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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2022(See People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 443 [pretext is established “when the compared jurors have expressed ‘a substantially similar combination of responses,’ in all material respects”], original italics.) This is particularly true here, where there is a single discriminatory challenge, the record reveals a “ ‘sound, objectively plausible basis’ ” for the challenge,6 and we must credit “ ‘the legitimate role that subjective factors may have in a prosecutor’s decision’ to challenge or not challenge jurors peremptorily.” (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 313 .) Thus, a comparison 2015Because “a Wheeler/Batson violation may occur with a single discriminatory challenge” (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 313 (Williams)), the trial court erred in relying on a categorical rule that a solitary challenge cannot. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Winbushgreen1 sentence2022(See People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 443 [pretext is established “when the compared jurors have expressed ‘a substantially similar combination of responses,’ in all material respects”], original italics.) This is particularly true here, where there is a single discriminatory challenge, the record reveals a “ ‘sound, objectively plausible basis’ ” for the challenge,6 and we must credit “ ‘the legitimate role that subjective factors may have in a prosecutor’s decision’ to challenge or not challenge jurors peremptorily.” (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 313 .) Thus, a comparison | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2007In sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification." ( Id. at pp. 538-539, 102 S.Ct. 3211 .) However, where the purpose for repealing legislation is to disadvantage a racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional. ( Id. at p. 539, fn. 21, 102 S.Ct. 3211 .) Countering the argument that Proposition I fundamentally altered the judicial system by leaving those seeking relief from racial isolation in violation of state law with less than full judicial relief, the cour 2007In sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification." ( Id. at pp. 538-539, 102 S.Ct. 3211 .) However, where the purpose for repealing legislation is to disadvantage a racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional. ( Id. at p. 539, fn. 21, 102 S.Ct. 3211 .) Countering the argument that Proposition I fundamentally altered the judicial system by leaving those seeking relief from racial isolation in violation of state law with less than full judicial relief, the cour | 1 | 1 |
Miller-El v. Dretkegreen2 sentences2006Our confidence in the results of appellate comparative analysis is somewhat diminished when there is a "lone questionable peremptory challenge" and the record reveals "a sound, objectively plausible basis" for the challenge. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1254 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 (cone, opn of Mosk, J.) ( Jackson ).) Moreover, C.K. was the only Black juror to be peremptorily challenged: (Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. 231, 241 , 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 [10 Black prospective jurors struck and one on panel].) Although, to be sure, a Wheeler/B 2006Our confidence in the results of appellate comparative analysis is somewhat diminished when there is a "lone questionable peremptory challenge" and the record reveals "a sound, objectively plausible basis" for the challenge. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1254 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 (cone, opn of Mosk, J.) ( Jackson ).) Moreover, C.K. was the only Black juror to be peremptorily challenged: (Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. 231, 241 , 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 [10 Black prospective jurors struck and one on panel].) Although, to be sure, a Wheeler/B | 1 | 1 |
Connecticut v. Tealgreen2 sentences1987First, as pointed out in Connecticut v. Teal, supra, the United States Supreme Court has “consistently focused on employment and promotion requirements that create a discriminatory bar to opportunities. [It] has never read [Title VII] as requiring the focus to be placed instead on the overall number of minority or female applicants actually hired or promoted.” (Id., 457 U.S. at p. 450 [ 73 L.Ed.2d at p. 139 ].) In any event, allowing an employer to avoid judicial scrutiny because the number of minorities actually promoted was too small would allow it to benefit from its own discriminatory prac 1987First, as pointed out in Connecticut v. Teal, supra, the United States Supreme Court has “consistently focused on employment and promotion requirements that create a discriminatory bar to opportunities. [It] has never read [Title VII] as requiring the focus to be placed instead on the overall number of minority or female applicants actually hired or promoted.” (Id., 457 U.S. at p. 450 [ 73 L.Ed.2d at p. 139 ].) In any event, allowing an employer to avoid judicial scrutiny because the number of minorities actually promoted was too small would allow it to benefit from its own discriminatory prac | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2006Our confidence in the results of appellate comparative analysis is somewhat diminished when there is a "lone questionable peremptory challenge" and the record reveals "a sound, objectively plausible basis" for the challenge. