second type rule in California

2013The force required for commission of the second type of violation of section 69 is illustrated in the holding in People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 ] (Carrasco).

2013The force required for commission of the second type of violation of section 69 is illustrated in the holding in People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 ] (Carrasco).

2021Co. v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 727 .) Upon such a challenge, the court may then determine that this second type of error rendered the judgment void. (311 South Spring Street Co. v. Department of General Services (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017 (311 South Spring Street).) In sum, the distinction between the two types of error affects the ability to attack a judgment as void: the first type of “fundamental” jurisdictional error may be subject to direct or collateral attack at any time, whereas the second type of jurisdictional error cannot be collaterally attacked absent unusual circum

2014(E.g., Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 404 [EIR concluded there were no feasible alternative sites for relocation of biomedical research facilities; EIR’s discussion was insufficient because it contained no analysis of alternative locations].) The second type of claim, which is presented in this case, is more complex.

2013This type of rule exists when a general defense that would otherwise be permitted by the FAA's section 2 saving clause (i.e., a defense such as unconscionability) is "applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration." ( Concepcion, supra, at p ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 1747 ].) Where this occurs, application of the defense might violate the rule "that a court may not 'rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.' " (Ibid., quoting Per

2013This type of rule exists when a general defense that would otherwise be permitted by the FAA's section 2 saving clause (i.e., a defense such as unconscionability) is "applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration." ( Concepcion, supra, at p ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 1747 ].) Where this occurs, application of the defense might violate the rule "that a court may not 'rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.' " (Ibid., quoting Per

2011(See In re Prentiss C. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1487 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 ] [a statute should be construed to promote rather than defeat the policy underlying the legislation].) The intent behind the IWC wage orders and section 226.7 was to provide an incentive to employers to comply with labor standards and compensate employees when those standards are violated. ( Murphy, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1106, 1110, 1113-1114.) As the Mario court concluded, “[B]y providing no additional premium wage when the second type of violation occurs, the alternative approach would encourage an employer to r

2011(See In re Prentiss C. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1487 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 ] [a statute should be construed to promote rather than defeat the policy underlying the legislation].) The intent behind the IWC wage orders and section 226.7 was to provide an incentive to employers to comply with labor standards and compensate employees when those standards are violated. ( Murphy, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1106, 1110, 1113-1114.) As the Mario court concluded, “[B]y providing no additional premium wage when the second type of violation occurs, the alternative approach would encourage an employer to r