Illinois rule in Indiana

1973However, the opposite result was reached in People v. Baxter (1928), 245 Mich. 229 , 222 N.W. 149 , where the court expressly rejected the Illinois rule.

1973However, the opposite result was reached in People v. Baxter (1928), 245 Mich. 229 , 222 N.W. 149 , where the court expressly rejected the Illinois rule.

2010The Illinois analysis of "implication by a statute of a private right of action" is similar to our negligence per se analysis; implication by a statute of a private right of action is appropriate when: "(1) plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted; (2) it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act; (3) plaintiffs injury is one the Act was designed to prevent; and (4) it is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the Act." Id.

2010The Illinois analysis of "implication by a statute of a private right of action" is similar to our negligence per se analysis; implication by a statute of a private right of action is appropriate when: "(1) plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted; (2) it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act; (3) plaintiffs injury is one the Act was designed to prevent; and (4) it is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the Act." Id.

1987Id., 55 Ill.Dec. at 639 , 426 N.E.2d at 964 .

1987Id., 55 Ill.Dec. at 639 , 426 N.E.2d at 964 .

1981It also appears, however, that cases subsequent to Bottorff have not strictly applied the Illinois rule, to the degree that children 14 and older have, in fact, been held to other than an adult standard by reason of their lessor mental abilities, Harris v. Indiana General Service Co., (1933) 206 Ind. 351 , 189 N.E. 410 (18-year-old), Petroski v. Northern Public Service Co., (1976) 171 Ind.App. 14 , 354 N.E.2d 736 (14-year-old), and see Wise v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co., (1941) 109 Ind.App. 681 , 34 N.E.2d 975 (16-year-old), and it is the conclusion of various commentaries in the area

1981It also appears, however, that cases subsequent to Bottorff have not strictly applied the Illinois rule, to the degree that children 14 and older have, in fact, been held to other than an adult standard by reason of their lessor mental abilities, Harris v. Indiana General Service Co., (1933) 206 Ind. 351 , 189 N.E. 410 (18-year-old), Petroski v. Northern Public Service Co., (1976) 171 Ind.App. 14 , 354 N.E.2d 736 (14-year-old), and see Wise v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co., (1941) 109 Ind.App. 681 , 34 N.E.2d 975 (16-year-old), and it is the conclusion of various commentaries in the area

1981Brush v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, (1939) 106 Ind.App. 554 , 21 N.E.2d 83 , 86. 4 In Bottorff v. South Construction Co., (1916) 184 Ind. 221 , 110 N.E. 977 , our Supreme Court alluded to the Illinois rule in reaching its conclusion that a 14-year-old boy, absent specific averments of fact to the contrary, may be presumed to be responsible for his acts as an “intervening agency” when another youth, age 12, was injured by the defendant construction company’s dynamite caps.

1981Brush v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, (1939) 106 Ind.App. 554 , 21 N.E.2d 83 , 86. 4 In Bottorff v. South Construction Co., (1916) 184 Ind. 221 , 110 N.E. 977 , our Supreme Court alluded to the Illinois rule in reaching its conclusion that a 14-year-old boy, absent specific averments of fact to the contrary, may be presumed to be responsible for his acts as an “intervening agency” when another youth, age 12, was injured by the defendant construction company’s dynamite caps.

1981It also appears, however, that cases subsequent to Bottorff have not strictly applied the Illinois rule, to the degree that children 14 and older have, in fact, been held to other than an adult standard by reason of their lessor mental abilities, Harris v. Indiana General Service Co., (1933) 206 Ind. 351 , 189 N.E. 410 (18-year-old), Petroski v. Northern Public Service Co., (1976) 171 Ind.App. 14 , 354 N.E.2d 736 (14-year-old), and see Wise v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co., (1941) 109 Ind.App. 681 , 34 N.E.2d 975 (16-year-old), and it is the conclusion of various commentaries in the area

1981It also appears, however, that cases subsequent to Bottorff have not strictly applied the Illinois rule, to the degree that children 14 and older have, in fact, been held to other than an adult standard by reason of their lessor mental abilities, Harris v. Indiana General Service Co., (1933) 206 Ind. 351 , 189 N.E. 410 (18-year-old), Petroski v. Northern Public Service Co., (1976) 171 Ind.App. 14 , 354 N.E.2d 736 (14-year-old), and see Wise v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co., (1941) 109 Ind.App. 681 , 34 N.E.2d 975 (16-year-old), and it is the conclusion of various commentaries in the area

1981Apparently consistent with the Illinois rule, our courts have held, for example, that an infant under the age of seven is conclusively presumed incapable of negligence, Fuller v. Thrun, (1941) 109 Ind.App. 407 , 31 N.E.2d 670 , and that a “normal” minor over the age of fourteen “must be charged as a matter of law with the consequences of his acts as an adult” where they constitute contributory negligence.

1981Apparently consistent with the Illinois rule, our courts have held, for example, that an infant under the age of seven is conclusively presumed incapable of negligence, Fuller v. Thrun, (1941) 109 Ind.App. 407 , 31 N.E.2d 670 , and that a “normal” minor over the age of fourteen “must be charged as a matter of law with the consequences of his acts as an adult” where they constitute contributory negligence.

