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8 California opinions name it 3 courts 2000–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Turnergreen1 sentence2014(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [a brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”]; see People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19 [“We discuss those arguments that are sufficiently developed to 12 due process being defendants’ sole assertion in their opening briefs, the People understandably limit their respondent’s briefing to the due process argument. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Zambranogreen1 sentence2014In June 2012, the People filed a complaint in case No. SCN 306847 (SCN 306847), 18 Although not raised as a separate claim, Boyle also suggests that the prosecutor committed a statutory discovery violation under section 1054.1, which requires disclosure to the defendant of "[a]ny exculpatory evidence" (id., subd. (e)) that "is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies." (§ 1054.1.) Even assuming that the prosecutor violated section 1054.1, a violation of the California reciprocal discovery statute | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mendozagreen2 sentences2012"As a general rule, in construing statutes, `[w]e presume the Legislature intends to change the meaning of a law when it alters the statutory language [citation], as for example when it deletes express provisions of the prior version [citation].'" ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 916 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 , 4 P.3d 265 ].) Thus we do not believe the Legislature intended that common law delayed discovery principles should apply to cases governed by section 340.1. (22) Further evidence of legislative intent to eliminate common law delayed discovery principles appeared in 1998, when the L 2012"As a general rule, in construing statutes, `[w]e presume the Legislature intends to change the meaning of a law when it alters the statutory language [citation], as for example when it deletes express provisions of the prior version [citation].'" ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 916 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 , 4 P.3d 265 ].) Thus we do not believe the Legislature intended that common law delayed discovery principles should apply to cases governed by section 340.1. (22) Further evidence of legislative intent to eliminate common law delayed discovery principles appeared in 1998, when the L | 1 | 1 |
Debbie Reynolds Professional Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2012(See Moore, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 382 [“An express legislative provision for circumstances which will toll a statute excludes, by necessary implication, all other exceptions. [Citation.] Accordingly, the outside limit of [the relevant statute of limitations] is not subject to delayed accrual or tolling except to the extent that the Legislature has expressly so provided.”]; see also Krupnick, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1029-1030 [an express revival clause applicable to one class of plaintiffs shows that other exceptions to the general rule were not contemplated]; Debbie Reynolds, supr 2012(See Moore, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 382 ["An express legislative provision for circumstances which will toll a statute excludes, by necessary implication, all other exceptions. [Citation.] Accordingly, the outside limit of [the relevant statute of limitations] is not subject to delayed accrual or tolling except to the extent that the Legislature has expressly so provided."]; see also Krupnick, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1029-1030 [an express revival clause applicable to one class of plaintiffs shows that other exceptions to the general rule were not contemplated]; Debbie Reynolds, supr | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. State Board of Controlgreen2 sentences2012(See Moore, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 382 [“An express legislative provision for circumstances which will toll a statute excludes, by necessary implication, all other exceptions. [Citation.] Accordingly, the outside limit of [the relevant statute of limitations] is not subject to delayed accrual or tolling except to the extent that the Legislature has expressly so provided.”]; see also Krupnick, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1029-1030 [an express revival clause applicable to one class of plaintiffs shows that other exceptions to the general rule were not contemplated]; Debbie Reynolds, supr 2012(See Moore, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 382 ["An express legislative provision for circumstances which will toll a statute excludes, by necessary implication, all other exceptions. [Citation.] Accordingly, the outside limit of [the relevant statute of limitations] is not subject to delayed accrual or tolling except to the extent that the Legislature has expressly so provided."]; see also Krupnick, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1029-1030 [an express revival clause applicable to one class of plaintiffs shows that other exceptions to the general rule were not contemplated]; Debbie Reynolds, supr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Quarry v. Doe I
green
