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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLCred2 sentences2021Although the judgment here binds the state on behalf of the aggrieved employees (Arias, at p. 986 [judgment under PAGA binds employee and state labor law enforcement agencies]; Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 381 [a nonparty represented by the agency is bound by the judgment]), employees’ interests are already represented in this action by the state’s proxy, Ali. 2021Although the judgment here binds the state on behalf of the aggrieved employees (Arias, at p. 986 [judgment under PAGA binds employee and state labor law enforcement agencies]; Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 381 [a nonparty represented by the agency is bound by the judgment]), employees’ interests are already represented in this action by the state’s proxy, Ali. | 1 | 1 |
People v. TULARE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURTgreen2 sentences2019The writ of habeas corpus affords an efficacious means of vindicating an individual's fundamental rights. [Citation.] The doctrine of res *659 judicata prevents the relitigation of issues determined by a final judgment in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with the original parties. [fn. omitted.] [Citation.] A final order or judgment granting relief to a petitioner on habeas corpus is a conclusive determination that he is illegally held in custody; it is res judicata of all issues of law and fact necessarily involved in that result." ( Crow , supra , at p. 623 [ 94 Ca 2019The writ of habeas corpus affords an efficacious means of vindicating an individual's fundamental rights. [Citation.] The doctrine of res *659 judicata prevents the relitigation of issues determined by a final judgment in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with the original parties. [fn. omitted.] [Citation.] A final order or judgment granting relief to a petitioner on habeas corpus is a conclusive determination that he is illegally held in custody; it is res judicata of all issues of law and fact necessarily involved in that result." ( Crow , supra , at p. 623 [ 94 Ca | 1 | 1 |
In Re Ditschgreen2 sentences2019The writ of habeas corpus affords an efficacious means of vindicating an individual's fundamental rights. [Citation.] The doctrine of res *659 judicata prevents the relitigation of issues determined by a final judgment in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with the original parties. [fn. omitted.] [Citation.] A final order or judgment granting relief to a petitioner on habeas corpus is a conclusive determination that he is illegally held in custody; it is res judicata of all issues of law and fact necessarily involved in that result." ( Crow , supra , at p. 623 [ 94 Ca 2019The writ of habeas corpus affords an efficacious means of vindicating an individual's fundamental rights. [Citation.] The doctrine of res *659 judicata prevents the relitigation of issues determined by a final judgment in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with the original parties. [fn. omitted.] [Citation.] A final order or judgment granting relief to a petitioner on habeas corpus is a conclusive determination that he is illegally held in custody; it is res judicata of all issues of law and fact necessarily involved in that result." ( Crow , supra , at p. 623 [ 94 Ca | 1 | 1 |
Weber v. Willardgreen2 sentences1991The county’s position that it is not barred from relitigating the banking game issue can be described as a “nonsensical interpretation of res judicata [which] is a frivolous ground for . . . appeal, maiding the appeal totally and completely without merit.” (Weber v. Willard (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 165 ].) We also conclude this appeal was brought for the improper purposes of harassment and delay. 1991The county’s position that it is not barred from relitigating the banking game issue can be described as a “nonsensical interpretation of res judicata [which] is a frivolous ground for . . . appeal, maiding the appeal totally and completely without merit.” (Weber v. Willard (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 165 ].) We also conclude this appeal was brought for the improper purposes of harassment and delay. | 1 | 1 |
County of Alameda v. Sampsongreen2 sentences1981“Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy when the doctrine of res *633 judicata in its subsidiary form of collateral estoppel refutes all triable issues of fact suggested by the pleading and supporting documents.” (County of Alameda v. Sampson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 584, 589-590 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 915 ].) Columbus opposed the motion for summary judgment on the cross-complaint by attempting to show that there are triable issues of fact regarding the alleged principal-agency relationship between Gray Line and Guatemala Sightseeing. 1981“Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy when the doctrine of res *633 judicata in its subsidiary form of collateral estoppel refutes all triable issues of fact suggested by the pleading and supporting documents.” (County of Alameda v. Sampson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 584, 589-590 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 915 ].) Columbus opposed the motion for summary judgment on the cross-complaint by attempting to show that there are triable issues of fact regarding the alleged principal-agency relationship between Gray Line and Guatemala Sightseeing. | 1 | 1 |
