Pickering test in California

2014Rather, we are faced with the “‘much simpler task’” of “deciding whether the Pickering test so clearly favors [appellant] that it would have been unreasonable for [Dickens] to believe that [appellant’s termination] was lawful.” (Brewster, supra, 149 F.3d at p. 981.) As was the case in Brewster, it would “be dubious indeed to conclude that [appellant’s] right to speak was sufficiently ‘clearly established’ to defeat [Dickens’s] assertion of qualified immunity.” (Ibid.) “Because qualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost if a

2014Rather, we are faced with the “‘much simpler task’” of “deciding whether the Pickering test so clearly favors [appellant] that it would have been unreasonable for [Dickens] to believe that [appellant’s termination] was lawful.” (Brewster, supra, 149 F.3d at p. 981.) As was the case in Brewster, it would “be dubious indeed to conclude that [appellant’s] right to speak was sufficiently ‘clearly established’ to defeat [Dickens’s] assertion of qualified immunity.” (Ibid.) “Because qualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost if a

2025Demers suggests the Pickering test applies to teaching: “We conclude that Garcetti [v. Ceballos (2006) 547 U.S. 410 ] does not—indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot—apply to teaching and academic writing that are performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.

2025Demers suggests the Pickering test applies to teaching: “We conclude that Garcetti [v. Ceballos (2006) 547 U.S. 410 ] does not—indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot—apply to teaching and academic writing that are performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.

2025First, the employee must show that his or her speech addressed ‘matters of public concern.’ [Citations.] Second, the employee’s interest ‘in commenting upon matters of public concern’ must outweigh ‘the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’” (Demers v. Austin, supra, 746 F.3d at p. 412 .) 32 student’s physical appearance and attire during a jail tour.

2025First, the employee must show that his or her speech addressed ‘matters of public concern.’ [Citations.] Second, the employee’s interest ‘in commenting upon matters of public concern’ must outweigh ‘the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’” (Demers v. Austin, supra, 746 F.3d at p. 412 .) 32 student’s physical appearance and attire during a jail tour.

2015(Rankin v. McPherson (1987) 483 U.S. 378, 388 .) “Application of this balancing test entails a factual inquiry into such matters as whether the speech (i) impairs discipline or control by superiors, (ii) disrupts co-worker relations, (iii) erodes a close working relationship premised on personal loyalty and confidentiality, (iv) interferes with the speaker’s performance of her or his duties, or (v) obstructs the routine operation of the office.

2015(Rankin v. McPherson (1987) 483 U.S. 378, 388 .) “Application of this balancing test entails a factual inquiry into such matters as whether the speech (i) impairs discipline or control by superiors, (ii) disrupts co-worker relations, (iii) erodes a close working relationship premised on personal loyalty and confidentiality, (iv) interferes with the speaker’s performance of her or his duties, or (v) obstructs the routine operation of the office.

2014However, these cases also admit that “‘the ultimate constitutional significance of the [undisputed] facts’ is a question of law.” (Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace (9th Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 1062 .) At this stage, we are assuming that all facts stated by appellant in her complaint are true.

2014However, these cases also admit that “‘the ultimate constitutional significance of the [undisputed] facts’ is a question of law.” (Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace (9th Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 1062 .) At this stage, we are assuming that all facts stated by appellant in her complaint are true.

2014(Colapinto v. County of Riverside (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 147, 151 [if party attempts to avoid the defects of a complaint by omitting facts which made the previous complaint defective, or by adding facts inconsistent with those previous pleadings, we may disregard the inconsistent allegations].) 21 simpler task’” of “deciding whether the Pickering test so clearly favors [appellant] that it would have been unreasonable for [Dickens] to believe that [appellant’s termination] was lawful.” (Brewster, supra, 149 F.3d at p. 981.) As was the case in Brewster, it would “be dubious indeed to conclude tha

2014(Colapinto v. County of Riverside (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 147, 151 [if party attempts to avoid the defects of a complaint by omitting facts which made the previous complaint defective, or by adding facts inconsistent with those previous pleadings, we may disregard the inconsistent allegations].) 21 simpler task’” of “deciding whether the Pickering test so clearly favors [appellant] that it would have been unreasonable for [Dickens] to believe that [appellant’s termination] was lawful.” (Brewster, supra, 149 F.3d at p. 981.) As was the case in Brewster, it would “be dubious indeed to conclude tha

1998In *1102 Pickering, supra, 391 U.S. 563 , a board of education had dismissed a high school teacher for publicly criticizing the board’s allocation of school funds between athletics and education and the board’s method of informing the public regarding the need for additional revenue.

1998In *1102 Pickering, supra, 391 U.S. 563 , a board of education had dismissed a high school teacher for publicly criticizing the board’s allocation of school funds between athletics and education and the board’s method of informing the public regarding the need for additional revenue.

