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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Estradagreen2 sentences2016(Ibid.) “The rule in Estrada, of course, is not implicated where the Legislature clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent.” (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 , fn. omitted (Nasalga) (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.); see Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747 [“where there is an express or implied saving clause,” the prior statute “should continue to operate as to past acts”].) If there is no express saving clause, one will be implied if the Legislature or electorate has “demonstrate[d] its intention 2016(Ibid.) “The rule in Estrada, of course, is not implicated where the Legislature clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent.” (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 , fn. omitted (Nasalga) (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.); see Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747 [“where there is an express or implied saving clause,” the prior statute “should continue to operate as to past acts”].) If there is no express saving clause, one will be implied if the Legislature or electorate has “demonstrate[d] its intention | 6 | 6 |
People v. Pedro T.green2 sentences2016(Ibid.) “The rule in Estrada, of course, is not implicated where the Legislature clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent.” (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 , fn. omitted (Nasalga) (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.); see Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747 [“where there is an express or implied saving clause,” the prior statute “should continue to operate as to past acts”].) If there is no express saving clause, one will be implied if the Legislature or electorate has “demonstrate[d] its intention 2016(Ibid.) “The rule in Estrada, of course, is not implicated where the Legislature clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent.” (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 , fn. omitted (Nasalga) (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.); see Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747 [“where there is an express or implied saving clause,” the prior statute “should continue to operate as to past acts”].) If there is no express saving clause, one will be implied if the Legislature or electorate has “demonstrate[d] its intention | 5 | 5 |
People v. Yearwoodgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 172 (Yearwood).) The Reform Act “change[d] the requirements for sentencing a third strike offender” by authorizing life sentences only in certain cases. ( Yearwood, supra, at p. 167 .) The Reform Act also enacted a new 8 statute, section 1170.126, which “created a postconviction release proceeding whereby [an eligible] prisoner . . . may have his or her sentence recalled and be sentenced as a second strike offender unless the court determines that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. [Citation.]” ( Yearwood, su 2016(People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 172 (Yearwood).) The Reform Act “change[d] the requirements for sentencing a third strike offender” by authorizing life sentences only in certain cases. ( Yearwood, supra, at p. 167 .) The Reform Act also enacted a new 8 statute, section 1170.126, which “created a postconviction release proceeding whereby [an eligible] prisoner . . . may have his or her sentence recalled and be sentenced as a second strike offender unless the court determines that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. [Citation.]” ( Yearwood, su | 4 | 4 |
Governing Board of Rialto Unified School District v. Manngreen2 sentences2019A statutory right (like that available under former § 4007.5 ) becomes vested-and, thus, protected in the event the statute is repealed-only if the right is converted into a final judgment before the repeal. ( Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819 , 822, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ( Mann ).) Thus, a *10 party in litigation may acquire a vested right only "when the award is final and any appeals have been concluded by a final judgment." ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1606 , 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 ; accord, Mann , supra , 18 Cal.3d at p. 822 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 55 2019A statutory right (like that available under former § 4007.5 ) becomes vested-and, thus, protected in the event the statute is repealed-only if the right is converted into a final judgment before the repeal. ( Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819 , 822, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ( Mann ).) Thus, a *10 party in litigation may acquire a vested right only "when the award is final and any appeals have been concluded by a final judgment." ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1606 , 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 ; accord, Mann , supra , 18 Cal.3d at p. 822 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 55 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gillgreen1 sentence2013(See In re Estrada (1966) 63 Cal.2d 740, 747 [where new law increases punishment, an offender can be punished under old law if there is an express or implied saving clause]; cf. People v. Gill (1857) 7 Cal. 356, 357 [amended penal law's saving clause continued old law in effect as to offenses committed prior to amendment].) Former section 4019, effective September 28, 2010, which was in effect before the 2011 amendments, provided that "a term of six days will be deemed to have been served for every four days spent in actual custody." (Stats.2010, ch. 426, § 2, p. 2088. eff. 9 Sept. 28, 2010.) | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Nasalga
green
2 sentences2016(Ibid.) “The rule in Estrada, of course, is not implicated where the Legislature clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent.” (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 , fn. omitted (Nasalga) (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.); see Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747 [“where there is an express or implied saving clause,” the prior statute “should continue to operate as to past acts”].) If there is no express saving clause, one will be implied if the Legislature or electorate has “demonstrate[d] its intention 2016(Ibid.) “The rule in Estrada, of course, is not implicated where the Legislature clearly signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent.” (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 , fn. omitted (Nasalga) (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.); see Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747 [“where there is an express or implied saving clause,” the prior statute “should continue to operate as to past acts”].) If there is no express saving clause, one will be implied if the Legislature or electorate has “demonstrate[d] its intention | 5 | 2015–2016 |
Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty
green
2 sentences2019More than a century ago, our Supreme Court explained: "[W]here a right is created solely by a statute, and is dependent upon the statute alone, and such right is still inchoate, and not reduced to possession, or perfected by final judgment, the repeal of the statute destroys the remedy, unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause." ( Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty (1901) 134 Cal. 315 , 317, 66 P. 322 .) As we discuss, neither situation is present here; C.P. did not have any vested rights at the time of former section 4007.5's repeal, and current section 4007.5 does not contain an ex 2019More than a century ago, our Supreme Court explained: "[W]here a right is created solely by a statute, and is dependent upon the statute alone, and such right is still inchoate, and not reduced to possession, or perfected by final judgment, the repeal of the statute destroys the remedy, unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause." ( Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty (1901) 134 Cal. 315 , 317, 66 P. 322 .) As we discuss, neither situation is present here; C.P. did not have any vested rights at the time of former section 4007.5's repeal, and current section 4007.5 does not contain an ex | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Beverly Hilton Hotel v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
green
2 sentences2019A statutory right (like that available under former § 4007.5 ) becomes vested-and, thus, protected in the event the statute is repealed-only if the right is converted into a final judgment before the repeal. ( Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819 , 822, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ( Mann ).) Thus, a *10 party in litigation may acquire a vested right only "when the award is final and any appeals have been concluded by a final judgment." ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1606 , 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 ; accord, Mann , supra , 18 Cal.3d at p. 822 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 55 2019A statutory right (like that available under former § 4007.5 ) becomes vested-and, thus, protected in the event the statute is repealed-only if the right is converted into a final judgment before the repeal. ( Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819 , 822, 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 558 P.2d 1 ( Mann ).) Thus, a *10 party in litigation may acquire a vested right only "when the award is final and any appeals have been concluded by a final judgment." ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1606 , 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 ; accord, Mann , supra , 18 Cal.3d at p. 822 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 526 , 55 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Marquez
green
1 sentence2013(See In re Estrada (1966) 63 Cal.2d 740, 747 [where new law increases punishment, an offender can be punished under old law if there is an express or implied saving clause]; cf. People v. Gill (1857) 7 Cal. 356, 357 [amended penal law's saving clause continued old law in effect as to offenses committed prior to amendment].) Former section 4019, effective September 28, 2010, which was in effect before the 2011 amendments, provided that "a term of six days will be deemed to have been served for every four days spent in actual custody." (Stats.2010, ch. 426, § 2, p. 2088. eff. 9 Sept. 28, 2010.) | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.