system doctrine (California) · Go Syfert
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system doctrine in California

8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2022 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Jambazian v. Bordengreen
calctapp · 1994 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997(Jambazian v. Borden (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 836, 844 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) In compliance with the foregoing, we turn to the first step of the system of analysis above fashioned, i.e., to define the issues framed by the pleadings.

1997(Jambazian v. Borden (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 836, 844 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 ].) In compliance with the foregoing, we turn to the first step of the system of analysis above fashioned, i.e., to define the issues framed by the pleadings.

22
People v. Aguileragreen
calctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022However, the warnings and waivers are only required when a suspect has been “taken into custody.” (See Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda (2008) 96 Cal. L.Rev. 1519.) An interrogation is custodial for Miranda purposes “when ‘a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way.’ [Citation.] Custody consists of a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. [Citations.] When there has been no formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have

11
Conrad v. Bank of Americagreen
calctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011In Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce (1995) 42 Cal.App.4th 1086 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] (Billmeyer), the court, while noting that the issue preclusion terminology used in the case precedents is variable, stated that “ ‘courts that have considered the effect of a debtor’s failure to disclose a potential lender-liability lawsuit in a bankruptcy proceeding have universally held that the debtor is equitably estopped, judicially estopped or barred by res judicata from bringing the action after confirmation of the bankruptcy reorganization plan.’ ” (Id. at p. 1091, fn. omitted; see also Conrad v. B

2011In Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce (1995) 42 Cal.App.4th 1086 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] (Billmeyer), the court, while noting that the issue preclusion terminology used in the case precedents is variable, stated that “ ‘courts that have considered the effect of a debtor’s failure to disclose a potential lender-liability lawsuit in a bankruptcy proceeding have universally held that the debtor is equitably estopped, judicially estopped or barred by res judicata from bringing the action after confirmation of the bankruptcy reorganization plan.’ ” (Id. at p. 1091, fn. omitted; see also Conrad v. B

11
cluster 507099green
ca3 · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996Judicial estoppel looks to the connection between the litigant and the judicial system and applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted. (848 F.2d at p. 419.) The court held that “Oneida’s failure to list its claim against the bank *147 worked in opposition to preservation of the integrity of the system which the doctrine of judicial estoppel seeks to protect.

1996Judicial estoppel looks to the connection between the litigant and the judicial system and applies to preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted. ( 848 F.2d at p. 419 .) The court held that "Oneida's failure to list its claim against the bank *Page 147 worked in opposition to preservation of the integrity of the system which the doctrine of judicial estoppel seeks to protect.

11
Serrano v. Priestgreen
cal · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
1 sentence

1976XIII, § 21), “specifically authorizes local districts to levy school taxes” ( 5 Cal.3d at p. 598, fn. 12 ) in no way implies that that section authorizes a system in violation of the requirements of equal protection.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Germany green
calctapp · 2005
2 sentences

2022(People v. Germany (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 784, 791 .) The law sought to enable those “ ‘no longer in the system to challenge their judgment when they learn that their conviction was obtained in part because of fraud or false evidence by a government official.’ ” (Ibid.) Section 1473.6 defines “ ‘newly discovered evidence’ [as] evidence that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to judgment” (§ 1473.6, subd. (b)), and mandates that a motion to vacate the judgment “be filed within one year” from “[t]he date the moving party discovered, or could have discovered with the e

2013Section 1473.6‟s legislative history demonstrates it is the exclusive remedy, “„other than a pardon,‟” for “those no longer in the system to challenge their judgment when they learn that their conviction was obtained in part because of fraud or false evidence by a government official.” (Germany, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 791 .) By 2008, Avetoom was “no longer in the system,” and thus his only remedy was by way of section 1473.6 or a pardon.

22013–2022
People v. Bejasa green
calctapp · 2012
1 sentence

2022However, the warnings and waivers are only required when a suspect has been “taken into custody.” (See Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda (2008) 96 Cal. L.Rev. 1519.) An interrogation is custodial for Miranda purposes “when ‘a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way.’ [Citation.] Custody consists of a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. [Citations.] When there has been no formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have

12022–2022
People v. Moore green
cal · 2011
1 sentence

2022However, the warnings and waivers are only required when a suspect has been “taken into custody.” (See Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda (2008) 96 Cal. L.Rev. 1519.) An interrogation is custodial for Miranda purposes “when ‘a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way.’ [Citation.] Custody consists of a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. [Citations.] When there has been no formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have

12022–2022
Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce green
calctapp · 1995
2 sentences

2011In Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce (1995) 42 Cal.App.4th 1086 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] (Billmeyer), the court, while noting that the issue preclusion terminology used in the case precedents is variable, stated that “ ‘courts that have considered the effect of a debtor’s failure to disclose a potential lender-liability lawsuit in a bankruptcy proceeding have universally held that the debtor is equitably estopped, judicially estopped or barred by res judicata from bringing the action after confirmation of the bankruptcy reorganization plan.’ ” (Id. at p. 1091, fn. omitted; see also Conrad v. B

2011In Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce (1995) 42 Cal.App.4th 1086 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 119 ] (Billmeyer), the court, while noting that the issue preclusion terminology used in the case precedents is variable, stated that “ ‘courts that have considered the effect of a debtor’s failure to disclose a potential lender-liability lawsuit in a bankruptcy proceeding have universally held that the debtor is equitably estopped, judicially estopped or barred by res judicata from bringing the action after confirmation of the bankruptcy reorganization plan.’ ” (Id. at p. 1091, fn. omitted; see also Conrad v. B

12011–2011

Where else courts name it

PA 15 (1976–2025) NJ 15 (1912–2025) LA 10 (1965–2003) CA 8 (1976–2022) NY 6 (1897–1997) IL 5 (1888–2022) WV 5 (1993–2021) TX 4 (1996–2015) MO 4 (1968–1985) WA 4 (2000–2007) SD 4 (1979–1995) AL 2 (1923–1982) ME 2 (2008–2011) OH 2 (2008–2010) MI 2 (1998–1999) CT 2 (1967–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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