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370 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1898–2026 32 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Homesgreen2 sentences2011App.3d 612, 619-20 , 211 Ill.Dec. 200 , 654 N.E.2d 662, 668-69 (1995) (acknowledging where the State introduces evidence of a defendant's postarrest, pre- Miranda silence is not a constitutional violation, but it is prohibited by the Illinois rule); Cf. People v. Givens, 135 Ill. 2011App.3d 612, 619-20 , 211 Ill.Dec. 200 , 654 N.E.2d 662, 668-69 (1995) (acknowledging where the State introduces evidence of a defendant's postarrest, pre- Miranda silence is not a constitutional violation, but it is prohibited by the Illinois rule); Cf. People v. Givens, 135 Ill. | 4 | 4 |
The People v. Lewerenzgreen2 sentences2020This Illinois rule is based on our supreme court’s pre-Miranda decisions in People v. Lewerenz, 24 Ill. 2d 295, 299 (1962), and People v. Rothe, 358 Ill. 52, 57 (1934), which held that an accused’s silence at the time of his arrest is neither relevant nor material because his exercise of his right to remain silent has no tendency to prove or disprove the charges against him. 2020This Illinois rule is based on our supreme court’s pre-Miranda decisions in People v. Lewerenz, 24 Ill. 2d 295, 299 (1962), and People v. Rothe, 358 Ill. 52, 57 (1934), which held that an accused’s silence at the time of his arrest is neither relevant nor material because his exercise of his right to remain silent has no tendency to prove or disprove the charges against him. | 4 | 4 |
Schramer v. Tiger Athletic Ass'n of Auroragreen2 sentences2019May 30, 2018). 4 “Under the Illinois rule of stare decisis, a circuit court must follow the precedent of the appellate court of its district, if such precedent exists; if no such precedent exists, the circuit court must follow the precedent of other districts.” Schramer v. Tiger Athletic Ass’n of Aurora, 351 Ill. 2019May 30, 2018). 4 “Under the Illinois rule of stare decisis, a circuit court must follow the precedent of the appellate court of its district, if such precedent exists; if no such precedent exists, the circuit court must follow the precedent of other districts.” Schramer v. Tiger Athletic Ass’n of Aurora, 351 Ill. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.green2 sentences2010The Illinois land trust is “a unique creation of the Illinois bar,” which over the years has “served as a useful vehicle in real estate transactions for maintaining secrecy of ownership and allowing ease of transfer.” People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 Ill. 2d 479, 487 (1979). 2010The Illinois land trust is “a unique creation of the Illinois bar,” which over the years has “served as a useful vehicle in real estate transactions for maintaining secrecy of ownership and allowing ease of transfer.” People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 Ill. 2d 479, 487 (1979). | 3 | 3 |
The People v. Rothegreen2 sentences2020This Illinois rule is based on our supreme court’s pre-Miranda decisions in People v. Lewerenz, 24 Ill. 2d 295, 299 (1962), and People v. Rothe, 358 Ill. 52, 57 (1934), which held that an accused’s silence at the time of his arrest is neither relevant nor material because his exercise of his right to remain silent has no tendency to prove or disprove the charges against him. 2020This Illinois rule is based on our supreme court’s pre-Miranda decisions in People v. Lewerenz, 24 Ill. 2d 295, 299 (1962), and People v. Rothe, 358 Ill. 52, 57 (1934), which held that an accused’s silence at the time of his arrest is neither relevant nor material because his exercise of his right to remain silent has no tendency to prove or disprove the charges against him. | 2 | 4 |
People v. McMullingreen2 sentences2019Id. ("[I]t is also apparent that the rule they set forth does not depend upon whether the silence sought to be utilized occurred before or after a defendant was given Miranda warnings."). ¶ 20 The Doyle rule has been applied even where impeachment is not at issue. 2019Id. ("[I]t is also apparent that the rule they set forth does not depend upon whether the silence sought to be utilized occurred before or after a defendant was given Miranda warnings."). ¶ 20 The Doyle rule has been applied even where impeachment is not at issue. | 2 | 4 |
Williams v. Board of Reviewgreen2 sentences2025See City of Rockford v. Gilles, 2022 IL App (2d) 210521 , ¶ 65; Williams, 241 Ill. 2d 352 . ¶ 38 Even so, case law instructs that equitable tolling under Illinois’ doctrine may be appropriate under three circumstances: (1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, (2) if the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting his or her rights in some extraordinary way, or (3) if the plaintiff has mistakenly asserted his or her rights in the wrong forum. 2025See City of Rockford v. Giles, 2022 IL App (2d) 210521 , ¶ 65; Williams, 241 Ill. 2d at 361, 370 (statutory deadline in the Federal Trade Act of 1974 (Federal Trade Act) ( 19 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (2006)) equitably tolled given the language of the statute, its subject and purpose, and the practical implications of applying equitable tolling). ¶ 20 Equitable tolling under Illinois’s doctrine may be appropriate under three circumstances: (1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, (2) if the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting his or her rights in some extraordinary way, o | 2 | 2 |
