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8 California opinions name it 1 courts 2011–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage of LaMusgagreen2 sentences2016(In re Marriage of Lasich (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 702, 720 .) The trial court recounted the move-away factors identified in In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072 , including the best interests of the child, the child’s need for continuity and stability in relationships, the extent of current shared custody, the impact on the child of relocation, the history of conflict between the parents, the parents’ predicted ability to facilitate continued contact, the ability of the parents to put the child’s needs ahead of their own, the age of the child, the child’s ties to any community or loc 2011Code, § 3007).” (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1081, fn. 1 .) One court subsequently stated: “When parents share joint custody^] the trial court need not question the wisdom of a parent’s move or examine the reasons for the proposed move, but should certainly consider evidence of bad faith by the moving party if such exists. [Citations.]” (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 364 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 398 ].) Assuming arguendo there was an existing final judicial custody determination at the time of the move-away hearing, we nevertheless would conclude Mother met her initial burden of sho | 1 | 3 |
In Re Marriage of Burgessgreen2 sentences2013For lack of a prior custody order, the move-away standard articulated in Burgess does not apply to this case. ( Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 31-32.) Instead, the trial court was required to make the initial custody determination based on the best interests of the children. 2011We reject Father’s assertion that the trial court erred by not applying the section 7501 rebuttable presumption requiring Mother to show Child would be detrimentally affected by a move with Father to Washington. 6 (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256 ; Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 37 ; In re Marriage of Richardson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 941, 952 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 ].) Because we conclude there was no existing final judicial custody determination at the time of the move-away hearing, neither the section 7501 rebuttable presumption nor any other requirement that Mother show changed cir | 1 | 3 |
NIKO v. Foremangreen2 sentences2011Code, § 3007).” (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1081, fn. 1 .) One court subsequently stated: “When parents share joint custody^] the trial court need not question the wisdom of a parent’s move or examine the reasons for the proposed move, but should certainly consider evidence of bad faith by the moving party if such exists. [Citations.]” (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 364 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 398 ].) Assuming arguendo there was an existing final judicial custody determination at the time of the move-away hearing, we nevertheless would conclude Mother met her initial burden of sho 2011Code, § 3007).” (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1081, fn. 1 .) One court subsequently stated: “When parents share joint custody^] the trial court need not question the wisdom of a parent’s move or examine the reasons for the proposed move, but should certainly consider evidence of bad faith by the moving party if such exists. [Citations.]” (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 364 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 398 ].) Assuming arguendo there was an existing final judicial custody determination at the time of the move-away hearing, we nevertheless would conclude Mother met her initial burden of sho | 1 | 2 |
De Angeles v. Roos Bros., Inc.green1 sentence2025Proc., § 909.) This includes the ability to “take additional evidence of or concerning facts occurring at any time prior to the decision of the appeal.” (Ibid.) But this ability is not “intended to transform reviewing courts into trial courts [citations] and the power granted is to be exercised sparingly.” (De Angeles v. Roos Bros., Inc. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 434, 443 [discussing former Code of Civil Procedure section 956a, which was substantively identical to section 909].) We grant the motion to strike in part, as to facts raised by Father that occurred after the time of the move-away hearin | 1 | 1 |
Yarborough v. Gentrygreen1 sentence2021(See Yarborough v. Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 5 [“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants 4 The temporary restraining order that Nwaigwe claims the trial court failed to adequately consider is also not contained in the record. 5 Nwaigwe also asserts that the trial judge’s “unethical past behaviors . . . may have affected the outcome at the hearing.” This argument is completely unsupported by the record and has no place in an appellate brief. 6 (U.S. Const., 6th Amend. [guaranteeing a defendant “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,” the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defe | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Faingreen1 sentence2021(See Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 (Fain).) As the Fain court explained: “Where no reporter’s transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. | 1 | 1 |
KEITH R. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2013(See generally Keith R. v. Superior Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1056 [domestic violence orders are not functional equivalent of final judicial custody determination].) Rather, the record reflects that the trial court was satisfied that it had fully evaluated the domestic violence issue at the February hearing, and hence it exercised its discretion to rely on its previous resolution of the issue rather than to permit another round of litigation on the exact same matter at the move-away hearing. 20 A trial court may properly take judicial notice of records and orders in its own files, and | 1 | 1 |
People v. Minceygreen1 sentence2013(In re Martin L. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 534, 539 .) Further, although a party has a due process right to present all competent, relevant, and material evidence, a trial court does not violate due process when it exercises its "power to rule on the admissibility of evidence, exclude proffered evidence that is deemed to be irrelevant, prejudicial or cumulative and expedite proceedings which, in the court's view, are dragging on too long without significantly aiding the trier of fact." (In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 291 ; see People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440 ; Pe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dunngreen1 sentence2013(In re Martin L. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 534, 539 .) Further, although a party has a due process right to present all competent, relevant, and material evidence, a trial court does not violate due process when it exercises its "power to rule on the admissibility of evidence, exclude proffered evidence that is deemed to be irrelevant, prejudicial or cumulative and expedite proceedings which, in the court's view, are dragging on too long without significantly aiding the trier of fact." (In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 291 ; see People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440 ; Pe | 1 | 1 |
