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8 California opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Comptongreen1 sentence2012As to the issue of consent, relying on Curry , the Supreme Court stated, “The effect of a failure to object is no longer an open question . . . .” (People v. Compton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 63.) The court further stated, “No grounds are shown to distinguish the present case from Curry on this point, and no consent to a mistrial may therefore be implied from defendant’s failure to voice an objection.” (Ibid.) Compton is similar to Curry in that it was not a case involving solely the silence of defense counsel. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Evansgreen2 sentences2004(People v. Evans (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 358, 368 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 ].) A single unanswered question may constitute Doyle error if the question improperly refers to the defendant’s silence and a defense objection to the question is erroneously overruled. 2004(People v. Evans (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 358, 368 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 ].) A single unanswered question may constitute Doyle error if the question improperly refers to the defendant’s silence and a defense objection to the question is erroneously overruled. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences1993In such circumstances, the record itself does not show that the defendant personally and unequivocally, that is, expressly and explicitly, waived his or her rights.” (.People v. Anderson (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 318, 324 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 676 ]. 1993In such circumstances, the record itself does not show that the defendant personally and unequivocally, that is, expressly and explicitly, waived his or her rights.” (.People v. Anderson (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 318, 324 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 676 ]. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hartygreen2 sentences1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal 1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal | 1 | 1 |
Carnley v. Cochrangreen2 sentences1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal 1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal | 1 | 1 |
In Re Lopezgreen2 sentences1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal 1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal 1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal | 1 | 1 |
In Re Smileygreen2 sentences1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal 1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal | 1 | 1 |
People v. Holmesgreen2 sentences1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal 1991(Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 502 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 85 ].) Thus, we may not presume a valid waiver from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515-516 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 70,76-78 , 82 S.Ct. 884 ]) or infer a waiver from either the entry of a guilty plea after the advisement of rights (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 621 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 , 427 P.2d 179 ]) or equivocal conduct, such as a defendant’s failure to assert his or her rights (In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 147 [ 84 Cal | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Griffin v. California
green
2 sentences1981It’s as simple as that.” *461 Appellant contends that these statements constitute comments by the prosecution on the accused’s silence in violation of the rule in Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 , 615 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110 , 85 S.Ct. 1797 ], and its progeny. 1981It’s as simple as that.” *461 Appellant contends that these statements constitute comments by the prosecution on the accused’s silence in violation of the rule in Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 , 615 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110 , 85 S.Ct. 1797 ], and its progeny. | 2 | 1981–2004 |
Illinois v. Perkins
green
1 sentence2026Specifically, defendant argues that this testimony (1) was not relevant, (2) should have been 4 The name comes from the U.S. Supreme Court case— Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292—which held that such operations did not violate a criminal defendant’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 5 excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice under Evidence Code section 352, (3) should have been excluded as propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, and (4) constituted an unconstitutional comment on a defendant’s silence | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Cromer
green
1 sentence2026We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371 , 409 (Flores)), and review its interpretation of constitutional law de novo (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2026Specifically, defendant argues that this testimony (1) was not relevant, (2) should have been 4 The name comes from the U.S. Supreme Court case— Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292—which held that such operations did not violate a criminal defendant’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 5 excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice under Evidence Code section 352, (3) should have been excluded as propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, and (4) constituted an unconstitutional comment on a defendant’s silence | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Doyle v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2026Specifically, defendant argues that this testimony (1) was not relevant, (2) should have been 4 The name comes from the U.S. Supreme Court case— Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292—which held that such operations did not violate a criminal defendant’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 5 excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice under Evidence Code section 352, (3) should have been excluded as propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, and (4) constituted an unconstitutional comment on a defendant’s silence | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. THORBOURN
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Thorbourn (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1089 .) 7 the more recent published decisions on point were issued.5 We frown on both the District Attorney’s failure to cite to adverse authority issued before she filed her brief and on her wholesale copying of material from another lawyer’s brief without attribution. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Curry v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2012Valenti In Curry , the Supreme Court cited to Valenti, supra, 49 Cal.2d 199 , with a “cf.” cite, in support of the proposition that “[w]hen a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee, and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver.” (Curry, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 713 .) Yet Valenti does not support that proposition; it was not a “consent” case and discussed double jeopardy only in dicta. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Valenti
green
1 sentence2012Valenti In Curry , the Supreme Court cited to Valenti, supra, 49 Cal.2d 199 , with a “cf.” cite, in support of the proposition that “[w]hen a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee, and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver.” (Curry, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 713 .) Yet Valenti does not support that proposition; it was not a “consent” case and discussed double jeopardy only in dicta. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Fletcher v. Weir
green
2 sentences1985“The significant difference between the present case and Doyle is that the record does not indicate that respondent . . . received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest.” (Id., at p. 605 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 493 ]; italics added.) It is true the Supreme Court in describing Doyle has referred to “government action” and “governmental assurances” inducing the defendant’s silence. 1985"The significant difference between the present case and Doyle is that the record does not indicate that respondent ... received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest." ( Id., at p. 605 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 493 ]; italics added.) It is true the Supreme Court in describing Doyle has referred to "government action" and "governmental assurances" inducing the defendant's silence. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Bethea
green
2 sentences1981He concedes that the statement, “all the evidence you have is that he did do it and there is no evidence that he didn’t,” is a permissible comment on the state of the evidence (People v. Berthea (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 930 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 229 ]), but he argues that the statement, “it’s absolutely undisputed that there was a kidnap,” in the prosecutor’s closing argument was impermissible because it connoted a lack of personal response by the accused himself. 1981He concedes that the statement, “all the evidence you have is that he did do it and there is no evidence that he didn’t,” is a permissible comment on the state of the evidence (People v. Berthea (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 930 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 229 ]), but he argues that the statement, “it’s absolutely undisputed that there was a kidnap,” in the prosecutor’s closing argument was impermissible because it connoted a lack of personal response by the accused himself. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, Inc. v. Jewel Tea Co.
green
1 sentence1981It’s as simple as that.” *461 Appellant contends that these statements constitute comments by the prosecution on the accused’s silence in violation of the rule in Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 , 615 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110 , 85 S.Ct. 1797 ], and its progeny. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.