Bruen test in California

2025Like all analogical reasoning, determining whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation requires a determination of whether the two regulations are “ ‘relevantly similar.’ ” (Id. at pp. 28–29.) Among the metrics courts should consider in evaluating whether modern and historic regulations are similar are “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self- defense.” (Ibid.) In United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 , 690–691 (Rahimi) the court applied the Bruen standard to uphold the constitutionality of section

2025Like all analogical reasoning, determining whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation requires a determination of whether the two regulations are “ ‘relevantly similar.’ ” (Id. at pp. 28–29.) Among the metrics courts should consider in evaluating whether modern and historic regulations are similar are “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self- defense.” (Ibid.) In United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 , 690–691 (Rahimi) the court applied the Bruen standard to uphold the constitutionality of section

2026(Duncan v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2025) 133 F.4th 852, 866, fn. 2 [“ ‘[t]here is no consensus on whether the common-use issue’ is a threshold, textual inquiry or a historical inquiry”]; see Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at pp. 31–32.) Nonetheless, several courts have concluded that the common-use analysis properly lies in Bruen step one.

2026(Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis (10th Cir. 2024) 121 F.4th 96, 113 ; Bevis v. City of Naperville 33 (7th Cir. 2023) 85 F.4th 1175, 1194 ; see Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24 .) In step one, Bruen considered whether the individuals challenging the regulation were a part of “ ‘the people’ ” that the Second Amendment protects, whether the weapons at issue are in “ ‘in common use’ ” today for self-defense, and whether the Second Amendment protects the individual’s “proposed course of conduct.” (Bruen, at pp. 31–32.) And in step two, Bruen considered whether the challenged regulation was “consi

2026(Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis (10th Cir. 2024) 121 F.4th 96, 113 ; Bevis v. City of Naperville 33 (7th Cir. 2023) 85 F.4th 1175, 1194 ; see Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24 .) In step one, Bruen considered whether the individuals challenging the regulation were a part of “ ‘the people’ ” that the Second Amendment protects, whether the weapons at issue are in “ ‘in common use’ ” today for self-defense, and whether the Second Amendment protects the individual’s “proposed course of conduct.” (Bruen, at pp. 31–32.) And in step two, Bruen considered whether the challenged regulation was “consi

2026“We disregard issues not properly addressed in the appellant’s opening brief.” (Aviel v. Ng (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 809, 821 ; see People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 .) For the foregoing reasons, we reject McCowan’s facial challenge to section 25850 and California’s firearm licensing scheme. 4.

2026“We disregard issues not properly addressed in the appellant’s opening brief.” (Aviel v. Ng (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 809, 821 ; see People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 .) For the foregoing reasons, we reject McCowan’s facial challenge to section 25850 and California’s firearm licensing scheme. 4.

2026(See In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 [Even where constitutional rights are implicated, a condition of probation may be permissible in juvenile adjudications that would not be permitted for an adult criminal defendant.].) 6 In reply, E.J. argues that our conclusion in Alexander should not apply here because he has successfully rehabilitated such that he is now “law-abiding.” Even if this argument had been preserved for our consideration, 4 it would not dictate a different conclusion.

2026(See In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 [Even where constitutional rights are implicated, a condition of probation may be permissible in juvenile adjudications that would not be permitted for an adult criminal defendant.].) 6 In reply, E.J. argues that our conclusion in Alexander should not apply here because he has successfully rehabilitated such that he is now “law-abiding.” Even if this argument had been preserved for our consideration, 4 it would not dictate a different conclusion.

2024(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered’ ”].) Also, as In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 885 , indicated, the trial courts are better suited institutionally for addressing factual disputes, such as the Heller/Bruen inquiry into the prevalence or dangerousness of weapons.

2023Given the focus of T.F.- G.’s facial challenge, we do not hold the state to the burden of demonstrating the constitutional validity of its unchallenged regulations. 26 historical analysis regarding federal statute prohibiting individuals convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from shipping or transporting any firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce or receiving any firearm or ammunition shipped in interstate commerce]; United States v. Rahimi (5th Cir. 2023) 61 F.4th 443, 448 (Rahimi) [federal prohibition on possession of firearms by someone subject

2023Given the focus of T.F.- G.’s facial challenge, we do not hold the state to the burden of demonstrating the constitutional validity of its unchallenged regulations. 26 historical analysis regarding federal statute prohibiting individuals convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from shipping or transporting any firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce or receiving any firearm or ammunition shipped in interstate commerce]; United States v. Rahimi (5th Cir. 2023) 61 F.4th 443, 448 (Rahimi) [federal prohibition on possession of firearms by someone subject