knowledgeable waiver in California

2013(People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 356 (Mosby).) “The Boykin-Tahl protections afforded an accused, other than the right of trial by jury, are available to juveniles charged pursuant to the Juvenile Court Law, as proceedings thereunder may result in a substantial deprivation of liberty analogous to incarceration for crime. [Citation.] The absence of a knowledgeable waiver of constitutional rights before entering a guilty plea or, in the case of juvenile court 6 proceedings, the admission of jurisdictional facts constitutes grounds for relief . . . .” (In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315,

2012Both parties admit and acknowledge that they have read the Agreement, and understand its meaning and legal consequences.” The first term of the Agreement provided each party waived any claim “in the separate property of the other.” In addition, the Agreement discussed spousal support: “Each of the parties acknowledge that while the case of In re Marriage of Higgason (1973) 10 [Cal.3d] 476 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 516 P.2d 289 ] (Higgason) . . . provides that the potential for the future right of spousal support cannot be waived by an agreement, the parties acknowledge that the law (relating to th

2012Both parties admit and acknowledge that they have read the Agreement, and understand its meaning and legal consequences.” The first term of the Agreement provided each party waived any claim “in the separate property of the other.” In addition, the Agreement discussed spousal support: “Each of the parties acknowledge that while the case of In re Marriage of Higgason (1973) 10 [Cal.3d] 476 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 516 P.2d 289 ] (Higgason) . . . provides that the potential for the future right of spousal support cannot be waived by an agreement, the parties acknowledge that the law (relating to th

1982(People v. Lara, supra, 67 Cal.2d 365 ; In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]; In re Anthony J., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 974 .) Accordingly, it is in the context of the totality of circumstances that we examine appellant’s specific contentions that the authorities should have sought consent from appellant’s parents or inquired whether appellant wished to speak to his parents or his sister.

1982(See People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 384 ; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ].) Rather, the question here is whether, under the totality of circumstances, appellant had the ability, capacity and willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver and hence to confess voluntarily to the crime or whether his will was actually overborne.

1982(See People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 384 ; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ].) Rather, the question here is whether, under the totality of circumstances, appellant had the ability, capacity and willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver and hence to confess voluntarily to the crime or whether his will was actually overborne.

1982(See People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 384 ; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ].) Rather, the question here is whether, under the totality of circumstances, appellant had the ability, capacity and willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver and hence to confess voluntarily to the crime or whether his will was actually overborne.

1982(People v. Lara, supra, 67 Cal.2d 365 ; In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]; In re Anthony J., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 974 .) Accordingly, it is in the context of the totality of circumstances that we examine appellant’s specific contentions that the authorities should have sought consent from appellant’s parents or inquired whether appellant wished to speak to his parents or his sister.

1982(People v. Lara, supra, 67 Cal.2d 365 ; In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]; In re Anthony J., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 974 .) Accordingly, it is in the context of the totality of circumstances that we examine appellant’s specific contentions that the authorities should have sought consent from appellant’s parents or inquired whether appellant wished to speak to his parents or his sister.

1982(See People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 384 ; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ].) Rather, the question here is whether, under the totality of circumstances, appellant had the ability, capacity and willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver and hence to confess voluntarily to the crime or whether his will was actually overborne.

1982(See People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 384 ; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 441 P.2d 625 ].) Rather, the question here is whether, under the totality of circumstances, appellant had the ability, capacity and willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver and hence to confess voluntarily to the crime or whether his will was actually overborne.

1982(People v. Lara, supra, 67 Cal.2d 365 ; In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]; In re Anthony J., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 974 .) Accordingly, it is in the context of the totality of circumstances that we examine appellant’s specific contentions that the authorities should have sought consent from appellant’s parents or inquired whether appellant wished to speak to his parents or his sister.

1980McCann (1942) 317 U.S. 269, 279 [ 87 L.Ed. 268, 275 , 63 S.Ct. 236 , 143 A.L.R. 435 ].) In People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 588 P.2d 773 ], the Supreme Court recognized that for there to be a judicial determination of a knowledgeable waiver of counsel discernible from the record “.. . the trial court must determine ‘whether the defendant has the mental capacity to waive his constitutional right to counsel. . . .’” (Id. at p. 113, quoting Curry v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 221, 226 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 884 ].) In Curry v. Superior Court, supra, it was determined t

1980McCann (1942) 317 U.S. 269, 279 [ 87 L.Ed. 268, 275 , 63 S.Ct. 236 , 143 A.L.R. 435 ].) In People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 588 P.2d 773 ], the Supreme Court recognized that for there to be a judicial determination of a knowledgeable waiver of counsel discernible from the record “.. . the trial court must determine ‘whether the defendant has the mental capacity to waive his constitutional right to counsel. . . .’” (Id. at p. 113, quoting Curry v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 221, 226 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 884 ].) In Curry v. Superior Court, supra, it was determined t

1977(See In re Sutherland (1972) 6 Cal.3d 666 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 493 P.2d 857 ].) The People concede that at the initial jurisdictional hearing in 1971 there was no compliance with Boykin-Tahl requirements.

1977(See In re Sutherland (1972) 6 Cal.3d 666 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 493 P.2d 857 ].) The People concede that at the initial jurisdictional hearing in 1971 there was no compliance with Boykin-Tahl requirements.

1972For these reasons and others the assistance of counsel at the time of sentencing is necessary in order to accord to the defendant the full advantage of his constitutional rights unless, as stated, a knowledgeable waiver of those rights has been intelligently made.” (See In re Levi, supra, 39 Cal.2d 41.) It is true that in Turrieta, supra, the court found that the defendant was confused and incapable of legally protecting herself.