legislative function violation in California

2010We may rewrite a statute to cure constitutional invalidity when we can assert confidently that “ ‘(i) it is possible to reform the statute in a manner that closely effectuates policy judgments clearly articulated by the enacting body, and (ii) the enacting body would have preferred the reformed construction to invalidation of the statute.’ ” (Ceridian, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 889 .) By heeding these factors, courts can steer clear of judicial policymaking disguised as statutory reformation, and thereby avoid impinging on the legislative function in violation of separation of powers princip

2008As [FTB] recognizes, attempting to rewrite subdivision (b) would involve us in precisely the type of judicial policymaking and encroachment on the legislative function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, against which the Kopp court warned. [Citation.] Thus, reformation is not possible in this case.” (Ibid.) *1225 Similarly, in City of Modesto v. National Med, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 518 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 215 ] (City of Modesto), a city filed suit to recover a tax deficiency assessed under a municipal license tax.

2008As [FTB] recognizes, attempting to rewrite subdivision (b) would involve us in precisely the type of judicial policymaking and encroachment on the legislative function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, against which the Kopp court warned. [Citation.] Thus, reformation is not possible in this case.” (Ibid.) *1225 Similarly, in City of Modesto v. National Med, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 518 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 215 ] (City of Modesto), a city filed suit to recover a tax deficiency assessed under a municipal license tax.

2003By applying these factors, courts may steer clear of `judicial policymaking' in the guise of statutory reformation, and thereby avoid encroaching on the legislative function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine." ( Id. at pp. 660-661, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108 , 905 P.2d 1248 .) Minor invokes this court's statement in In re Timothy R. (1988) 202 Cal. App.3d 593 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 721 : "Courts will attempt to preserve an enactment's constitutionality by a reasonable narrowing construction (e.g., Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior University (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 322, 348 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 228

2003By applying these factors, courts may steer clear of `judicial policymaking' in the guise of statutory reformation, and thereby avoid encroaching on the legislative function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine." ( Id. at pp. 660-661, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108 , 905 P.2d 1248 .) Minor invokes this court's statement in In re Timothy R. (1988) 202 Cal. App.3d 593 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 721 : "Courts will attempt to preserve an enactment's constitutionality by a reasonable narrowing construction (e.g., Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior University (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 322, 348 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 228

2003By applying these factors, courts may steer clear of `judicial policymaking' in the guise of statutory reformation, and thereby avoid encroaching on the legislative function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine." ( Id. at pp. 660-661, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108 , 905 P.2d 1248 .) Minor invokes this court's statement in In re Timothy R. (1988) 202 Cal. App.3d 593 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 721 : "Courts will attempt to preserve an enactment's constitutionality by a reasonable narrowing construction (e.g., Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior University (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 322, 348 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 228

2003By applying these factors, courts may steer clear of `judicial policymaking' in the guise of statutory reformation, and thereby avoid encroaching on the legislative function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine." ( Id. at pp. 660-661, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108 , 905 P.2d 1248 .) Minor invokes this court's statement in In re Timothy R. (1988) 202 Cal. App.3d 593 , 248 Cal.Rptr. 721 : "Courts will attempt to preserve an enactment's constitutionality by a reasonable narrowing construction (e.g., Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior University (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 322, 348 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 228

1959The consequence that the statute has become applicable, and conduct in violation thereof has become actionable, is in no way due to the exercise of any assumed legislative power on the part of the contracting parties. [Citation.] We conclude that there is no delegation of the legislative function in violation of constitutional prohibitions." ( 45 Cal.2d at p. 888 .) Whether the same conclusion applies to the provisions involved here depends upon whether the function performed by the persons who assertedly exercise delegated legislative powers is the same under the general Fair Trade Act and th

1959The consequence that the statute has become applicable, and conduct in violation thereof has become actionable, is in no way due to the exercise of any assumed legislative power on the part of the contracting parties. [Citation.] We conclude that there is no delegation of the legislative function in violation of constitutional prohibitions.” ( 45 Cal.2d at p. 888 .) Whether the same conclusion applies to the provisions involved here depends upon whether the function performed by the persons who assertedly exercise delegated legislative powers is the same under the general Fair Trade Act and th

1955(See Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., supra, 225 Wis. 474 [ 224 N.W. 426 ].) We conclude that there is no delegation of the legislative function in violation of constitutional prohibitions.

1955(See Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., supra, 225 Wis. 474 [ 224 N.W. 426 ].) We conclude that there is no delegation of the legislative function in violation of constitutional prohibitions. [5] The claim of indefiniteness of the expression "fair and open competition" (Bus. & Prof.