City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2020Though “the Illinois Constitution may provide greater protection to free speech than does its federal counterpart” (City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 390, 446 (2006)), plaintiff is content to rely solely on case law interpreting the federal free- speech clause and does not ask that we find greater protection under the Illinois clause in this particular context. ¶ 80 In his opening brief, plaintiff relies principally on Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). ¶ 81 In Pickering, a 2020Though “the Illinois Constitution may provide greater protection to free speech than does its federal counterpart” (City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 390, 446 (2006)), plaintiff is content to rely solely on case law interpreting the federal free speech clause and does not ask that we find greater protection under the Illinois clause in this particular context. 2 Virginia recognized the following categories of defamation per se: “(1) Those which impute to a person the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge is tr | 2 | 2 |
Fletcher v. Weirgreen2 sentences2020See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607 ; People v. Homes, 274 Ill. App. 3d 612, 619-20 (1995). ¶ 171 There are limited situations where a defendant’s postarrest silence may be used for impeachment purposes. 2020See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607 ; People v. Homes, 274 Ill. App. 3d 612, 619-20 (1995). ¶ 171 There are limited situations where a defendant’s postarrest silence may be used for impeachment purposes. | 2 | 2 |
Green v. Northwest Community Hospitalgreen2 sentences2016Neither exception applies here. ¶ 29 Under the Illinois rule against claim-splitting, which is closely related to the doctrine of res judicata, a plaintiff is "not permitted to sue for part of a claim in one action and then sue for the remainder in another action." Green v. Northwest Community Hospital, 401 Ill. 2016Neither exception applies here. ¶ 29 Under the Illinois rule against claim-splitting, which is closely related to the doctrine of res judicata, a plaintiff is "not permitted to sue for part of a claim in one action and then sue for the remainder in another action." Green v. Northwest Community Hospital, 401 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Stable Investments Partnership v. Thomas Vilsackgreen2 sentences2015In distinguishing authority relied upon by defendant, plaintiff maintains that “[t]he case at bar involved neither tort issues [n]or breach of contract issues.” ¶ 40 An Illinois land trust is a “unique” type of trust “created by the Illinois bar, with the aid and acceptance of the Illinois bench, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.” Stable Investments Partnership v. Vilsack, 775 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2015). 2015In distinguishing authority relied upon by defendant, plaintiff maintains that "[t]he case at bar involved neither tort issues [n]or breach of contract issues." ¶ 40 An Illinois land trust is a "unique" type of trust "created by the Illinois bar, with the aid and acceptance of the Illinois bench, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." Stable Investments Partnership v. Vilsack, 775 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2015). | 2 | 2 |
| PASSALINO v. City of Ziongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest Hospitalgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Bruecks v. County of Lakegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Fink v. Banksgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Givensgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Clarkgreen | 2 | 2 |
| South Park Commissioners v. Dunlevygreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. William Curtis, IIIgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Employers Insurance v. Ehlco Liquidating Trustgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Finley v. Keslinggreen | 2 | 2 |
| Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzmangreen | 2 | 2 |
| Salsitz v. Kreissgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Ledesmared | 2 | 2 |
| Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.red | 2 | 2 |
| Bonta' v. Burkegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Relsolelo v. Fiskgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Vickrey v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| Witherell v. Weimergreen | 2 | 2 |
