one-subject rule in California

2016(Ibid., italics added.) The Nevada Supreme Court rejected a federal constitutional challenge to the Nevada Equal Rights Amendment vote, explaining that the advisory question was not “a limitation on legislative power violative of article V of the federal constitution” but instead “simply specifie[d] a means by which to assist the legislature whether to consent or not to consent to the proposed amendment.” (Kimble v. Swackhamer (1978) 94 Nev. 600 [ 584 P.2d 161, 162-163 ].) Then Justice Rehnquist, acting as circuit justice, rejected an application for summary reversal of this decision, agreeing

2016(Ibid., italics added.) The Nevada Supreme Court rejected a federal constitutional challenge to the Nevada Equal Rights Amendment vote, explaining that the advisory question was not “a limitation on legislative power violative of article V of the federal constitution” but instead “simply specifie[d] a means by which to assist the legislature whether to consent or not to consent to the proposed amendment.” (Kimble v. Swackhamer (1978) 94 Nev. 600 [ 584 P.2d 161, 162-163 ].) Then Justice Rehnquist, acting as circuit justice, rejected an application for summary reversal of this decision, agreeing

1987(Turner v. Wright (1957) 11 Ill.2d 161 [ 142 N.E.2d 84, 90 ]; Commonwealth v. Barnett (1901) 199 Pa. 161 [ 48 A. 976, 977 ]; see State v. Henry (1935) 82 Wis.2d 679 [ 260 N.W. 486, 492 , 99 A.L.R. 1267 ].) 16 As we shall see, the primary purpose of the one subject rule is the regulation of legislative procedures: the avoidance of logrolling by legislators in the enactment of laws.

1987(Turner v. Wright (1957) 11 Ill.2d 161 [ 142 N.E.2d 84, 90 ]; Commonwealth v. Barnett (1901) 199 Pa. 161 [ 48 A. 976, 977 ]; see State v. Henry (1935) 82 Wis.2d 679 [ 260 N.W. 486, 492 , 99 A.L.R. 1267 ].) 16 As we shall see, the primary purpose of the one subject rule is the regulation of legislative procedures: the avoidance of logrolling by legislators in the enactment of laws.

1987(Turner v. Wright (1957) 11 Ill.2d 161 [ 142 N.E.2d 84, 90 ]; Commonwealth v. Barnett (1901) 199 Pa. 161 [ 48 A. 976, 977 ]; see State v. Henry (1935) 82 Wis.2d 679 [ 260 N.W. 486, 492 , 99 A.L.R. 1267 ].) 16 As we shall see, the primary purpose of the one subject rule is the regulation of legislative procedures: the avoidance of logrolling by legislators in the enactment of laws.

1987(Turner v. Wright (1957) 11 Ill.2d 161 [ 142 N.E.2d 84, 90 ]; Commonwealth v. Barnett (1901) 199 Pa. 161 [ 48 A. 976, 977 ]; see State v. Henry (1935) 82 Wis.2d 679 [ 260 N.W. 486, 492 , 99 A.L.R. 1267 ].) 16 As we shall see, the primary purpose of the one subject rule is the regulation of legislative procedures: the avoidance of logrolling by legislators in the enactment of laws.

1985One of its functions “is to prevent legislators and the public from being entrapped by misleading titles to bills whereby legislation relating to one subject might be obtained under the title of another.” (Abeel v. Clark (1890) 84 Cal. 226, 228 [ 24 P. 383 ]; Ex parte Liddell (1892) 93 Cal. 633, 636 [ 29 P. 251 ]; Matter of Maginnis (1912) 162 Cal. 200, 203 [ 121 P. 723 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510 [ 289 P. 160 ]; People v. Superior Court (1937) 10 Cal.2d 288, 293 [ 73 P.2d 1221 ].) But prevention of the passage of acts bearing misleading titles is not the principal purpose of th

1985One of its functions “is to prevent legislators and the public from being entrapped by misleading titles to bills whereby legislation relating to one subject might be obtained under the title of another.” (Abeel v. Clark (1890) 84 Cal. 226, 228 [ 24 P. 383 ]; Ex parte Liddell (1892) 93 Cal. 633, 636 [ 29 P. 251 ]; Matter of Maginnis (1912) 162 Cal. 200, 203 [ 121 P. 723 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510 [ 289 P. 160 ]; People v. Superior Court (1937) 10 Cal.2d 288, 293 [ 73 P.2d 1221 ].) But prevention of the passage of acts bearing misleading titles is not the principal purpose of th

1985Even if arguendo Proposition 8 is not violative of the one-subject rule for the purpose of qualifying the whole measure for the ballot ( Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d 236, 252-253 , but see pp. 262-299), it remains speculative to rely on "voter intent" as it relates to any one provision. "[A] proposition may contain 20 good features, but have one bad one secreted among the 20 good ones.

1985Even if arguendo Proposition 8 is not violative of the one-subject rule for the purpose of qualifying the whole measure for the ballot (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d 236, 252-253 , but see pp. 262-299), it remains speculative to rely on “voter intent” as it relates to any one provision. “[A] proposition may contain 20 good features, but have one bad one secreted among the 20 good ones.

