view of the foregoing, we must respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the court in McGue concerning the nature of the vested right at issue here.

1987(Ibid.) 9 In Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 252-253 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 2 ], the court held there was no fundamental right for administrative review purposes to build a revetment to protect owners’ houses.

1987(Ibid.) 9 In Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 252-253 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 2 ], the court held there was no fundamental right for administrative review purposes to build a revetment to protect owners’ houses.

1983(U.S. v. Carotene Products Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 144 , 152-153, fn. 4 [ 82 L.Ed. 1234, 1241, 1242 , 58 S.Ct. 778 ].) Obviously, the foregoing Carotene Products test bears little relation to the standard used when determining which rights are “fundamental” under the Bixby rule for administrative review purposes.

1983(U.S. v. Carotene Products Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 144 , 152-153, fn. 4 [ 82 L.Ed. 1234, 1241, 1242 , 58 S.Ct. 778 ].) Obviously, the foregoing Carotene Products test bears little relation to the standard used when determining which rights are “fundamental” under the Bixby rule for administrative review purposes.

1980Rights which qualify on the first basis, we think, must include those which were considered sufficient to invoke independent review under pre- Bixby law. [6] In holding that plaintiff's right to be free from erroneous charges to its unemployment insurance reserve account is a fundamental vested right within the meaning of our Bixby decision — and that therefore it is entitled to independent judicial review of the evidence when a decision of the Board affects that right — we should not be understood to espouse a principle of necessary reciprocity between the right of an applicant to *781 benefi

1980Rights which qualify on the first basis, we think, must include those which were considered sufficient to invoke independent review under pre- Bixby law. [6] In holding that plaintiff's right to be free from erroneous charges to its unemployment insurance reserve account is a fundamental vested right within the meaning of our Bixby decision — and that therefore it is entitled to independent judicial review of the evidence when a decision of the Board affects that right — we should not be understood to espouse a principle of necessary reciprocity between the right of an applicant to *781 benefi

1979(See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., supra, 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, 45 ; Bixby v. Pierno, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, 144-147; see also Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1979) ante, pp. 12, 15-16, fn. 3 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 506 ].) In view of the foregoing, we must respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the court in McGue concerning the nature of the vested right at issue here.

1979(See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., supra, 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, 45 ; Bixby v. Pierno, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, 144-147; see also Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1979) ante, pp. 12, 15-16, fn. 3 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 506 ].) In view of the foregoing, we must respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the court in McGue concerning the nature of the vested right at issue here.