2 sentences2016Generally, a civil cause of action for child molestation accrues at the time of the molestation ( K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1239, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( K.J. )), but delayed discovery principles may apply to a cause of action arising out of childhood sexual abuse. ( Id . at p. 1241, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) As detailed in Quarry, section 340.1 has been amended numerous times. ( Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 962-972, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 3 , 272 P.3d 977 .) As relevant *1046 here, the Legislature removed reference to common law delayed discovery principles from sec 2016(Quarry, at p. 984.) In 2002, the Legislature again amended section 340.1 and "provided a longer limitations period for childhood sexual abuse claims, subject to the statutory delayed discovery rule already defined by subdivision (a) of the statute." (Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 968 .) This statutory delayed discovery rule provides that an action for 5 damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse must be filed "within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered tha | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Morrison
green
2 sentences2010(Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 715 .) Second, we reject defendant’s assertion that the proper sanction for the statutory discovery violation was a declaration of mistrial. 2010Moreover, the information was disclosed at trial, and hence was not suppressed for Brady purposes. ( Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 715 .) *283 Second, we reject defendant's assertion that the proper sanction for the statutory discovery violation was a declaration of mistrial. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School District
green
2 sentences2016Generally, a civil cause of action for child molestation accrues at the time of the molestation ( K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1239, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( K.J. )), but delayed discovery principles may apply to a cause of action arising out of childhood sexual abuse. ( Id . at p. 1241, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) As detailed in Quarry, section 340.1 has been amended numerous times. ( Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 962-972, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 3 , 272 P.3d 977 .) As relevant *1046 here, the Legislature removed reference to common law delayed discovery principles from sec 2016Generally, a civil cause of action for child molestation accrues at the time of the molestation ( K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1239, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( K.J. )), but delayed discovery principles may apply to a cause of action arising out of childhood sexual abuse. ( Id . at p. 1241, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) As detailed in Quarry, section 340.1 has been amended numerous times. ( Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 962-972, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 3 , 272 P.3d 977 .) As relevant *1046 here, the Legislature removed reference to common law delayed discovery principles from sec | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Bohannon
green
2 sentences2014Under the heading stating that his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the purported discovery violation, Comphel’s opening brief reads, “In People v. Bohannon, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 798 , the Court of Appeal noted that the sua sponte obligation of the prosecution to disclose material information is based in the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution, as well as the statutory obligation set forth in Penal Code section 1054.1.” However, the Bohannon court noted, the “constitutional duty is independent of, and to be differentiated from, the statutory duty of th 2014Under the heading stating that his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the purported discovery violation, Comphel’s opening brief reads, “In People v. Bohannon, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 798 , the Court of Appeal noted that the sua sponte obligation of the prosecution to disclose material information is based in the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution, as well as the statutory obligation set forth in Penal Code section 1054.1.” However, the Bohannon court noted, the “constitutional duty is independent of, and to be differentiated from, the statutory duty of th | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2014In June 2012, the People filed a complaint in case No. SCN 306847 (SCN 306847), 18 Although not raised as a separate claim, Boyle also suggests that the prosecutor committed a statutory discovery violation under section 1054.1, which requires disclosure to the defendant of "[a]ny exculpatory evidence" (id., subd. (e)) that "is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies." (§ 1054.1.) Even assuming that the prosecutor violated section 1054.1, a violation of the California reciprocal discovery statute | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Vai v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n
green
2 sentences2000Proa, § 338, subd. (d)) nor criticize the holdings of the Supreme Court cases that do ( Vai v. Bank of America, supra, 56 Cal.2d 329 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 364 P.2d 247 ; Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d 412 , 159 P.2d 958 ). 2000Proa, § 338, subd. (d)) nor criticize the holdings of the Supreme Court cases that do ( Vai v. Bank of America, supra, 56 Cal.2d 329 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 364 P.2d 247 ; Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d 412 , 159 P.2d 958 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co.
green
2 sentences2000Proa, § 338, subd. (d)) nor criticize the holdings of the Supreme Court cases that do ( Vai v. Bank of America, supra, 56 Cal.2d 329 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 364 P.2d 247 ; Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d 412 , 159 P.2d 958 ). 2000Proa, § 338, subd. (d)) nor criticize the holdings of the Supreme Court cases that do ( Vai v. Bank of America, supra, 56 Cal.2d 329 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 364 P.2d 247 ; Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d 412 , 159 P.2d 958 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.