Adamson v. Adamsongreen2 sentences1968(Garcia v. Garcia, supra; Heathman v. Vant, 172 Cal.App.2d 639 [343 P.2d 104]; Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal.2d 563 [ 107 P.2d 36 ]; see Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal.App.2d 492 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 236 ].) In Garcia v. Garcia, supra, it was held that an interlocutory decree of divorce which approved and incorporated by reference a property settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed there was a child of the marriage determined the issue of parentage, and that the doctrine of res -judicata' precluded the husband from thereafter maintaining an action against the wife and child to have it declared that t 1968(Garcia v. Garcia, supra; Heathman v. Vant, 172 Cal.App.2d 639 [343 P.2d 104]; Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal.2d 563 [ 107 P.2d 36 ]; see Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal.App.2d 492 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 236 ].) In Garcia v. Garcia, supra, it was held that an interlocutory decree of divorce which approved and incorporated by reference a property settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed there was a child of the marriage determined the issue of parentage, and that the doctrine of res -judicata' precluded the husband from thereafter maintaining an action against the wife and child to have it declared that t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Expansion Pointe Properties Ltd. Partnership v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP
green
1 sentence2025Code, § 646, subd. (b).) The presumption arises when the evidence satisfies three conditions: ‘ “(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” ’ ” (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820 , 825– 826 (Brown).) In the trial court, Sonnet did not present evidence and argue in opposition to the summary judgment motion that | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Brown v. Poway Unified School District
green
1 sentence2025Code, § 646, subd. (b).) The presumption arises when the evidence satisfies three conditions: ‘ “(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” ’ ” (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820 , 825– 826 (Brown).) In the trial court, Sonnet did not present evidence and argue in opposition to the summary judgment motion that | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Arias v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2021(See Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986 .) Mitchem argues that there is an immediate interest here because approving the PAGA settlement would prevent him from pursuing the same claims on behalf of the aggrieved employees under the doctrine of res 18 judicata. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Crow
green
2 sentences2019The writ of habeas corpus affords an efficacious means of vindicating an individual's fundamental rights. [Citation.] The doctrine of res *659 judicata prevents the relitigation of issues determined by a final judgment in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with the original parties. [fn. omitted.] [Citation.] A final order or judgment granting relief to a petitioner on habeas corpus is a conclusive determination that he is illegally held in custody; it is res judicata of all issues of law and fact necessarily involved in that result." ( Crow , supra , at p. 623 [ 94 Ca 2019The writ of habeas corpus affords an efficacious means of vindicating an individual's fundamental rights. [Citation.] The doctrine of res *659 judicata prevents the relitigation of issues determined by a final judgment in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with the original parties. [fn. omitted.] [Citation.] A final order or judgment granting relief to a petitioner on habeas corpus is a conclusive determination that he is illegally held in custody; it is res judicata of all issues of law and fact necessarily involved in that result." ( Crow , supra , at p. 623 [ 94 Ca | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission
green
2 sentences2019Application Griset II makes clear that a trial court does "not have jurisdiction to reopen or retry [a] case" after "unqualified affirmance" of a prior final judgment. ( Griset II , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 701 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 , 23 P.3d 43 .) Griset II is consistent with well-established principles of finality ( People v. DeLouize (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1223 , 1231, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 302 , 89 P.3d 733 ["judicial error in the making of a final order or judgment 'may not be corrected except pursuant to *874 statutory procedures' 16 or on the limited grounds available for a collateral attack"] ) an 2019Application Griset II makes clear that a trial court does "not have jurisdiction to reopen or retry [a] case" after "unqualified affirmance" of a prior final judgment. ( Griset II , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 701 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 , 23 P.3d 43 .) Griset II is consistent with well-established principles of finality ( People v. DeLouize (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1223 , 1231, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 302 , 89 P.3d 733 ["judicial error in the making of a final order or judgment 'may not be corrected except pursuant to *874 statutory procedures' 16 or on the limited grounds available for a collateral attack"] ) an | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. DeLouize