1998(Accord, In re Schenck (1994) 318 Or. 402, 433 [ 870 P.2d 185, 204 ], cert. den. 513 U.S. 871 [ 115 S.Ct. 195 , 130 L.Ed.2d 127 ] [adopting the Pickering standard for judicial comment on pending cases]; see Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment (1986) 36 Syracuse L.Rev. 1181, 1184-1190; see generally, Annot., First Amendment Protection for Judges or Government Attorneys Subjected to Discharge, Transfer, or Discipline Because of Speech (1992) 108 A.L.R.Fed. 117, 126-127.) And we reject petitioner’s proposed standard permitting judges to comment publicly on any pending case

1998(Accord, In re Schenck (1994) 318 Or. 402, 433 [ 870 P.2d 185, 204 ], cert. den. 513 U.S. 871 [ 115 S.Ct. 195 , 130 L.Ed.2d 127 ] [adopting the Pickering standard for judicial comment on pending cases]; see Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment (1986) 36 Syracuse L.Rev. 1181, 1184-1190; see generally, Annot., First Amendment Protection for Judges or Government Attorneys Subjected to Discharge, Transfer, or Discipline Because of Speech (1992) 108 A.L.R.Fed. 117, 126-127.) And we reject petitioner’s proposed standard permitting judges to comment publicly on any pending case

1998(Accord, In re Schenck (1994) 318 Or. 402, 433 [ 870 P.2d 185, 204 ], cert. den. 513 U.S. 871 [ 115 S.Ct. 195 , 130 L.Ed.2d 127 ] [adopting the Pickering standard for judicial comment on pending cases]; see Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment (1986) 36 Syracuse L.Rev. 1181, 1184-1190; see generally, Annot., First Amendment Protection for Judges or Government Attorneys Subjected to Discharge, Transfer, or Discipline Because of Speech (1992) 108 A.L.R.Fed. 117, 126-127.) And we reject petitioner’s proposed standard permitting judges to comment publicly on any pending case

1998(Accord, In re Schenck (1994) 318 Or. 402, 433 [ 870 P.2d 185, 204 ], cert. den. 513 U.S. 871 [ 115 S.Ct. 195 , 130 L.Ed.2d 127 ] [adopting the Pickering standard for judicial comment on pending cases]; see Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment (1986) 36 Syracuse L.Rev. 1181, 1184-1190; see generally, Annot., First Amendment Protection for Judges or Government Attorneys Subjected to Discharge, Transfer, or Discipline Because of Speech (1992) 108 A.L.R.Fed. 117, 126-127.) And we reject petitioner’s proposed standard permitting judges to comment publicly on any pending case

1994We agree with the court in Miles v. Denver Public Schools, supra, 944 F.2d 773 , that: "Although the Pickering test accounts for the state's interests as an employer, it does not address the significant interest of the state as educator. . . .

1994We agree with the court in Miles v. Denver Public Schools, supra, 944 F.2d 773 , that: "Although the Pickering test accounts for the state's interests as an employer, it does not address the significant interest of the state as educator. . . .

1994The concern addressed in Pickering -- the right of an employee to participate as other citizens in debate on public matters -- is simply less forceful when considered `"in light of the special characteristics of the school environment."' [Citations.] Because of the special characteristics of a classroom environment, in applying Hazelwood instead of Pickering we distinguish between teachers' classroom expression and teachers' expression in other situations that would not reasonably be perceived as school- sponsored. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 777.) Finally, in accordance with the Hazelwood stand

1994The concern addressed in Pickering -- the right of an employee to participate as other citizens in debate on public matters -- is simply less forceful when considered `"in light of the special characteristics of the school environment."' [Citations.] Because of the special characteristics of a classroom environment, in applying Hazelwood instead of Pickering we distinguish between teachers' classroom expression and teachers' expression in other situations that would not reasonably be perceived as school- sponsored. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 777.) Finally, in accordance with the Hazelwood stand

1985In Kim v. Coppin State College, supra, 662 F.2d 1055 , two college professors claimed they were denied promotion due in part to their First Amendment activity.

1985In Kim v. Coppin State College, supra, 662 F.2d 1055 , two college professors claimed they were denied promotion due in part to their First Amendment activity.

1985In Rozman v. Elliott (8th Cir. 1972) 467 F.2d 1145 , a university professor’s discharge was upheld.

1985In Rozman v. Elliott (8th Cir. 1972) 467 F.2d 1145 , a university professor’s discharge was upheld.

1985(Id., at pp. 1062-1066.) We agree with plaintiff and Mabey v. Reagan, supra, 537 F.2d 1036 , that in order to conduct a Pickering analysis a court should be aware of a number of factors, including the differences between the college and the high school environment (id., at pp. 1046-1048), whether the expressive conduct was that of a teacher or a student (id., at p. 1048), and whether the occurrence was on or off campus (id., at pp. 1047-1048).

1985(Id., at pp. 1062-1066.) We agree with plaintiff and Mabey v. Reagan, supra, 537 F.2d 1036 , that in order to conduct a Pickering analysis a court should be aware of a number of factors, including the differences between the college and the high school environment (id., at pp. 1046-1048), whether the expressive conduct was that of a teacher or a student (id., at p. 1048), and whether the occurrence was on or off campus (id., at pp. 1047-1048).