evidence warranted instruction in California

1986(See also People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 684.) Even if there were any doubt whether the evidence warranted the instruction, “[djoubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions should be resolved in favor of the accused.

1982The Legislature has deemed such self-defense to be justifiable homicide rather than voluntary manslaughter. (§ 197.) Hence, a trial court should not instruct on heat-of-passion *328 voluntary manslaughter where the same facts would give rise to a finding of reasonable self-defense. [6] (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 678 ; People v. Mitchell (1939) 14 Cal.2d 237, 241-242 [ 93 P.2d 121 ]; People v. Manzo (1937) 9 Cal.2d 594, 598-599 [ 72 P.2d 119 ].) Whether or not the evidence warranted an instruction on heat of passion, the alternative theory of unreasonable self-defense was certainly ra

2016(See People v. Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 29 .) “Imperfect self-defense, which reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter, arises when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. [Citations.]” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527 , 561- 562; see People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611, 620 .) Imperfect or unreasonable self-defense “‘may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances u

2016(See People v. Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 29 .) “Imperfect self-defense, which reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter, arises when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. [Citations.]” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527 , 561- 562; see People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611, 620 .) Imperfect or unreasonable self-defense “‘may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances u

2016(See People v. Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 29 .) “Imperfect self-defense, which reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter, arises when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. [Citations.]” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527 , 561- 562; see People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611, 620 .) Imperfect or unreasonable self-defense “‘may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances u

2016(See People v. Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 29 .) “Imperfect self-defense, which reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter, arises when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. [Citations.]” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527 , 561- 562; see People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611, 620 .) Imperfect or unreasonable self-defense “‘may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances u

2004(See People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196-198 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ].) We need not decide whether the evidence warranted an instruction on second degree murder in this case because we find any error both invited and harmless.

2004(See People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196-198 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ].) We need not decide whether the evidence warranted an instruction on second degree murder in this case because we find any error both invited and harmless.

1998(People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248, 274-276 [failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter harmless under Sedeño standard]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1222 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] [same result as to failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter].) Even assuming the evidence warranted instruction on degrees or theories of unlawful homicide other than those given, the instructions actually given and the verdicts actually rendered persuade us beyond doubt that the jury would not have adopted any such lesser degrees or theories.

1998(People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248, 274-276 [failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter harmless under Sedeño standard]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1222 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] [same result as to failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter].) Even assuming the evidence warranted instruction on degrees or theories of unlawful homicide other than those given, the instructions actually given and the verdicts actually rendered persuade us beyond doubt that the jury would not have adopted any such lesser degrees or theories.

1998(People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248, 274-276 [failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter harmless under Sedeño standard]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1222 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] [same result as to failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter].) Even assuming the evidence warranted instruction on degrees or theories of unlawful homicide other than those given, the instructions actually given and the verdicts actually rendered persuade us beyond doubt that the jury would not have adopted any such lesser degrees or theories.

1989For its part, the court was under a duty to instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ]), and the court correctly determined that the evidence warranted instruction on the law pertaining to felony murder and accomplice liability, in addition to instruction on the prosecutor’s theory of deliberate and premeditated murder.

1989For its part, the court was under a duty to instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ]), and the court correctly determined that the evidence warranted instruction on the law pertaining to felony murder and accomplice liability, in addition to instruction on the prosecutor’s theory of deliberate and premeditated murder.

1982The Legislature has deemed such self-defense to be justifiable homicide rather than voluntary manslaughter. (§ 197.) Hence, a trial court should not instruct on heat-of-passion *328 voluntary manslaughter where the same facts would give rise to a finding of reasonable self-defense. [6] (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 678 ; People v. Mitchell (1939) 14 Cal.2d 237, 241-242 [ 93 P.2d 121 ]; People v. Manzo (1937) 9 Cal.2d 594, 598-599 [ 72 P.2d 119 ].) Whether or not the evidence warranted an instruction on heat of passion, the alternative theory of unreasonable self-defense was certainly ra

1982The Legislature has deemed such self-defense to be justifiable homicide rather than voluntary manslaughter. (§ 197.) Hence, a trial court should not instruct on heat-of-passion *328 voluntary manslaughter where the same facts would give rise to a finding of reasonable self-defense. [6] (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 678 ; People v. Mitchell (1939) 14 Cal.2d 237, 241-242 [ 93 P.2d 121 ]; People v. Manzo (1937) 9 Cal.2d 594, 598-599 [ 72 P.2d 119 ].) Whether or not the evidence warranted an instruction on heat of passion, the alternative theory of unreasonable self-defense was certainly ra

1982The Legislature has deemed such self-defense to be justifiable homicide rather than voluntary manslaughter. (§ 197.) Hence, a trial court should not instruct on heat-of-passion *328 voluntary manslaughter where the same facts would give rise to a finding of reasonable self-defense. [6] (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 678 ; People v. Mitchell (1939) 14 Cal.2d 237, 241-242 [ 93 P.2d 121 ]; People v. Manzo (1937) 9 Cal.2d 594, 598-599 [ 72 P.2d 119 ].) Whether or not the evidence warranted an instruction on heat of passion, the alternative theory of unreasonable self-defense was certainly ra

1982The Legislature has deemed such self-defense to be justifiable homicide rather than voluntary manslaughter. (§ 197.) Hence, a trial court should not instruct on heat-of-passion *328 voluntary manslaughter where the same facts would give rise to a finding of reasonable self-defense. [6] (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 678 ; People v. Mitchell (1939) 14 Cal.2d 237, 241-242 [ 93 P.2d 121 ]; People v. Manzo (1937) 9 Cal.2d 594, 598-599 [ 72 P.2d 119 ].) Whether or not the evidence warranted an instruction on heat of passion, the alternative theory of unreasonable self-defense was certainly ra

1965(People v. Jones, 215 Cal.App. 2d 341, 347 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 280 ].) Likewise, the evidence warranted the instruction that the killing occurred in the course of an assault with a deadly weapon—both defendants having admitted that they pulled out their knives during the fight— thus constituting murder in the second degree and fully warranting the instruction given by the judge on this subject.

1965(People v. Jones, 215 Cal.App. 2d 341, 347 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 280 ].) Likewise, the evidence warranted the instruction that the killing occurred in the course of an assault with a deadly weapon—both defendants having admitted that they pulled out their knives during the fight— thus constituting murder in the second degree and fully warranting the instruction given by the judge on this subject.