second Thing requirement in California

2023A plaintiff may recover based on an event perceived by other senses, so long as the event is contemporaneously understood as causing injury to a close relative. [Citation.] But this slight degree of flexibility in the second Thing requirement does not aid plaintiff here because they had no sensory perception whatsoever of the transection at the time it occurred. 4 Thus, defining the injury-producing event as the transection, plaintiffs’ claim falls squarely within the category of cases the second Thing requirement was intended to bar.” (Bird, at pp. 916-917.) In stating this rule, the court no

2002A plaintiff may recover based on an event perceived by other senses so long as the event is contemporaneously understood as causing injury to a close relative. ( Wilks v. Hom (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272-1273 , 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 [plaintiff was in the living room speaking to her children in their bedrooms when she saw, heard and felt one bedroom explode from a gas leak].) [3] But this slight degree of flexibility *470 in the second Thing requirement does not aid plaintiffs here because they had no sensory perception whatsoever of the transection at the time it occurred.

2021(Ra, at pp. 152-153; accord, Fife v. Astenius (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1090 [evidence plaintiffs heard the sounds and saw debris from an automobile collision outside their yard without realizing their sister had been injured until they reached the accident minutes later was insufficient to satisfy the second Thing requirement].) Similarly, in Fortman v. Förvaltningsbolaget Insulan AB (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 830, 832-834 (Fortman), the Court of Appeal concluded the sister of a deceased scuba diver could not recover NIED damages from the manufacturer of allegedly defective scuba diving equipment aft

2020(Ra, at pp. 152-153; accord, Fife v. Astenius (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1090 [evidence plaintiffs heard the sounds and saw debris from an automobile collision outside their yard without realizing their sister had been injured until they reached the accident minutes later was insufficient to satisfy the second Thing requirement].) Similarly, in Fortman v. Förvaltningsbolaget Insulan AB (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 830, 832-834 (Fortman), the Court of Appeal concluded the sister of a deceased scuba diver could not recover NIED damages from the manufacturer of allegedly defective scuba diving equipment aft

2023(Ibid.) Explaining it was bound and limited by the mandatory guidelines discussed above (Bird, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 915 ; Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d 644 ), the court reviewing a summary judgment held the second factor was not met: “Fortman witnessed her brother’s injury, but like the parents in Golstein[, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1415 ] who were unaware of the radiation overdose, Fortman had no contemporaneous awareness of the causal connection between the company’s defective product and her brother’s 17 injuries.” (Fortman, at p. 845.) It declined “to hold a product manufacturer strictly liable

2021Surveying Thing, Ochoa, and Dillon, the court reasoned, “From these pertinent bystander cases, it is clear that to satisfy the second Thing requirement the plaintiff must experience a contemporaneous sensory awareness of the causal connection between the defendant’s infliction of harm and the injuries suffered by the close relative.” (Fortman, at p. 836; accord, Golstein v. Superior Court (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1415, 1427 [parents who watched as their son underwent radiation therapy but only later discovered he had been overexposed when he developed symptoms of radiation poisoning could not rec

2023(Ibid.) Explaining it was bound and limited by the mandatory guidelines discussed above (Bird, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 915 ; Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d 644 ), the court reviewing a summary judgment held the second factor was not met: “Fortman witnessed her brother’s injury, but like the parents in Golstein[, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1415 ] who were unaware of the radiation overdose, Fortman had no contemporaneous awareness of the causal connection between the company’s defective product and her brother’s 17 injuries.” (Fortman, at p. 845.) It declined “to hold a product manufacturer strictly liable

2021(Ra, at pp. 152-153; accord, Fife v. Astenius (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1090 [evidence plaintiffs heard the sounds and saw debris from an automobile collision outside their yard without realizing their sister had been injured until they reached the accident minutes later was insufficient to satisfy the second Thing requirement].) Similarly, in Fortman v. Förvaltningsbolaget Insulan AB (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 830, 832-834 (Fortman), the Court of Appeal concluded the sister of a deceased scuba diver could not recover NIED damages from the manufacturer of allegedly defective scuba diving equipment aft