1981As the Court stated, for example, in Tabor v. Continental Baking Co., (1941) 110 Ind.App. 633, 643 , 38 N.E.2d 257, 261 , an action for personal injuries sustained by a nine-year-old girl whose sled collided with the defendant’s parked truck, “While the burden of establishing the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is upon the defendant in a case of this sort, it would be proper for the court to direct a verdict for the defendant because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, if the evidence produced by the plaintiff had been such as to show contributory negligence of the plaintiff w

1981As the Court stated, for example, in Tabor v. Continental Baking Co., (1941) 110 Ind.App. 633, 643 , 38 N.E.2d 257, 261 , an action for personal injuries sustained by a nine-year-old girl whose sled collided with the defendant’s parked truck, “While the burden of establishing the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is upon the defendant in a case of this sort, it would be proper for the court to direct a verdict for the defendant because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, if the evidence produced by the plaintiff had been such as to show contributory negligence of the plaintiff w

1981It also appears, however, that cases subsequent to Bottorff have not strictly applied the Illinois rule, to the degree that children 14 and older have, in fact, been held to other than an adult standard by reason of their lessor mental abilities, Harris v. Indiana General Service Co., (1933) 206 Ind. 351 , 189 N.E. 410 (18-year-old), Petroski v. Northern Public Service Co., (1976) 171 Ind.App. 14 , 354 N.E.2d 736 (14-year-old), and see Wise v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co., (1941) 109 Ind.App. 681 , 34 N.E.2d 975 (16-year-old), and it is the conclusion of various commentaries in the area

1981It also appears, however, that cases subsequent to Bottorff have not strictly applied the Illinois rule, to the degree that children 14 and older have, in fact, been held to other than an adult standard by reason of their lessor mental abilities, Harris v. Indiana General Service Co., (1933) 206 Ind. 351 , 189 N.E. 410 (18-year-old), Petroski v. Northern Public Service Co., (1976) 171 Ind.App. 14 , 354 N.E.2d 736 (14-year-old), and see Wise v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co., (1941) 109 Ind.App. 681 , 34 N.E.2d 975 (16-year-old), and it is the conclusion of various commentaries in the area

1981Brush v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, (1939) 106 Ind.App. 554 , 21 N.E.2d 83 , 86. 4 In Bottorff v. South Construction Co., (1916) 184 Ind. 221 , 110 N.E. 977 , our Supreme Court alluded to the Illinois rule in reaching its conclusion that a 14-year-old boy, absent specific averments of fact to the contrary, may be presumed to be responsible for his acts as an “intervening agency” when another youth, age 12, was injured by the defendant construction company’s dynamite caps.

1981Brush v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, (1939) 106 Ind.App. 554 , 21 N.E.2d 83 , 86. 4 In Bottorff v. South Construction Co., (1916) 184 Ind. 221 , 110 N.E. 977 , our Supreme Court alluded to the Illinois rule in reaching its conclusion that a 14-year-old boy, absent specific averments of fact to the contrary, may be presumed to be responsible for his acts as an “intervening agency” when another youth, age 12, was injured by the defendant construction company’s dynamite caps.

1979Crump v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 358 , 287 N.E.2d 342 . 11 .

1979Crump v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 358 , 287 N.E.2d 342 . 11 .

1974The Appellate Court of Illinois, in the case of Johnson v. Sleaford (1963), 188 N.E.2d 230, 235 , held as follows: “. . .

1974The Appellate Court of Illinois, in the case of Johnson v. Sleaford (1963), 188 N.E.2d 230, 235 , held as follows: “. . .

1974In the case of Avan v. Frey (1879), 69 Ind. 91, 93 , our Supreme Court stated that evidence was admissible to prove the amount and value of crops which would have been raised on land as a basis for laying the groundwork for damages. *407 The Illinois rule in relation to growing crops which have been converted and the value of the same is enlightening to this issue.

1974In the case of Avan v. Frey (1879), 69 Ind. 91, 93 , our Supreme Court stated that evidence was admissible to prove the amount and value of crops which would have been raised on land as a basis for laying the groundwork for damages. *407 The Illinois rule in relation to growing crops which have been converted and the value of the same is enlightening to this issue.

1938The appellant favors the Illinois rule and the appellee seems to be satisfied with either the Illinois or Maryland rule, but appellee believes the Maryland rule to be the most sound and equitable and appellee states that the bankruptcy rule was not adopted in the case of the Union Trust Co. v. Fletcher Trust Co. (1924), 194 Ind. 314 , 142 N. E. 711 .

1938The appellant favors the Illinois rule and the appellee seems to be satisfied with either the Illinois or Maryland rule, but appellee believes the Maryland rule to be the most sound and equitable and appellee states that the bankruptcy rule was not adopted in the case of the Union Trust Co. v. Fletcher Trust Co. (1924), 194 Ind. 314 , 142 N. E. 711 .