1982(See 25 Cal.3d at p. 37 .) In FPPC, we reemphasized that the single subject rule is to be "construed liberally," and that "Numerous provisions, having one general object, if fairly indicated in the title, may be united in one act." ( Id., at p. 38, italics added.) In amplification, we used this language in FPPC in describing the overriding principle which controls our disposition of the single-subject attack against Proposition 8: "Consistent with our duty to uphold the people's right to initiative process, we adhere to the reasonably germane test and, in doing so, find that the measure before

1982(See 25 Cal.3d at p. 37 .) In FPPC, we reemphasized that the single subject rule is to be “construed liberally,” and that “Numerous provisions, having one general object, if fairly indicated in the title, may be united in one act.” (Id., at p. 38, italics added.) In amplification, we used this language in FPPC in describing the overriding principle which controls our disposition of the single-subject attack against Proposition 8: “Consistent with our duty to uphold the people’s right to initiative process, we adhere to the reasonably germane test and, in doing so, find that the measure before

1979NOTES [1] A Michigan statute adopted by the Legislature — containing provisions similar to those before us — was held to violate the one subject requirement. ( In re Advisory Opinion (Being 1975 PA 227 ) (1976) 396 Mich. 123 [ 240 N.W.2d 193 ].) As an alternate ground of decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that a similar initiative involved only a single subject. ( Fritz v. Gorton (1974) 83 Wn.2d 275 [ 517 P.2d 911, 920-921 ].) [2] Each of the four headings is further broken down as follows: "1.

1979NOTES [1] A Michigan statute adopted by the Legislature — containing provisions similar to those before us — was held to violate the one subject requirement. ( In re Advisory Opinion (Being 1975 PA 227 ) (1976) 396 Mich. 123 [ 240 N.W.2d 193 ].) As an alternate ground of decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that a similar initiative involved only a single subject. ( Fritz v. Gorton (1974) 83 Wn.2d 275 [ 517 P.2d 911, 920-921 ].) [2] Each of the four headings is further broken down as follows: "1.

1979(Cf. Associated Home Builders etc. Inc. v. City of Livermore, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, 591-592 .) Accordingly, we adhere to the reasonably germane test for both. *43 (1b) The provisions of the initiative are reasonably germane to the subject of political practices, and there is no violation of the one subject requirement.

1979In Schmitz v. Younger (1978) 21 Cal.3d 90 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 517 , 577 P.2d 652 ], I joined Justice Manuel's dissenting opinion, which concluded (1) that "the special nature of the initiative process requires a narrower construction" of the one subject requirement than the limitation on legislative bills, and (2) that "to satisfy the one-subject requirement, an initiative's provisions must be functionally related in furtherance of a common underlying purpose." (21 Cal.3d at pp. 99-100.) I continue to adhere to that position today. (1d) Unlike Justice Manuel, however, I believe that the 1974 Poli

1979In Schmitz v. Younger (1978) 21 Cal.3d 90 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 517 , 577 P.2d 652 ], I joined Justice Manuel's dissenting opinion, which concluded (1) that "the special nature of the initiative process requires a narrower construction" of the one subject requirement than the limitation on legislative bills, and (2) that "to satisfy the one-subject requirement, an initiative's provisions must be functionally related in furtherance of a common underlying purpose." (21 Cal.3d at pp. 99-100.) I continue to adhere to that position today. (1d) Unlike Justice Manuel, however, I believe that the 1974 Poli

1979NOTES [1] A Michigan statute adopted by the Legislature — containing provisions similar to those before us — was held to violate the one subject requirement. ( In re Advisory Opinion (Being 1975 PA 227 ) (1976) 396 Mich. 123 [ 240 N.W.2d 193 ].) As an alternate ground of decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that a similar initiative involved only a single subject. ( Fritz v. Gorton (1974) 83 Wn.2d 275 [ 517 P.2d 911, 920-921 ].) [2] Each of the four headings is further broken down as follows: "1.

1979NOTES [1] A Michigan statute adopted by the Legislature — containing provisions similar to those before us — was held to violate the one subject requirement. ( In re Advisory Opinion (Being 1975 PA 227 ) (1976) 396 Mich. 123 [ 240 N.W.2d 193 ].) As an alternate ground of decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that a similar initiative involved only a single subject. ( Fritz v. Gorton (1974) 83 Wn.2d 275 [ 517 P.2d 911, 920-921 ].) [2] Each of the four headings is further broken down as follows: "1.

1979NOTES [1] A Michigan statute adopted by the Legislature — containing provisions similar to those before us — was held to violate the one subject requirement. ( In re Advisory Opinion (Being 1975 PA 227 ) (1976) 396 Mich. 123 [ 240 N.W.2d 193 ].) As an alternate ground of decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that a similar initiative involved only a single subject. ( Fritz v. Gorton (1974) 83 Wn.2d 275 [ 517 P.2d 911, 920-921 ].) [2] Each of the four headings is further broken down as follows: "1.

1979(In re Advisory Opinion (Being 1975 PA 227 ) (1976) 396 Mich. 123 [ 240 N.W.2d 193 ].) As an alternate ground of decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that a similar initiative involved only a single subject.