nonliability rule in California

2023This could be done, for instance, by indirectly including the cost of safety precautions and insurance coverage in the contract price. [Citations.] “Over time, the courts have, for policy reasons, created so many exceptions to this general rule of nonliability that ‘ “ ‘the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions.’ ” ’ [Citation]; Rest.2d Torts, §§ 410–429 and § 409, com. b, at p. 370 [describing the nonliability rule as ‘ “general” only in the sense that it is applied where no good reason is found for departing from it’].)” (Privette v. Superior Court (1

2000The rule, however, has become subject to so many exceptions that "`"`[it] is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions.'"' [Citations.]" ( Privette v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 ; see also Sugimoto v. Exportadora De Sal (9th Cir.1994) 19 F.3d 1309, 1312 [nonliability is the rule "only in the sense that it is applied when no good reason is found for departing from it"].) Two of the many acknowledged exceptions to the nonliability rule have been the doctrine of peculiar risk and the theory of negligent hiring.

2000The rule, however, has become subject to so many exceptions that "`"`[it] is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions.'"' [Citations.]" ( Privette v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 ; see also Sugimoto v. Exportadora De Sal (9th Cir.1994) 19 F.3d 1309, 1312 [nonliability is the rule "only in the sense that it is applied when no good reason is found for departing from it"].) Two of the many acknowledged exceptions to the nonliability rule have been the doctrine of peculiar risk and the theory of negligent hiring.

1974Workers, 16 Cal.App.3d 686, 697 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 562 ]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1974) Torts, § 856, pp. 3147-3148) or (2) where the tort was committed by an employee or agent acting in a managerial capacity (Lowe v. Yolo County etc. Water Co., 157 Cal. 503, 511-513 [ 108 P. 297 ]; Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 711-712 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 29 A.L.R.3d 988 ]).

1974Workers, 16 Cal.App.3d 686, 697 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 562 ]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1974) Torts, § 856, pp. 3147-3148) or (2) where the tort was committed by an employee or agent acting in a managerial capacity (Lowe v. Yolo County etc. Water Co., 157 Cal. 503, 511-513 [ 108 P. 297 ]; Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 711-712 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 29 A.L.R.3d 988 ]).

1974Workers, 16 Cal.App.3d 686, 697 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 562 ]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1974) Torts, § 856, pp. 3147-3148) or (2) where the tort was committed by an employee or agent acting in a managerial capacity (Lowe v. Yolo County etc. Water Co., 157 Cal. 503, 511-513 [ 108 P. 297 ]; Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 711-712 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 29 A.L.R.3d 988 ]).

1974Workers, 16 Cal.App.3d 686, 697 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 562 ]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1974) Torts, § 856, pp. 3147-3148) or (2) where the tort was committed by an employee or agent acting in a managerial capacity (Lowe v. Yolo County etc. Water Co., 157 Cal. 503, 511-513 [ 108 P. 297 ]; Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 711-712 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 29 A.L.R.3d 988 ]).

1974Workers, 16 Cal.App.3d 686, 697 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 562 ]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1974) Torts, § 856, pp. 3147-3148) or (2) where the tort was committed by an employee or agent acting in a managerial capacity (Lowe v. Yolo County etc. Water Co., 157 Cal. 503, 511-513 [ 108 P. 297 ]; Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 711-712 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 29 A.L.R.3d 988 ]).

1974Workers, 16 Cal.App.3d 686, 697 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 562 ]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1974) Torts, § 856, pp. 3147-3148) or (2) where the tort was committed by an employee or agent acting in a managerial capacity (Lowe v. Yolo County etc. Water Co., 157 Cal. 503, 511-513 [ 108 P. 297 ]; Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 711-712 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 29 A.L.R.3d 988 ]).

1951It is precisely the situation presented to our Supreme Court in 1862, in respect to the treatment and care of the indigent sick at the Yuba County Hospital, when that court said that "a quasi corporation, like a county, is not liable for the acts of officers or employees which it appoints in the exercise of a portion of the sovereign power of the State, by the requirements of a public law, and simply for the public benefit, and for a purpose from which the county, as a corporation, derives no benefit." (Sherbourne v. Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113, at p. 115 [81 Am.Dec. 151].) This doctrine of nonli

1951It is precisely the situation presented to our Supreme Court in 1862, in respect to the treatment and care of the indigent sick at the Yuba County Hospital, when that court said that “a quasi corporation, like a county, is not liable for the acts of officers or employees which it appoints in the exercise of a portion of the sovereign power of the State, by the requirements of a public law, and simply for the public benefit, and for a purpose from which the county, as a corporation, derives no benefit.” (Sherbourne v. Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113, at p. 115 [81 Am.Dec. 151].) This doctrine of nonli

1939In the later case of Stewart v. California Med. etc. Assn., 178 Cal. 418, 422, 423 [ 176 Pac. 46 ], the court took occasion to refer to the prior ruling and after declaring its status to be that of obiter, stated that it “cannot be considered as having committed this court to any one of the several theories on which the nonliability of charitable corporations is based, or to the doctrine of nonliability”, concluding that “It may be noted, however, that if this rule [of exemption based on implied contract] is followed, the defendant could hardly claim to be thereby relieved of responsibility, f

1939In the later case of Stewart v. California Med. etc. Assn., 178 Cal. 418, 422, 423 [ 176 Pac. 46 ], the court took occasion to refer to the prior ruling and after declaring its status to be that of obiter, stated that it “cannot be considered as having committed this court to any one of the several theories on which the nonliability of charitable corporations is based, or to the doctrine of nonliability”, concluding that “It may be noted, however, that if this rule [of exemption based on implied contract] is followed, the defendant could hardly claim to be thereby relieved of responsibility, f