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1254 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 (cone, opn of Mosk, J.) ( Jackson ).) Moreover, C.K. was the only Black juror to be peremptorily challenged: (Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. 231, 241 , 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 [10 Black prospective jurors struck and one on panel].) Although, to be sure, a Wheeler/B 2006Our confidence in the results of appellate comparative analysis is somewhat diminished when there is a "lone questionable peremptory challenge" and the record reveals "a sound, objectively plausible basis" for the challenge. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1254 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 (cone, opn of Mosk, J.) ( Jackson ).) Moreover, C.K. was the only Black juror to be peremptorily challenged: (Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. 231, 241 , 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 [10 Black prospective jurors struck and one on panel].) Although, to be sure, a Wheeler/B | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Howlett Ex Rel. Howlett v. Rose
green
1 sentence1994For example, neutral procedural rules may be applied to federal claims (Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 372 ) [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 351-352]; stated differently, a discriminatory state requirement may violate the supremacy clause. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
New York Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Commission
neutral
1 sentence1992Cir. 1988) 854 F.2d 1338 [ 272 U.S.App.D.C. 129 ], The court in New York Shipping upheld a determination by the Federal Maritime Commission that in reviewing the validity of a discriminatory rule contained in a collective bargaining agreement, the commission could not rely on labor policy considerations (such as the interest in preserving work), but could consider only transportation conditions. (854 F.2d at pp. 1344, 1366, 1373, 1375.) The court reasoned as follows: the Shipping Act’s prohibition against unreasonable discriminatory practices is similar to prohibitions in the Interstate Commer | 1 | 1992–1992 |
cluster 510613
green
1 sentence1992Cir. 1988) 854 F.2d 1338 [ 272 U.S.App.D.C. 129 ], The court in New York Shipping upheld a determination by the Federal Maritime Commission that in reviewing the validity of a discriminatory rule contained in a collective bargaining agreement, the commission could not rely on labor policy considerations (such as the interest in preserving work), but could consider only transportation conditions. (854 F.2d at pp. 1344, 1366, 1373, 1375.) The court reasoned as follows: the Shipping Act’s prohibition against unreasonable discriminatory practices is similar to prohibitions in the Interstate Commer | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto
green
1 sentence1987First, as pointed out in Connecticut v. Teal, supra, the United States Supreme Court has “consistently focused on employment and promotion requirements that create a discriminatory bar to opportunities. [It] has never read [Title VII] as requiring the focus to be placed instead on the overall number of minority or female applicants actually hired or promoted.” (Id., 457 U.S. at p. 450 [ 73 L.Ed.2d at p. 139 ].) In any event, allowing an employer to avoid judicial scrutiny because the number of minorities actually promoted was too small would allow it to benefit from its own discriminatory prac | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Franklin Life Insurance v. State Board of Equalization
green
2 sentences1967Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1965) 63 Cal.2d 222 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 869 , 404 P.2d 477 ], the Supreme Court held (adopting a position already taken by the Attorney General in 35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 182 ) that although the new statute would be unconstitutional if applied to a case where the discrimination contemplated by article XIII, section 14 4/5, subdivision (f)(3), is not present, no constitutional defect exists in any ease which meets both the discriminatory test of the constitutional provision and the comparative test of Insurance Code section 685. ( 63 Cal.2d 222 , 227.) By an amendmen 1967Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1965) 63 Cal.2d 222 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 869 , 404 P.2d 477 ], the Supreme Court held (adopting a position already taken by the Attorney General in 35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 182 ) that although the new statute would be unconstitutional if applied to a case where the discrimination contemplated by article XIII, section 14 4/5, subdivision (f)(3), is not present, no constitutional defect exists in any ease which meets both the discriminatory test of the constitutional provision and the comparative test of Insurance Code section 685. ( 63 Cal.2d 222 , 227.) By an amendmen | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.