natural watercourse rule in California

2015If both plaintiff and defendant have acted reasonably, the natural watercourse rule imposes the burden of stream-caused damage on the downstream property.” (Locklin, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 337.) When considering the reasonableness of adjoining landowners with respect to the flow of surface waters, the court considers “all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm which results, the purpose or motive with which the possessor acted, and all other relevant matter.” (Keys, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 410.) Another factor to be consid

1994In those cases, however, we have not considered whether that rule, as applied in this state, does include an element of reasonableness, or whether the rule of Keys v. Romley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 396 , which expressly holds that the upper owner’s conduct be reasonable, applies to the manner in which a riparian owner discharges surface waters into a natural watercourse. 16 Although this court has not considered the latter question, the Court of Appeal has done so in a series of decisions in which,the court either assumed that the rule of reasonableness is applicable or expressly held it to be appli

2015If both plaintiff and defendant have acted reasonably, the natural watercourse rule imposes the burden of stream-caused damage on the downstream property.” (Locklin, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 337.) When considering the reasonableness of adjoining landowners with respect to the flow of surface waters, the court considers “all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm which results, the purpose or motive with which the possessor acted, and all other relevant matter.” (Keys, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 410.) Another factor to be consid

2001Surface waters were discharged therefrom into a natural watercourse causing an increased flow of streamwater which damaged plaintiffs' downstream properties. [4] Under the natural watercourse rule, an upstream property owner who altered the natural drainage, channeling surface waters into a natural watercourse, was immune from any resulting damage to property downstream. ( Locklin, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 344 , 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 , 867 P.2d 724 .) The defendants in Locklin relied on this historic rule and argued that "extraordinary liability" would result if the court set it aside. ( Id. at p.

2016(See Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 596, 612, fn. 9 .) Locklin defined a natural watercourse as " 'a channel with defined bed and banks made and habitually used by water passing down as a collected body or stream in those seasons of the year and at those times when the streams in the region are accustomed to flow.' " (Locklin, 15 of the rule by acknowledging that "[t]he modern rule governing landowner liability for surface water runoff and drainage is no longer simply a rule of property law . . . .

2015First, Pinole Point’s appellate briefs do not “ ‘fairly summarize all of the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 739 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 658 ] [“In every appeal, ‘the appellant has the duty to fairly summarize all of the facts *935 in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ”].) Failure to provide all material evidence amounts to waiver of the alleged error and we may presume that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.

2015First, Pinole Point’s appellate briefs do not “ ‘fairly summarize all of the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 739 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 658 ] [“In every appeal, ‘the appellant has the duty to fairly summarize all of the facts *935 in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ”].) Failure to provide all material evidence amounts to waiver of the alleged error and we may presume that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.

2008Under private water law analysis, these rules immunized the landowner from liability for resulting damage to downstream property.” (Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 738 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 ].) But in recent cases, the Archer exception has been curtailed and the murky rules pertaining to liability imposed upon government entities for damage caused by flowing water have been refined.

2008Under private water law analysis, these rules immunized the landowner from liability for resulting damage to downstream property.” (Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 738 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 38 ].) But in recent cases, the Archer exception has been curtailed and the murky rules pertaining to liability imposed upon government entities for damage caused by flowing water have been refined.

1994Because Belair involved only flood control projects, however, and we had acknowledged in Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296 , that exceptions to inverse condemnation liability have been recognized for “privileged” activities, some lower courts have continued to apply the Archer exception to inverse condemnation liability in other cases in which a public agency invoked the natural watercourse rule.

1994While we did not decide in Holtz v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 296, 307 , whether the natural watercourse rule was such a privilege, we did note that the Archer exception was not necessarily an absolute privilege.

1988(Steiger v. City of San Diego (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 110, 114 [ 329 P.2d 94 ].) This common law rule provides that “an improvement for the purposes of drainage of lands above does not give a lower riparian owner on the stream a cause of action merely because the improvement increases the volume of water coming to his land in the stream with the incidents necessarily accompanying such increase of volume, but without affecting the stream in any other manner.” (San Gabriel V.

1988(Steiger v. City of San Diego (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 110, 114 [ 329 P.2d 94 ].) This common law rule provides that “an improvement for the purposes of drainage of lands above does not give a lower riparian owner on the stream a cause of action merely because the improvement increases the volume of water coming to his land in the stream with the incidents necessarily accompanying such increase of volume, but without affecting the stream in any other manner.” (San Gabriel V.

1976The Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 97 [ 196 P. 25 ], is in point: “It follows from the authorities cited that the construction of dikes along and parallel with the river banks and the mere deepening of the river channel along its natural course ... for the protection of their respective lands on one or the other banks of the river, or by their joint action through dikes on both sides of the river, were not wrongful so long as they did not obstruct the natural flow of the stream or divert its course....

1976The Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 97 [ 196 P. 25 ], is in point: “It follows from the authorities cited that the construction of dikes along and parallel with the river banks and the mere deepening of the river channel along its natural course ... for the protection of their respective lands on one or the other banks of the river, or by their joint action through dikes on both sides of the river, were not wrongful so long as they did not obstruct the natural flow of the stream or divert its course....