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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Eduardo A.green1 sentence2016(See, e.g., In re Eduardo A. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1038, 1042 (Eduardo A.) [explaining the limited nature of the exception]; People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 511-512 [discussing the exception in the context of a criminal defendant pleading not guilty by reason of insanity].) As courts have noted in juvenile dependency cases, matters more analogous to the present case than criminal cases, court-ordered counseling to assist in understanding and addressing, for example, a past molestation, is quite different from the 6 The 2014 order also specifies that Dr. Davidoff was to determine when to | 1 | 1 |
People v. Linesgreen1 sentence2016(See, e.g., In re Eduardo A. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1038, 1042 (Eduardo A.) [explaining the limited nature of the exception]; People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 511-512 [discussing the exception in the context of a criminal defendant pleading not guilty by reason of insanity].) As courts have noted in juvenile dependency cases, matters more analogous to the present case than criminal cases, court-ordered counseling to assist in understanding and addressing, for example, a past molestation, is quite different from the 6 The 2014 order also specifies that Dr. Davidoff was to determine when to | 1 | 1 |
People v. Barragangreen2 sentences2006To paraphrase Lucido, "because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS's] failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) For these reasons, the majority errs in asserting that "the purposes" of administrative fair hearings and welfare fraud prosecutions "do not differ greatly." (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 2006To paraphrase Lucido, "because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS's] failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) For these reasons, the majority errs in asserting that "the purposes" of administrative fair hearings and welfare fraud prosecutions "do not differ greatly." (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. | 1 | 1 |
Glade v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1991The quoted language clearly requires an intention on the part of the client to abuse the attorney-client relationship, . . .’ (Glade v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 738, 746 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 119 ]. 1991The quoted language clearly requires an intention on the part of the client to abuse the attorney-client relationship, . . .’ (Glade v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 738, 746 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 119 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Dennis B.green2 sentences1990(Cf. United States v. Miller, supra, 797 F.2d at p. 342 .) (1d) Given these distinctions between the revocation hearing and a criminal trial, application of collateral estoppel would not serve the public interest in holding probationers accountable for both violation of the terms of their probation and commission of newly alleged crimes. [10] (Cf. In re Dennis B. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 687, 696 [ 135 Cal. Rptr. 82 , 557 P.2d 514 ] *349 ["undeniable state interest in prosecuting serious misdemeanors and felonies" must be balanced against degree of harassment caused by successive proceedings].) Preemp 1990(Cf. United States v. Miller, supra, 797 F.2d at p. 342 .) (1d) Given these distinctions between the revocation hearing and a criminal trial, application of collateral estoppel would not serve the public interest in holding probationers accountable for both violation of the terms of their probation and commission of newly alleged crimes. [10] (Cf. In re Dennis B. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 687, 696 [ 135 Cal. Rptr. 82 , 557 P.2d 514 ] *349 ["undeniable state interest in prosecuting serious misdemeanors and felonies" must be balanced against degree of harassment caused by successive proceedings].) Preemp | 1 | 1 |
People v. Haykogreen2 sentences1990(See, e.g., People v. Hayko (1970) 7 Cal. App.3d 604, 610 [ 86 Cal. Rptr. 726 ].) Because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the People's failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the revocation hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. 1990(See, e.g., People v. Hayko (1970) 7 Cal. App.3d 604, 610 [ 86 Cal. Rptr. 726 ].) Because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the People's failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the revocation hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. | 1 | 1 |
Rosenthal v. Gouldgreen2 sentences1989The limited nature of that rule is also consistent with the two cases cited by the Black court in support of its holding: Rosenthal v. Gould (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 239, 243-244 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 244 ] and Anderson v. Thacher (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 50, 72 [ 172 P.2d 533 ]. 1989The limited nature of that rule is also consistent with the two cases cited by the Black court in support of its holding: Rosenthal v. Gould (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 239, 243-244 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 244 ] and Anderson v. Thacher (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 50, 72 [ 172 P.2d 533 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Thachergreen2 sentences1989The limited nature of that rule is also consistent with the two cases cited by the Black court in support of its holding: Rosenthal v. Gould (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 239, 243-244 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 244 ] and Anderson v. Thacher (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 50, 72 [ 172 P.2d 533 ]. 1989The limited nature of that rule is also consistent with the two cases cited by the Black court in support of its holding: Rosenthal v. Gould (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 239, 243-244 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 244 ] and Anderson v. Thacher (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 50, 72 [ 172 P.2d 533 ]. | 1 | 1 |