United Central Bank v. KMWC 845, LLCgreen2 sentences2025United Central Bank v. KMWC 845, LLC, 800 F.3d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 2015) (“long-standing Illinois law precludes a plaintiff from foreclosing on a mortgage when an action on the underlying note is barred by the statute of limitations or another procedural rule”) 3; Financial Freedom v. Kirgis, 377 Ill. App. 3d 107, 124 (2007) (citing the “old principle” that “ ‘where the note is barred, the mortgage being but an incident to it, all right of action on the mortgage is also barred’ ” (quoting Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 132 (1896), overruled on other grounds by ABN AMRO, 237 Ill. 2d at 538 ) 2025United Central Bank v. KMWC 845, LLC, 800 F.3d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 2015) (“long-standing Illinois law precludes a plaintiff from foreclosing on a mortgage when an action on the underlying note is barred by the statute of limitations or another procedural rule”) 3; Financial Freedom v. Kirgis, 377 Ill. App. 3d 107, 124 (2007) (citing the “old principle” that “ ‘where the note is barred, the mortgage being but an incident to it, all right of action on the mortgage is also barred’ ” (quoting Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 132 (1896), overruled on other grounds by ABN AMRO, 237 Ill. 2d at 538 ) | 1 | 3 |
The People v. Montgomeryyellow2 sentences2025We note, however, that the language used in the Illinois rule of evidence was adopted from the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence 609, in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516-17 (1971), as “a guide for trial courts in deciding whether a defendant’s prior convictions should be admitted to impeach [his or her] credibility.” People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (2009) (citing Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 519 ). 2025We note, however, that the language used in the Illinois rule of evidence was adopted from the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence 609, in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516-17 (1971), as “a guide for trial courts in deciding whether a defendant’s prior convictions should be admitted to impeach [his or her] credibility.” People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (2009) (citing Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 519 ). | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Garsteckigreen | 1 | 2 |
| Sanitary District of Chicago v. Chapingreen | 1 | 2 |
| Cirrincione v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 2 |
| Jachim v. Townsleygreen | 1 | 2 |
| Eckhardt v. Hansongreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Duncangreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2026Defendant asserted that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its Illinois progeny provided a new substantive rule regarding considerations of defendant’s youth when sentenced. 2023I, § 11) because “his sentencer failed to take into account the hallmark features of youth now required by the U.S. Supreme and Illinois Courts,” referring to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and its Illinois progeny. | 6 | 2020–2026 |
Northfield Insurance v. City of Waukegan
green
2 sentences2017As the Seventh Circuit observed in Northfield Insurance Co., 701 F.3d at 1132 , “[a]s a federal court interpreting Illinois law, we are not entitled to singlehandedly modify the Illinois rule without some new direction from the state.” Unless and until our supreme court states otherwise, the holdings in City of Zion, Indian Harbor, and County of McLean express Illinois’s law on the coverage trigger issue in this case. ¶ 45 The problem with Westport I and II and the City’s argument is that they focus on the elements or accrual date of a fifth-amendment claim instead of comparing the allegations 2017As the Seventh Circuit observed in Northfield Insurance Co., 701 F.3d at 1132 , “[a]s a federal court interpreting Illinois law, we are not entitled to singlehandedly modify the Illinois rule without some new direction from the state.” Unless and until our supreme court states otherwise, the holdings in City of Zion, Indian Harbor, and County of McLean express Illinois’s law on the coverage trigger issue in this case. ¶ 45 The problem with Westport I and II and the City’s argument is that they focus on the elements or accrual date of a fifth-amendment claim instead of comparing the allegations | 4 | 2014–2017 |
Madden v. State
green
2 sentences2021Madden, 799 S.W.2d at 698 . 2021Madden, 799 S.W.2d at 698 . | 3 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Minniefield
green
2 sentences2021Id. ¶ 38. ¶ 51 On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for stage-two post-conviction proceedings, finding that “Illinois courts typically consider the sentencing claims of young adults under the proportionate penalties clause rather than the eighth amendment [,]” because federal cases have generally drawn a line at age 18 (Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 37 ), and because “the Illinois clause offers a broader path to the same type of relief.” Id. ¶ 61. 2020This is because federal cases have generally drawn a line at 18 years of age (Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 37 ) and because, as we explain below, the Illinois clause offers a broader path to the same type of relief. ¶ 62 V. | 3 | 2020–2021 |
SHACHTER v. City of Chicago
green
