ethics rule in California

2018(See Dornbirer v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 831 , 846, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 116 [under section 1281.91, subdivision (c), a claimant waives the right to disqualify the arbitrator by "consent[ing] to proceed with the arbitration despite being aware of the deficiencies in [the arbitrator's] disclosure" and cannot "challenge the arbitration award on the ground that [the arbitrator's] failure to provide" sufficient information in the disclosure "constitutes a 'ground for disqualification' "].) Honeycutt's remedy for the arbitrator's violations of Ethics standard 12(b) was

2018(See Dornbirer v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 831 , 846, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 116 [under section 1281.91, subdivision (c), a claimant waives the right to disqualify the arbitrator by "consent[ing] to proceed with the arbitration despite being aware of the deficiencies in [the arbitrator's] disclosure" and cannot "challenge the arbitration award on the ground that [the arbitrator's] failure to provide" sufficient information in the disclosure "constitutes a 'ground for disqualification' "].) Honeycutt's remedy for the arbitrator's violations of Ethics standard 12(b) was

2018Ethics Standards 7 and 12 The Ethics Standards at issue in this appeal are standards 7 and 12, which the Judicial Council adopted to address the " 'bias, or appearance of bias, that may flow from one side in an arbitration being a source or potential source of additional employment, and thus additional income, for the arbitrator.' " ( Ovitz , supra , 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 839 , 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 117 .) Ethics standard 7 describes the disclosure obligations of a "person nominated or appointed as an arbitrator." The proposed arbitrator must make the initial disclosures listed in standard 7 in writi

2018Ethics Standards 7 and 12 The Ethics Standards at issue in this appeal are standards 7 and 12, which the Judicial Council adopted to address the " 'bias, or appearance of bias, that may flow from one side in an arbitration being a source or potential source of additional employment, and thus additional income, for the arbitrator.' " ( Ovitz , supra , 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 839 , 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 117 .) Ethics standard 7 describes the disclosure obligations of a "person nominated or appointed as an arbitrator." The proposed arbitrator must make the initial disclosures listed in standard 7 in writi

2018Holyoke , supra , 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315 , 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 597 [arbitrator's "failure to timely disclose [a] ground for disqualification of which he was then aware compels the vacation of the arbitrator's award"]; Comment to Standard 7 ["[f]ailure to disclose, within the time required for disclosure, a ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware is a ground for vacatur of the arbitrator's award"].) To vacate an arbitration award under section 1286.2 for a violation of Ethics standard 7(d), the party challenging the award must show that the arbitrator was aware he or

2018Holyoke , supra , 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315 , 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 597 [arbitrator's "failure to timely disclose [a] ground for disqualification of which he was then aware compels the vacation of the arbitrator's award"]; Comment to Standard 7 ["[f]ailure to disclose, within the time required for disclosure, a ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware is a ground for vacatur of the arbitrator's award"].) To vacate an arbitration award under section 1286.2 for a violation of Ethics standard 7(d), the party challenging the award must show that the arbitrator was aware he or

2018Code, §§ 6147, subd. (b), 6148, subd. (c).) "Allowing quantum meruit recovery when two law firms negotiate a fee-sharing agreement without complying with [the ethics rule's] written client consent requirement is consistent with the Legislature's policy determination that, even if a particular fee or compensation agreement is not in writing or signed by the client, a law firm laboring under such an agreement nonetheless deserves reasonable compensation for its services." ( Huskinson , at p. 460, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 , 84 P.3d 379 .) Finally, we considered in Huskinson whether allowing recovery in

2018Code, §§ 6147, subd. (b), 6148, subd. (c).) "Allowing quantum meruit recovery when two law firms negotiate a fee-sharing agreement without complying with [the ethics rule's] written client consent requirement is consistent with the Legislature's policy determination that, even if a particular fee or compensation agreement is not in writing or signed by the client, a law firm laboring under such an agreement nonetheless deserves reasonable compensation for its services." ( Huskinson , at p. 460, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 , 84 P.3d 379 .) Finally, we considered in Huskinson whether allowing recovery in

2004As summarized by the court in Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 565 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 367 ] (Emmons): “Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation (Crawford v. State Bar [1960] 54 Cal.2d 659, 666 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 746 , 355 P.2d 490 ]); poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate (Utz v. State Bar [1942] 21 Cal.2d 100, 108 [ 130 P.2d 377 ]); facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorn

2004As summarized by the court in Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 565 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 367 ] (Emmons): “Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation (Crawford v. State Bar [1960] 54 Cal.2d 659, 666 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 746 , 355 P.2d 490 ]); poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate (Utz v. State Bar [1942] 21 Cal.2d 100, 108 [ 130 P.2d 377 ]); facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorn

2004As summarized by the court in Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 565 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 367 ] (Emmons): “Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation (Crawford v. State Bar [1960] 54 Cal.2d 659, 666 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 746 , 355 P.2d 490 ]); poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate (Utz v. State Bar [1942] 21 Cal.2d 100, 108 [ 130 P.2d 377 ]); facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorn

