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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Belmontesgreen2 sentences2015The Gutierrez court noted that remand for resentencing is required when a trial court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers “unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391 , quoting People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 .) The Gutierrez court ordered resentencing in the two cases before it because in one case the trial court had expressly referred to the Guinn presumption in favor of LWOP while in the other case, a 2015The Gutierrez court noted that remand for resentencing is required when a trial court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers “unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391 , quoting People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 .) The Gutierrez court ordered resentencing in the two cases before it because in one case the trial court had expressly referred to the Guinn presumption in favor of LWOP while in the other case, a | 4 | 4 |
Roper v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences2014The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” This constitutional provision “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.” (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 560 (Roper).) This right “flows from the basic ‘ “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” ’ ” (Ibid.) To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment, “courts must look beyond historical concepti 2014The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” This constitutional provision “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.” (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 560 (Roper).) This right “flows from the basic ‘ “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” ’ ” (Ibid.) To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment, “courts must look beyond historical concepti | 2 | 2 |
Graham v. Floridagreen2 sentences2014The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” This constitutional provision “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.” (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 560 (Roper).) This right “flows from the basic ‘ “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” ’ ” (Ibid.) To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment, “courts must look beyond historical concepti 2014The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” This constitutional provision “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.” (Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 560 (Roper).) This right “flows from the basic ‘ “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” ’ ” (Ibid.) To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment, “courts must look beyond historical concepti | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gutierrez
green
2 sentences2022(Id., subd. (h).) Our Supreme Court subsequently observed that section 190.5, subdivision (b) confers discretion on the sentencing court to impose a sentence of either LWOP or 25 years to life on a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstances murder, but Guinn’s presumption in favor of LWOP was inconsistent with the high court’s decision in Miller. ( Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1386-1387.) In Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190 , at page 212, the high court concluded that Miller was a new substantive rule that applies retroactively. 2014In Gutierrez, the Attorney General argued the enactment of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) eliminated any constitutional problems arising from the Guinn presumption by effectively transforming the sentence into life with the possibility of parole. ( Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1384-1386.) The Supreme Court disagreed, pointing out that even if the defendant were successful in his petition, the same questionable presumption would apply at resentencing because the new sentencing hearing must be conducted “ ‘in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced.’ ” (Id. | 3 | 2014–2022 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2014In sum, the Attorney General’s 35 reliance on the data cited in Miller does not enable us to confidently conclude that the discretion afforded by section 190.5(b), when constrained by a presumption in favor of life without parole, has resulted in imposition of life without parole only on “ ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2469 ].) Finally, the Attorney General argues that the recent enactment of Penal Code, section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) (hereafter section 1170(d)(2)) eliminates any constitutional 2014In sum, the Attorney General’s 35 reliance on the data cited in Miller does not enable us to confidently conclude that the discretion afforded by section 190.5(b), when constrained by a presumption in favor of life without parole, has resulted in imposition of life without parole only on “ ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2469 ].) Finally, the Attorney General argues that the recent enactment of Penal Code, section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) (hereafter section 1170(d)(2)) eliminates any constitutional | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Guinn
green
2 sentences2014(Guinn, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 1142 .) Third, the Attorney General claims that California‘s sentencing scheme already ―makes LWOP terms for minors uncommon in fact‖ notwithstanding the 33 Guinn presumption. 2014(Guinn, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 1142 .) Third, the Attorney General claims that California’s sentencing scheme already “makes LWOP terms for minors uncommon in fact” notwithstanding the 33 Guinn presumption. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2022(Id., subd. (h).) Our Supreme Court subsequently observed that section 190.5, subdivision (b) confers discretion on the sentencing court to impose a sentence of either LWOP or 25 years to life on a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstances murder, but Guinn’s presumption in favor of LWOP was inconsistent with the high court’s decision in Miller. ( Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1386-1387.) In Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190 , at page 212, the high court concluded that Miller was a new substantive rule that applies retroactively. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.