Elkins v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2013A. Relevant Law A party has a right to call witnesses to testify at a family law proceeding. (§ 217; Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1345, 1356-1357 (Elkins).) Pursuant to section 217, the court is required to receive relevant live testimony, absent good cause for refusing to receive the testimony. (§ 217, subds. (a), (b); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8 At the May 8, 2012 hearing, the court ordered that Mother could move to Maryland immediately. | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2011We reject Father’s assertion that the trial court erred by not applying the section 7501 rebuttable presumption requiring Mother to show Child would be detrimentally affected by a move with Father to Washington. 6 (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256 ; Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 37 ; In re Marriage of Richardson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 941, 952 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 ].) Because we conclude there was no existing final judicial custody determination at the time of the move-away hearing, neither the section 7501 rebuttable presumption nor any other requirement that Mother show changed cir 2011We reject Father’s assertion that the trial court erred by not applying the section 7501 rebuttable presumption requiring Mother to show Child would be detrimentally affected by a move with Father to Washington. 6 (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256 ; Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 37 ; In re Marriage of Richardson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 941, 952 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 ].) Because we conclude there was no existing final judicial custody determination at the time of the move-away hearing, neither the section 7501 rebuttable presumption nor any other requirement that Mother show changed cir | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Montenegro v. Diaz
green
2 sentences2025(See Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 258 .) 5 (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 362 .) “A custody decision allowing one parent to move the children out of the state necessarily interferes with the other parent’s ability to have frequent and continuing contact with them” and “ ‘is one of the most serious decisions a family law court is required to make.’ ” (Seagondollar, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1119 .) “The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citation.] The precise measure is whether the trial cour 2011We reject Father’s assertion that the trial court erred by not applying the section 7501 rebuttable presumption requiring Mother to show Child would be detrimentally affected by a move with Father to Washington. 6 (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256 ; Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 37 ; In re Marriage of Richardson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 941, 952 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 ].) Because we conclude there was no existing final judicial custody determination at the time of the move-away hearing, neither the section 7501 rebuttable presumption nor any other requirement that Mother show changed cir | 2 | 2011–2025 |
Sm v. Ep
green
1 sentence2025Marian did not appeal the court’s DVRO findings, despite his improper attempts to relitigate them at the move-away hearing and here in this appeal. “[A] finding of domestic abuse sufficient to support a DVPA [(Domestic Violence Prevention Act)] restraining order necessarily triggers the presumption in section 3044.” (S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1267 .) Further, although the trial court did not make any explicit findings as to whether Marian brandished a gun to issue the DVRO, at an earlier hearing on December 8, 2022, the court stated, “the court’s impression was that he did have | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Reveron v. Seagondollar
green
1 sentence2025(See Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 258 .) 5 (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 362 .) “A custody decision allowing one parent to move the children out of the state necessarily interferes with the other parent’s ability to have frequent and continuing contact with them” and “ ‘is one of the most serious decisions a family law court is required to make.’ ” (Seagondollar, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1119 .) “The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citation.] The precise measure is whether the trial cour | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lasich v. Lasich
green
1 sentence2016(In re Marriage of Lasich (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 702, 720 .) The trial court recounted the move-away factors identified in In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072 , including the best interests of the child, the child’s need for continuity and stability in relationships, the extent of current shared custody, the impact on the child of relocation, the history of conflict between the parents, the parents’ predicted ability to facilitate continued contact, the ability of the parents to put the child’s needs ahead of their own, the age of the child, the child’s ties to any community or loc | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Marriage of Carlsson
green
1 sentence2013(In re Martin L. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 534, 539 .) Further, although a party has a due process right to present all competent, relevant, and material evidence, a trial court does not violate due process when it exercises its "power to rule on the admissibility of evidence, exclude proffered evidence that is deemed to be irrelevant, prejudicial or cumulative and expedite proceedings which, in the court's view, are dragging on too long without significantly aiding the trier of fact." (In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 291 ; see People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440 ; Pe | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re Martin L.
green
1 sentence2013(In re Martin L. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 534, 539 .) Further, although a party has a due process right to present all competent, relevant, and material evidence, a trial court does not violate due process when it exercises its "power to rule on the admissibility of evidence, exclude proffered evidence that is deemed to be irrelevant, prejudicial or cumulative and expedite proceedings which, in the court's view, are dragging on too long without significantly aiding the trier of fact." (In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 291 ; see People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440 ; Pe | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Slayton v. Biggums-Slayton
green
1 sentence2013(In re Marriage of Slayton & Biggums-Slayton, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 661 .) Although the trial court was not legally bound by its February ruling on the domestic violence issue for purposes of the move-away hearing, the court's decision to rely on the evidence and ruling from the February hearing was reasonable and did not violate due process. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.