California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliottgreen2 sentences1978(See California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 580 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 551 P.2d 1193 ]; County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845 [ 59 Cal. Rptr. 609 , 428 P.2d 593 ].) (2) We stress initially the limited nature of our inquiry. 1978(See California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 580 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 551 P.2d 1193 ]; County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845 [ 59 Cal. Rptr. 609 , 428 P.2d 593 ].) (2) We stress initially the limited nature of our inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
County of Sacramento v. Hickmangreen2 sentences1978(See California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 580 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 551 P.2d 1193 ]; County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845 [ 59 Cal. Rptr. 609 , 428 P.2d 593 ].) (2) We stress initially the limited nature of our inquiry. 1978(See California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 580 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 551 P.2d 1193 ]; County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845 [ 59 Cal. Rptr. 609 , 428 P.2d 593 ].) (2) We stress initially the limited nature of our inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassettgreen2 sentences1942(South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 258 [ 60 S. Ct. 544 , 84 L.Ed. 732 ]; 24 Va. L. 1942(South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 258 [ 60 S. Ct. 544 , 84 L.Ed. 732 ]; 24 Va. L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
County of San Diego v. Gorham
green
1 sentence2024(See, e.g., Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1222, 1230 [proving residence contrary to the affidavit of service almost 10 years after entry of the default judgment].) And there are some motions brought beyond the two-year limit as to which trial courts will exercise their discretion to hold hearings and allow oral testimony. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lucido v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2006To paraphrase Lucido, "because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS's] failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) For these reasons, the majority errs in asserting that "the purposes" of administrative fair hearings and welfare fraud prosecutions "do not differ greatly." (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 2006To paraphrase Lucido, "because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS's] failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) For these reasons, the majority errs in asserting that "the purposes" of administrative fair hearings and welfare fraud prosecutions "do not differ greatly." (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2006To paraphrase Lucido, "because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS's] failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) For these reasons, the majority errs in asserting that "the purposes" of administrative fair hearings and welfare fraud prosecutions "do not differ greatly." (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 2006To paraphrase Lucido, "because the limited nature of this inquiry may not involve or invoke presentation of all evidence bearing on the underlying factual allegations, the [DSS's] failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof at the [administrative fair] hearing does not necessarily amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal standard of proof. [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) For these reasons, the majority errs in asserting that "the purposes" of administrative fair hearings and welfare fraud prosecutions "do not differ greatly." (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. John Franklin Miller, Sr.
green
2 sentences1990(Cf. United States v. Miller, supra, 797 F.2d at p. 342 .) Given these distinctions between the revocation hearing and a criminal trial, application of collateral estoppel would not serve the public interest in holding probationers accountable for both violation of the terms of their probation and commission of newly alleged crimes. 10 (Cf. In re Dennis B. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 687, 696 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 82 , 557 P.2d 514 ] [“undeniable state interest in prosecuting serious misdemeanors and felonies” must be balanced against degree of harassment caused by successive proceedings].) Preemption of trial 1990(Cf. United States v. Miller, supra, 797 F.2d at p. 342 .) (1d) Given these distinctions between the revocation hearing and a criminal trial, application of collateral estoppel would not serve the public interest in holding probationers accountable for both violation of the terms of their probation and commission of newly alleged crimes. [10] (Cf. In re Dennis B. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 687, 696 [ 135 Cal. Rptr. 82 , 557 P.2d 514 ] *349 ["undeniable state interest in prosecuting serious misdemeanors and felonies" must be balanced against degree of harassment caused by successive proceedings].) Preemp | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.