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8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Regency Services Corp. v. Board of County Commissionersgreen2 sentences1995Regency Services Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners, 819 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Colo.1991) ("A regulatory scheme will be upheld as long as the classification is based on differences that are real ... and the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.") Since there is no fundamental right or suspect class involved here, the rational basis of review applies. 1995Regency Services Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners, 819 P.2d 1049,1056 (Colo.1991) (“A regulatory scheme will be upheld as long as the classification is based on differences that are real ... and the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.”) Since there is no fundamental right or suspect class involved here, the rational basis of review applies. | 2 | 2 |
Lindsey v. Normetgreen2 sentences1984“In the absence of a suspect classification, an infringement upon a fundamental right, or a classification triggering an intermediate standard of scrutiny, a statutory classification will be upheld as long as it has some reasonable basis in fact and bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Dawson by and through McKelvey v. Public Employees' Retirement Association, 664 P.2d 702 , 707 (Colo.1983); see also San Antonio School District, 411 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1278 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 ; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 , 92 S.Ct. 862 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). 10 . 1984“In the absence of a suspect classification, an infringement upon a fundamental right, or a classification triggering an intermediate standard of scrutiny, a statutory classification will be upheld as long as it has some reasonable basis in fact and bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Dawson by and through McKelvey v. Public Employees' Retirement Association, 664 P.2d 702 , 707 (Colo.1983); see also San Antonio School District, 411 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1278 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 ; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 , 92 S.Ct. 862 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). 10 . | 1 | 4 |
DAWSON BY AND THROUGH McKELVEY v. PERAgreen2 sentences1989See Board of County Comm’rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 982 (Colo.1984); Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 49-50 (Colo.1984); Dawson by & through McKelvey v. Public Employees’ Retirement Ass’n, 664 P.2d 702, 708 (Colo.1983); see also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 70 , 92 S.Ct. 862, 872 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). 1984“In the absence of a suspect classification, an infringement upon a fundamental right, or a classification triggering an intermediate standard of scrutiny, a statutory classification will be upheld as long as it has some reasonable basis in fact and bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Dawson by and through McKelvey v. Public Employees' Retirement Association, 664 P.2d 702 , 707 (Colo.1983); see also San Antonio School District, 411 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1278 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 ; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 , 92 S.Ct. 862 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). 10 . | 1 | 2 |
Tassian v. Peoplegreen1 sentence1995See Tassian v. People, supra. Applying such a standard, we conclude that the Act does not violate plaintiffs’ right to equal protection. | 1 | 1 |
Board of County Commissioners v. Flickingergreen1 sentence1989See Board of County Comm’rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 982 (Colo.1984); Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 49-50 (Colo.1984); Dawson by & through McKelvey v. Public Employees’ Retirement Ass’n, 664 P.2d 702, 708 (Colo.1983); see also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 70 , 92 S.Ct. 862, 872 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Austin v. Litvakgreen1 sentence1989See Board of County Comm’rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 982 (Colo.1984); Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 49-50 (Colo.1984); Dawson by & through McKelvey v. Public Employees’ Retirement Ass’n, 664 P.2d 702, 708 (Colo.1983); see also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 70 , 92 S.Ct. 862, 872 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences1984“In the absence of a suspect classification, an infringement upon a fundamental right, or a classification triggering an intermediate standard of scrutiny, a statutory classification will be upheld as long as it has some reasonable basis in fact and bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Dawson by and through McKelvey v. Public Employees' Retirement Association, 664 P.2d 702 , 707 (Colo.1983); see also San Antonio School District, 411 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1278 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 ; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 , 92 S.Ct. 862 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). 10 . 1984“In the absence of a suspect classification, an infringement upon a fundamental right, or a classification triggering an intermediate standard of scrutiny, a statutory classification will be upheld as long as it has some reasonable basis in fact and bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Dawson by and through McKelvey v. Public Employees' Retirement Association, 664 P.2d 702 , 707 (Colo.1983); see also San Antonio School District, 411 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1278 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 ; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 , 92 S.Ct. 862 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). 10 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mosgrove v. Town of Federal Heights
green
2 sentences1983See, e.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 , 92 S.Ct. 862 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972); Heninger v. Charnes, supra; Mosgrove v. Town of Federal Heights, 190 Colo. 1 , 543 P.2d 715 (1975). 1983See, e.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 , 92 S.Ct. 862 , 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972); Heninger v. Charnes, supra; Mosgrove v. Town of Federal Heights, 190 Colo. 1 , 543 P.2d 715 (1975). | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Krueger v. Ary
green
1 sentence2012As support for this proposition, plaintiffs cite only CJI-Civ. 12:4, which they contend imposes on a landowner a duty to "exercise reasonable care to protect persons like [the] plaintiff from injury." As noted above, this jury instruction is not binding Colorado law, Krueger, 205 P.3d at 1154 , and plaintiffs have not provided us with any Colorado precedent that would establish that duty of care. (35 We disagree that the "reasonable care" standard imposed on landowners as to trespassing children under the attractive nuisance doctrine is a higher standard of care than is owed to child invitees | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.