reduction claim in California

2007To do otherwise would, in effect, cause money paid in settlement to be treated as if it was paid as a joint liability.” (Id. at pp. 276-277.) Thus, Espinoza, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th 268, construed section 877 to require a reduction in a claim against a nonsettling defendant only if the claim pertains to a joint and several liability. 7 Hoch, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 48, 63 , following Espinoza , stated more explicitly that section 877, subdivision (a) “presupposes the existence of multiple defendants jointly liable for the same damages.” Hoch also focused on the language in section 877, “claimed to

2007To do otherwise would, in effect, cause money paid in settlement to be treated as if it was paid as a joint liability." ( Id. at pp. 276-277, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 498 .) Thus, Espinoza, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th 268 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 498 construed section 877 to require a reduction in a claim *58 against a nonsettling defendant only if the claim pertains to a joint and several liability. [7] Hoch, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 48, 63 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 , following Espinoza , stated more explicitly that section 877, subdivision (a) "presupposes the existence of multiple defendants jointly liable for the same dam

2007To do otherwise would, in effect, cause money paid in settlement to be treated as if it was paid as a joint liability.” (Id. at pp. 276-277.) Thus, Espinoza, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th 268, construed section 877 to require a reduction in a claim against a nonsettling defendant only if the claim pertains to a joint and several liability. 7 Hoch, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 48, 63 , following Espinoza , stated more explicitly that section 877, subdivision (a) “presupposes the existence of multiple defendants jointly liable for the same damages.” Hoch also focused on the language in section 877, “claimed to

2007To do otherwise would, in effect, cause money paid in settlement to be treated as if it was paid as a joint liability." ( Id. at pp. 276-277, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 498 .) Thus, Espinoza, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th 268 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 498 construed section 877 to require a reduction in a claim *58 against a nonsettling defendant only if the claim pertains to a joint and several liability. [7] Hoch, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 48, 63 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 , following Espinoza , stated more explicitly that section 877, subdivision (a) "presupposes the existence of multiple defendants jointly liable for the same dam

2024Case law requires only that the defendant “timely raise the issue.” (McMahan, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 749 .) Here, in light of Mahmood’s pro per status and his repeated attempts to obtain a reduction or waiver of fees and costs due to his indigent status, including by raising the issue at the sentencing hearing, we conclude that Mahmood has sufficiently preserved for appeal his challenge to the trial court’s failure to consider Mahmood’s ability to pay when imposing the fines and fees.

2020If, after the hearing, “the court finds that the defendant does not have the ability to pay, the court may reduce or waive this fee.” The court “shall state the reason [for the reduction or waiver] on the record.” (§ 1203.097, subd. (a)(5)(A).) 4 People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 held due process requires a trial court to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing and ascertain a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing court assessments and executing a restitution fine.

2011Petitioners also contend that the Lease does not provide for a reduction or waiver of rent because the Port District “did not give up any tangible economic asset when it agreed to the ‘rent reduction.’ ” According to Petitioners, the rent credit provided in the Lease “could not be sold in the marketplace” and is simply the result of “the [Port District’s] adjustment of its initial lease rate starting point during negotiations.” In Petitioners’ view, State Building, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 289 , supports this argument.

2011Petitioners also contend that the Lease does not provide for a reduction or waiver of rent because the Port District “did not give up any tangible economic asset when it agreed to the ‘rent reduction.’ ” According to Petitioners, the rent credit provided in the Lease “could not be sold in the marketplace” and is simply the result of “the [Port District’s] adjustment of its initial lease rate starting point during negotiations.” In Petitioners’ view, State Building, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 289 , supports this argument.

2006At trial, the jury found in the plaintiff’s favor and attributed 75 percent fault to the assailant, 20 percent fault to the bar and 5 percent fault to the plaintiff. ( 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 4 .) The plaintiff appealed a reduction of the bar’s share of the noneconomic damages pursuant to Proposition 51, arguing that Proposition 51 was inapplicable where any tortfeasor was found to have committed an intentional tort. ( 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 5 .) Noting that the plaintiff was “attempting to transfer the intentional actor’s responsibility to the negligent tortfeasor” ( Weidenfeller, supra, Cal.App.4th

2006At trial, the jury found in the plaintiff’s favor and attributed 75 percent fault to the assailant, 20 percent fault to the bar and 5 percent fault to the plaintiff. ( 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 4 .) The plaintiff appealed a reduction of the bar’s share of the noneconomic damages pursuant to Proposition 51, arguing that Proposition 51 was inapplicable where any tortfeasor was found to have committed an intentional tort. ( 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 5 .) Noting that the plaintiff was “attempting to transfer the intentional actor’s responsibility to the negligent tortfeasor” ( Weidenfeller, supra, Cal.App.4th

1950There are three legal principles which apply to this situation ; (1) Where two clauses of an agreement are repugnant, “the first shall be received and the latter rejected.” (12 Am, Jur. 778, § 243; Burns v. Peters, 5 Cal.2d 619 [ 55 P.2d 1182 ].) (2) That clause “which affords the most protection to the insured will control and be given effect.” (1 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, 369; Frenzer v. Mutual Ben.

1950There are three legal principles which apply to this situation ; (1) Where two clauses of an agreement are repugnant, “the first shall be received and the latter rejected.” (12 Am, Jur. 778, § 243; Burns v. Peters, 5 Cal.2d 619 [ 55 P.2d 1182 ].) (2) That clause “which affords the most protection to the insured will control and be given effect.” (1 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, 369; Frenzer v. Mutual Ben.