green
2 sentences2019Application Griset II makes clear that a trial court does "not have jurisdiction to reopen or retry [a] case" after "unqualified affirmance" of a prior final judgment. ( Griset II , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 701 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 , 23 P.3d 43 .) Griset II is consistent with well-established principles of finality ( People v. DeLouize (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1223 , 1231, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 302 , 89 P.3d 733 ["judicial error in the making of a final order or judgment 'may not be corrected except pursuant to *874 statutory procedures' 16 or on the limited grounds available for a collateral attack"] ) an 2019Application Griset II makes clear that a trial court does "not have jurisdiction to reopen or retry [a] case" after "unqualified affirmance" of a prior final judgment. ( Griset II , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 701 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 , 23 P.3d 43 .) Griset II is consistent with well-established principles of finality ( People v. DeLouize (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1223 , 1231, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 302 , 89 P.3d 733 ["judicial error in the making of a final order or judgment 'may not be corrected except pursuant to *874 statutory procedures' 16 or on the limited grounds available for a collateral attack"] ) an | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano
green
1 sentence2018In Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3d 856 , the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the plaintiffs' successful facial challenge to a statute was "brought against a blank factual background of enforcement and outside the context of any particular case. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Estate of Estrem
green
2 sentences1968(Garcia v. Garcia, supra; Heathman v. Vant, 172 Cal.App.2d 639 [343 P.2d 104]; Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal.2d 563 [ 107 P.2d 36 ]; see Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal.App.2d 492 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 236 ].) In Garcia v. Garcia, supra, it was held that an interlocutory decree of divorce which approved and incorporated by reference a property settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed there was a child of the marriage determined the issue of parentage, and that the doctrine of res -judicata' precluded the husband from thereafter maintaining an action against the wife and child to have it declared that t 1968(Garcia v. Garcia, supra; Heathman v. Vant, 172 Cal.App.2d 639 [343 P.2d 104]; Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal.2d 563 [ 107 P.2d 36 ]; see Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal.App.2d 492 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 236 ].) In Garcia v. Garcia, supra, it was held that an interlocutory decree of divorce which approved and incorporated by reference a property settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed there was a child of the marriage determined the issue of parentage, and that the doctrine of res -judicata' precluded the husband from thereafter maintaining an action against the wife and child to have it declared that t | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Heathman v. Vant
green
2 sentences1968(Garcia v. Garcia, supra; Heathman v. Vant, 172 Cal.App.2d 639 [343 P.2d 104]; Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal.2d 563 [ 107 P.2d 36 ]; see Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal.App.2d 492 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 236 ].) In Garcia v. Garcia, supra, it was held that an interlocutory decree of divorce which approved and incorporated by reference a property settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed there was a child of the marriage determined the issue of parentage, and that the doctrine of res -judicata' precluded the husband from thereafter maintaining an action against the wife and child to have it declared that t 1968(Garcia v. Garcia, supra; Heathman v. Vant, 172 Cal.App.2d 639 [343 P.2d 104]; Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal.2d 563 [ 107 P.2d 36 ]; see Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal.App.2d 492 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 236 ].) In Garcia v. Garcia, supra, it was held that an interlocutory decree of divorce which approved and incorporated by reference a property settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed there was a child of the marriage determined the issue of parentage, and that the doctrine of res -judicata' precluded the husband from thereafter maintaining an action against the wife and child to have it declared that t | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Morris v. Morris
green
2 sentences1930(Morris v. Morris, 84 Cal. App. 599 [ 258 Pac. 616 ].) There are, of course, cases where under the doctrine of res. ipsa loquitur, the negligence of the defendant may be inferred from the circumstances. 1930(Morris v. Morris, 84 Cal. App. 599 [ 258 Pac. 616 ].) There are, of course, cases where under the doctrine of res. ipsa loquitur, the negligence of the defendant may be inferred from the circumstances. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.