2004As summarized by the court in Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 565 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 367 ] (Emmons): “Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation (Crawford v. State Bar [1960] 54 Cal.2d 659, 666 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 746 , 355 P.2d 490 ]); poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate (Utz v. State Bar [1942] 21 Cal.2d 100, 108 [ 130 P.2d 377 ]); facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorn

2004As summarized by the court in Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 565 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 367 ] (Emmons): “Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation (Crawford v. State Bar [1960] 54 Cal.2d 659, 666 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 746 , 355 P.2d 490 ]); poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate (Utz v. State Bar [1942] 21 Cal.2d 100, 108 [ 130 P.2d 377 ]); facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorn

2004As summarized by the court in Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 565 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 367 ] (Emmons): “Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation (Crawford v. State Bar [1960] 54 Cal.2d 659, 666 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 746 , 355 P.2d 490 ]); poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate (Utz v. State Bar [1942] 21 Cal.2d 100, 108 [ 130 P.2d 377 ]); facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorn

2004(Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142, 148 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 536 , 56 P.3d 645 ].) Subject to exceptions manifestly inapplicable here, current rule 1-320(A) of the CPRC* 11 admonishes with stark brevity: “Neither a member [of the State Bar] nor a law firm shall directly or indirectly share legal fees with a person who is not a lawyer, . . .” This is not an ethics rule of recent vintage, for the State Bar’s general prohibition against sharing fees with nonmembers was adopted by the California Supreme Court as part of former rule 3 on December 1, 1944, 12 and was later reenacted as rule 3-102(A

2004(Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142, 148 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 536 , 56 P.3d 645 ].) Subject to exceptions manifestly inapplicable here, current rule 1-320(A) of the CPRC* 11 admonishes with stark brevity: “Neither a member [of the State Bar] nor a law firm shall directly or indirectly share legal fees with a person who is not a lawyer, . . .” This is not an ethics rule of recent vintage, for the State Bar’s general prohibition against sharing fees with nonmembers was adopted by the California Supreme Court as part of former rule 3 on December 1, 1944, 12 and was later reenacted as rule 3-102(A

2004As summarized by the court in Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 565 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 367 ] (Emmons): “Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation (Crawford v. State Bar [1960] 54 Cal.2d 659, 666 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 746 , 355 P.2d 490 ]); poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate (Utz v. State Bar [1942] 21 Cal.2d 100, 108 [ 130 P.2d 377 ]); facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorn

2004As summarized by the court in Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 565 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 367 ] (Emmons): “Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation (Crawford v. State Bar [1960] 54 Cal.2d 659, 666 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 746 , 355 P.2d 490 ]); poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate (Utz v. State Bar [1942] 21 Cal.2d 100, 108 [ 130 P.2d 377 ]); facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorn

1991Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740, 746 [ 218 Cal. Rptr. 24 , 705 P.2d 347 ].) The prosecutor was also factually correct in noting that discovery in the criminal context was not a two-way street; the prosecution's disclosure obligations were not reciprocated by the defense. ( In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543 [ 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 , 698 P.2d 637 ]; but see Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 [ 285 Cal. Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ].) Nor do we believe the jury could reasonably have interpreted the remarks as impugning the ethics of defense counsel, or as an improper attempt

1991Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740, 746 [ 218 Cal. Rptr. 24 , 705 P.2d 347 ].) The prosecutor was also factually correct in noting that discovery in the criminal context was not a two-way street; the prosecution's disclosure obligations were not reciprocated by the defense. ( In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543 [ 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 , 698 P.2d 637 ]; but see Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 [ 285 Cal. Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ].) Nor do we believe the jury could reasonably have interpreted the remarks as impugning the ethics of defense counsel, or as an improper attempt

1985Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 150, 155 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 478 , 624 P.2d 1206 ].) We express no view on whether a dating relationship is covered by this ethics rule.

1985Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 150, 155 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 478 , 624 P.2d 1206 ].) We express no view on whether a dating relationship is covered by this ethics rule.

1985(But see Codiga v. State Bar (1978) 20 Cal.3d 788, 792 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 404 , 575 P.2d 1186 ], construing the identical language of former State Bar rule 6 as applying to an in-law.) See also Cross, Ethical Issues Facing Lawyer-Spouses and Their Employers (1981) 34 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 1435; Comment, Ethical Concerns of Lawyers Who Are Related by Kinship or Marriage, supra, 60 Ore.L.Rev. 399; Note, Legal Ethics—Representation of Differing Interests by Husband and Wife: Appearance of Impropriety and Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest? (1975) 52 Denver L.J. 735. 2 The Maxwell and Mroczko decisions in

1985(But see Codiga v. State Bar (1978) 20 Cal.3d 788, 792 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 404 , 575 P.2d 1186 ], construing the identical language of former State Bar rule 6 as applying to an in-law.) See also Cross, Ethical Issues Facing Lawyer-Spouses and Their Employers (1981) 34 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 1435; Comment, Ethical Concerns of Lawyers Who Are Related by Kinship or Marriage, supra, 60 Ore.L.Rev. 399; Note, Legal Ethics—Representation of Differing Interests by Husband and Wife: Appearance of Impropriety and Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest? (1975) 52 Denver L.J. 735. 2 The Maxwell and Mroczko decisions in