Mendez claim in California

2019At worst, what we have before us is a statement obtained during interrogation in violation of Edwards but " 'unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will.' " ( Storm , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 1033 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 , 52 P.3d 52 , quoting Elstad , supra , 470 U.S. at p. 309 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) The admissibility of Mendez's subsequent statement to Bakotich thus turns solely on whether that subsequent statement "was itself voluntary and obtained without a Miranda violation." ( Storm, at p. 1030, 124 Cal.Rp

2019At worst, what we have before us is a statement obtained during interrogation in violation of Edwards but " 'unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will.' " ( Storm , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 1033 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 , 52 P.3d 52 , quoting Elstad , supra , 470 U.S. at p. 309 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) The admissibility of Mendez's subsequent statement to Bakotich thus turns solely on whether that subsequent statement "was itself voluntary and obtained without a Miranda violation." ( Storm, at p. 1030, 124 Cal.Rp

2019(See People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1 , 24, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 , 354 P.3d 983 ( Romero and Self ) [observing that contemporaneous objections enable trial courts to create a record for appeal and correct errors in the first instance]; People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850 , 857, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 143 , 340 P.3d 371 [similar].) So we cannot fault the trial court for permitting Underhill's testimony about Mendez's police contacts under the circumstances that it did. *694 We reiterate that our analysis of Mendez's claim of Sanchez error is grounded in the unique facts of this case:

2019(See People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1 , 24, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 , 354 P.3d 983 ( Romero and Self ) [observing that contemporaneous objections enable trial courts to create a record for appeal and correct errors in the first instance]; People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850 , 857, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 143 , 340 P.3d 371 [similar].) So we cannot fault the trial court for permitting Underhill's testimony about Mendez's police contacts under the circumstances that it did. *694 We reiterate that our analysis of Mendez's claim of Sanchez error is grounded in the unique facts of this case:

2019(See People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1 , 24, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 , 354 P.3d 983 ( Romero and Self ) [observing that contemporaneous objections enable trial courts to create a record for appeal and correct errors in the first instance]; People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850 , 857, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 143 , 340 P.3d 371 [similar].) So we cannot fault the trial court for permitting Underhill's testimony about Mendez's police contacts under the circumstances that it did. *694 We reiterate that our analysis of Mendez's claim of Sanchez error is grounded in the unique facts of this case:

2019(See People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1 , 24, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 , 354 P.3d 983 ( Romero and Self ) [observing that contemporaneous objections enable trial courts to create a record for appeal and correct errors in the first instance]; People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850 , 857, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 143 , 340 P.3d 371 [similar].) So we cannot fault the trial court for permitting Underhill's testimony about Mendez's police contacts under the circumstances that it did. *694 We reiterate that our analysis of Mendez's claim of Sanchez error is grounded in the unique facts of this case:

2013“On review, we examine the jury instructions as a whole, in light of the trial record, to determine whether it is reasonably likely the jury understood the challenged instruction in a way that undermined the presumption of innocence or tended to relieve the prosecution of the burden to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 30 .) Over Mendez’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 as follows: “If the defendant fled immediately after the crime was committed, or after he was accused of committing the crime

2010While Graham emphasized that a state is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime, the court does require that a state “must” give a juvenile “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” ( Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p._[ 130 S.Ct. at p. 2030 ].) Although the court did not define what constitutes a “meaningful” opportunity for parole, leaving it to “the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance” (ibid.), common sense dictates that a juvenile who i

2010While Graham emphasized that a state is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime, the court does require that a state “must” give a juvenile “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” ( Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p._[ 130 S.Ct. at p. 2030 ].) Although the court did not define what constitutes a “meaningful” opportunity for parole, leaving it to “the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance” (ibid.), common sense dictates that a juvenile who i

2008Proc., § 170 [judge has duty to decide proceeding]; People v. Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 721 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 323 , 23 P.3d 563 ] [findings and recommendations of constitutionally limited nonjudicial officers must be independently reviewed by the court]; Hosford v. Henry (1951) 107 *1368 Cal.App.2d 765, 772 [ 238 P.2d 91 ] [court cannot delegate own factfinding powers].) Here, the trial court simply listened to new counsel’s “opinion” that there were no “issues involving a possible ineffective assistance of counsel claim” and, with no inquiry at all, assigned Mendez’s defens

2008Proc., § 170 [judge has duty to decide proceeding]; People v. Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 721 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 323 , 23 P.3d 563 ] [findings and recommendations of constitutionally limited nonjudicial officers must be independently reviewed by the court]; Hosford v. Henry (1951) 107 *1368 Cal.App.2d 765, 772 [ 238 P.2d 91 ] [court cannot delegate own factfinding powers].) Here, the trial court simply listened to new counsel’s “opinion” that there were no “issues involving a possible ineffective assistance of counsel claim” and, with no inquiry at all, assigned Mendez’s defens

2008Third, the trial court has the duty to “make a record sufficient to show the nature of [a defendant’s grievances and the court’s response to them.” (Eastman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 696 .) Here, immediately after Mendez identified the two prospective witnesses who characterized the assault as a “one-on-one,” the trial court asked him why he had not brought that up at the original probation and sentencing hearing, intimated that Mendez wanted “the [witnesses] [to] come back a second time to be frustrated,” and appointed new counsel.

2001Moreover, because we reject the Mendez analysis, absent a "business pursuits" or similar exclusion we would have been inclined to find a duty to defend in Ray based on the possibility the advice in question was given in a moment of carelessness that resulted in unexpected and unintended consequences. [11] While Horace Mann dealt with an educator's liability policy rather than a CGL policy as in this case ( Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1080 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ), it does illustrate the fact the existence of a sexual relationship, even an improper one, between the insured

2001Moreover, because we reject the Mendez analysis, absent a "business pursuits" or similar exclusion we would have been inclined to find a duty to defend in Ray based on the possibility the advice in question was given in a moment of carelessness that resulted in unexpected and unintended consequences. [11] While Horace Mann dealt with an educator's liability policy rather than a CGL policy as in this case ( Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1080 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ), it does illustrate the fact the existence of a sexual relationship, even an improper one, between the insured

2001Moreover, because we reject the Mendez analysis, absent a "business pursuits" or similar exclusion we would have been inclined to find a duty to defend in Ray based on the possibility the advice in question was given in a moment of carelessness that resulted in unexpected and unintended consequences. [11] While Horace Mann dealt with an educator's liability policy rather than a CGL policy as in this case ( Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1080 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ), it does illustrate the fact the existence of a sexual relationship, even an improper one, between the insured

2001Moreover, because we reject the Mendez analysis, absent a "business pursuits" or similar exclusion we would have been inclined to find a duty to defend in Ray based on the possibility the advice in question was given in a moment of carelessness that resulted in unexpected and unintended consequences. [11] While Horace Mann dealt with an educator's liability policy rather than a CGL policy as in this case ( Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1080 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ), it does illustrate the fact the existence of a sexual relationship, even an improper one, between the insured