2 sentences2016Shachter v. City of Chicago, 2011 IL App (1st) 103582, ¶ 80 . ¶ 33 Another objection that somewhat tracks the authoritativeness issue is whether the algorithm described in the book can be suitably classified as "generally accepted" to meet Illinois' standard for admissibility of expert methodology when the book itself acknowledges that the algorithm cannot be "scientifically proven." The Manual's authors acknowledge that the algorithm "cannot be considered to be scientifically proven as the only or even necessarily the best way to approach any one clinical problem or patient." The authors cont 2016Shachter v. City of Chicago, 2011 IL App (1st) 103582, ¶ 80 . ¶ 33 Another objection that somewhat tracks the authoritativeness issue is whether the algorithm described in the book can be suitably classified as "generally accepted" to meet Illinois' standard for admissibility of expert methodology when the book itself acknowledges that the algorithm cannot be "scientifically proven." The Manual's authors acknowledge that the algorithm "cannot be considered to be scientifically proven as the only or even necessarily the best way to approach any one clinical problem or patient." The authors cont | 3 | 2015–2016 |
Sidwell v. Griggsville Community School District 4
neutral
2 sentences1993Under the Illinois rule of stare decisis between the various districts of the appellate court, a circuit court should follow the precedent of the appellate court of its district, if such precedent exists. ( Sidwell v. Griggsville Community School District 4 (1991), 208 Ill.App.3d 296, 299 , 152 Ill.Dec. 961 , 566 N.E.2d 838 .) If not, it must follow the precedent of other districts. ( Sidwell, 208 Ill.App.3d at 299 , 152 Ill.Dec. 961 , 566 N.E.2d 838 .) If the other districts are in disagreement, the circuit court may then choose which precedent it considers to be most nearly correct. ( Sidwel 1993Under the Illinois rule of stare decisis between the various districts of the appellate court, a circuit court should follow the precedent of the appellate court of its district, if such precedent exists. ( Sidwell v. Griggsville Community School District 4 (1991), 208 Ill.App.3d 296, 299 , 152 Ill.Dec. 961 , 566 N.E.2d 838 .) If not, it must follow the precedent of other districts. ( Sidwell, 208 Ill.App.3d at 299 , 152 Ill.Dec. 961 , 566 N.E.2d 838 .) If the other districts are in disagreement, the circuit court may then choose which precedent it considers to be most nearly correct. ( Sidwel | 3 | 1993–1994 |
Ariola v. Nigro
green
2 sentences1988Ariola v. Nigro (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 200, 206-07 . 1986The Federal courts, in construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), after which Illinois’ rule was patterned (see Ariola v. Nigro (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 200, 203 ), have held that an appeal from a judgment on a validly severed single claim may be taken without the required findings of appealability and enforceability notwithstanding the pendency of the remaining claims or counterclaims unless the severance amounted to an abuse of discretion. | 3 | 1986–1988 |
The People v. Nichols
green
2 sentences1986People v. Nichols, 378 Ill. 487 , 38 N.E.2d 766 (1942).” Hires v. Price (1966), 75 Ill. 1986People v. Nichols, 378 Ill. 487 , 38 N.E.2d 766 (1942).” Hires v. Price (1966), 75 Ill. | 3 | 1966–1986 |
People v. Savage
green
2 sentences2023Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 61 . ¶ 43 The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution states that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the defendant to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. 2023Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 61 . ¶ 139 The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution states that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the defendant to useful citizenship.” Ill. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Bounds
green
2 sentences2021Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d at 46-47 . 2019Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d at 46-47 . | 2 | 2019–2021 |
Bond v. Floyd
green
2 sentences2020Though “the Illinois Constitution may provide greater protection to free speech than does its federal counterpart” (City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 390, 446 (2006)), plaintiff is content to rely solely on case law interpreting the federal free- speech clause and does not ask that we find greater protection under the Illinois clause in this particular context. ¶ 80 In his opening brief, plaintiff relies principally on Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). ¶ 81 In Pickering, a 2020Though “the Illinois Constitution may provide greater protection to free speech than does its federal counterpart” (City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 390, 446 (2006)), plaintiff is content to rely solely on case law interpreting the federal free speech clause and does not ask that we find greater protection under the Illinois clause in this particular context. 2 Virginia recognized the following categories of defamation per se: “(1) Those which impute to a person the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge is tr | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.