2021A plaintiff may recover based on an event perceived by other senses so long as the event is contemporaneously understood as causing injury to a close relative. [Citation.] [¶] But this slight degree of flexibility in the second Thing 15 requirement does not aid plaintiffs here because they had no sensory perception whatsoever of the transection at the time it occurred.” (Ibid.; compare Keys v. Alta Bates Summit Medical Center (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 484, 487, 490-491 [substantial evidence supported NIED judgment for sister and daughter of a surgery patient who observed the patient’s inability t

2020A plaintiff may recover based on an event perceived by other senses so long as the event is contemporaneously understood as causing injury to a close relative. [Citation.] [¶] But this slight degree of flexibility in the second Thing 15 requirement does not aid plaintiffs here because they had no sensory perception whatsoever of the transection at the time it occurred.” (Ibid.; compare Keys v. Alta Bates Summit Medical Center (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 484, 487, 490-491 [substantial evidence supported NIED judgment for sister and daughter of a surgery patient who observed the patient’s inability t

2024This case likewise turns on the second Thing requirement, that the bystander plaintiff be “present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and [be] then aware that it is causing injury to the victim.” (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 668 .) The question is whether, to satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must understand not only that a close relative is suffering injury, but also that the defendant’s negligent conduct or omissions have caused the injury.5 The focal point of the dispute is Bird, supra, 28 Cal.4th 910 , so we will begin there.

2024This case likewise turns on the second Thing requirement, that the bystander plaintiff be “present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and [be] then aware that it is causing injury to the victim.” (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 668 .) The question is whether, to satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must understand not only that a close relative is suffering injury, but also that the defendant’s negligent conduct or omissions have caused the injury.5 The focal point of the dispute is Bird, supra, 28 Cal.4th 910 , so we will begin there.

2024This case likewise turns on the second Thing requirement, that the bystander plaintiff be “present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and [be] then aware that it is causing injury to the victim.” (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 668 .) The question is whether, to satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must understand not only that a close relative is suffering injury, but also that the defendant’s negligent conduct or omissions have caused the injury.5 The focal point of the dispute is Bird, supra, 28 Cal.4th 910 , so we will begin there.

2023(Ibid.) Explaining it was bound and limited by the mandatory guidelines discussed above (Bird, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 915 ; Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d 644 ), the court reviewing a summary judgment held the second factor was not met: “Fortman witnessed her brother’s injury, but like the parents in Golstein[, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1415 ] who were unaware of the radiation overdose, Fortman had no contemporaneous awareness of the causal connection between the company’s defective product and her brother’s 17 injuries.” (Fortman, at p. 845.) It declined “to hold a product manufacturer strictly liable

2013(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) Fortman contends that applying the second Thing requirement precludes bystander recovery in all strict products liability cases.

2013(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) Fortman contends that applying the second Thing requirement precludes bystander recovery in all strict products liability cases.

2013As discussed below, based upon the pertinent cases and our independent review (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 , 71 P.3d 296 ]), we conclude as a matter of law that Fortman cannot state an NIED claim under the bystander theory of recovery.

2013As discussed below, based upon the pertinent cases and our independent review (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 , 71 P.3d 296 ]), we conclude as a matter of law that Fortman cannot state an NIED claim under the bystander theory of recovery.

2007“A plaintiff may recover based on an event perceived by other senses so long as the event is contemporaneously understood as *149 causing injury to a close relative.” (Bird v. Saenz, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 916-917; see Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 76 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 562 P.2d 1022 ] (Krouse) [“ ‘sensory and contemporaneous observance’ ” does not necessitate visual perception]. 6 ) Although a plaintiff may establish presence at the scene through nonvisual sensory perception, “someone who hears an accident but does not then know it is causing injury to a relative does not have a

2007“A plaintiff may recover based on an event perceived by other senses so long as the event is contemporaneously understood as *149 causing injury to a close relative.” (Bird v. Saenz, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 916-917; see Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 76 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 562 P.2d 1022 ] (Krouse) [“ ‘sensory and contemporaneous observance’ ” does not necessitate visual perception]. 6 ) Although a plaintiff may establish presence at the scene through nonvisual sensory perception, “someone who hears an accident but does not then know it is causing injury to a relative does not have a