green
2 sentences2020Though “the Illinois Constitution may provide greater protection to free speech than does its federal counterpart” (City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 390, 446 (2006)), plaintiff is content to rely solely on case law interpreting the federal free- speech clause and does not ask that we find greater protection under the Illinois clause in this particular context. ¶ 80 In his opening brief, plaintiff relies principally on Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). ¶ 81 In Pickering, a 2020Though “the Illinois Constitution may provide greater protection to free speech than does its federal counterpart” (City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 390, 446 (2006)), plaintiff is content to rely solely on case law interpreting the federal free speech clause and does not ask that we find greater protection under the Illinois clause in this particular context. 2 Virginia recognized the following categories of defamation per se: “(1) Those which impute to a person the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge is tr | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Quinonez
green
2 sentences2020“The language of relevancy and materiality utilized by our supreme court in Lewerenz and Rothe indicates that the Illinois rule which prohibits impeachment with defendant’s postarrest silence is based on evidentiary principles, rather than constitutional law. [Citation.] Therefore, the rule is unaltered by federal - 16 - constitutional cases which found that the use of a defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda silence does not violate due process.” Quinonez, 2011 IL App (1st) 092333, ¶ 26 . 2020“The language of relevancy and materiality utilized by our supreme court in Lewerenz and Rothe indicates that the Illinois rule which prohibits impeachment with defendant’s postarrest silence is based on evidentiary principles, rather than constitutional law. [Citation.] Therefore, the rule is unaltered by federal - 16 - constitutional cases which found that the use of a defendant’s postarrest, pre-Miranda silence does not violate due process.” Quinonez, 2011 IL App (1st) 092333, ¶ 26 . | 2 | 2018–2020 |
Harshman v. DePhillips
green
2 sentences2018However, we are unconvinced that, in enacting section 5, the legislature intended the actions taken by plaintiffs in this case to constitute the assertion of a contribution claim by third-party complaint in the pending lawsuit." Id. at 501, 300 Ill.Dec. 498 , 844 N.E.2d 941 . ¶ 17 Harshman illustrates that the rule of Laue is strictly applied, even if the court in the underlying action denied a plaintiff's attempt to bring a contribution claim. 2018However, we are unconvinced that, in enacting section 5, the legislature intended the actions taken by plaintiffs in this case to constitute the assertion of a contribution claim by third-party complaint in the pending lawsuit." Id. at 501, 300 Ill.Dec. 498 , 844 N.E.2d 941 . ¶ 17 Harshman illustrates that the rule of Laue is strictly applied, even if the court in the underlying action denied a plaintiff's attempt to bring a contribution claim. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Wartell v. Formusa
green
2 sentences2018This position has been adopted by the [tentative draft of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws], which provides in part that 'whether one member of a family is immune from tort liability to another member of the family is determined by the local law of the state of their domicile.' An increasing number of courts have also held this to be the better reasoned view. [Citations.] We also adopt this view and hold that in this case the Illinois immunity statute is determinative of the question of whether plaintiff may maintain this action against her deceased husband's estate." Id. at 59-60 , 2018This position has been adopted by the [tentative draft of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws], which provides in part that 'whether one member of a family is immune from tort liability to another member of the family is determined by the local law of the state of their domicile.' An increasing number of courts have also held this to be the better reasoned view. [Citations.] We also adopt this view and hold that in this case the Illinois immunity statute is determinative of the question of whether plaintiff may maintain this action against her deceased husband's estate." Id. at 59-60 , | 2 | 1986–2018 |
Wells v. McCullock
neutral
2 sentences2018The Court noted its "conclusion is supported by the presence of the long-established Illinois rule against the imposition of costs of prosecution upon an acquittal or discharged criminal defendant, Wells v. McCullock , 13 Ill. 606 (1852), and by the Illinois court's own determination [in Schilb I ] that the charge under § 110-7(f) is an administrative fee and not a cost of prosecution imposed * * * only upon the convicted defendant." Id. at 371, 92 S.Ct. 479 . ¶ 56 b. 2018The Court noted its "conclusion is supported by the presence of the long-established Illinois rule against the imposition of costs of prosecution upon an acquittal or discharged criminal defendant, Wells v. McCullock , 13 Ill. 606 (1852), and by the Illinois court's own determination [in Schilb I ] that the charge under § 110-7(f) is an administrative fee and not a cost of prosecution imposed * * * only upon the convicted defendant." Id. at 371, 92 S.Ct. 479 . ¶ 56 b. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Wilms v. Jess
green
2 sentences2016First, Union Pacific points out that in Wilms, 94 Ill. at 469 , the supreme court recognized “contributive negligence” as a defense in an action for mine subsidence. 2016First, Union Pacific points out that in Wilms, 94 Ill. at 469 , the supreme court recognized “contributive negligence” as a defense in an action for mine subsidence. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
| Hicks v. Charles Pfizer & Co. Inc. green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| In Re Mitan green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Griffin v. Illinois green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Williams v. Illinois green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| White Way Sign & Maintenance Co. v. Montclare Lanes, Inc. green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| American Safety Casualty Insurance v. City of Waukegan green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Esser v. McIntyre green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| People v. Ramirez green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Dusanek v. O'Donnell green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Curtis v. United States green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Home Insurance Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh green | 2 | 2007–2008 |
| People v. Pitman green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Frye v. United States red | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. De La Paz green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Kemner v. Monsanto Co. green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Smith green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Schal Bovis, Inc. v. Casualty Insurance green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc. green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| Kathleen Evans, as Conservator of Jessica Evans, a Protected Person v. Lederle Laboratories, Link Clinic, and O. Sharma green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| McCraw v. Cegielski green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.