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8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. Forsythgreen2 sentences1986Qualified immunity provides a governmental official performing a discretionary function with an entitlement to immunity from liability upon a showing that the challenged conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 ; see Mitchell v. Forsyth, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2811 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). 1986Qualified immunity provides a governmental official performing a discretionary function with an entitlement to immunity from liability upon a showing that the challenged conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 ; see Mitchell v. Forsyth, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2811 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Garciagreen1 sentence2020Rather, in the context of the showing necessary to be entitled to a hearing, “competent evidence” merely means evidence that is admissible under CRE 606(b), People v. Garcia, 752 P.2d 570, 583 (Colo. 1988), which indicates that prejudicial extraneous information may have been before the jury, Clark, ¶ 239. 7 B. | 1 | 1 |
Double I Ltd. Partnership v. Plan & Zoning Commissiongreen2 sentences2002P’Ship v. Plan and Zoning Comm’n, 218 Conn. 65 , 588 A.2d 624, 631 (1991) (citing Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir.1989)) (“A party seeking to demonstrate a property interest entitled to protection under the due process clause cannot ‘simply rely upon the procedural guarantees of state law or local ordinance.’ ”). 2002P’Ship v. Plan and Zoning Comm’n, 218 Conn. 65 , 588 A.2d 624, 631 (1991) (citing Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir.1989)) (“A party seeking to demonstrate a property interest entitled to protection under the due process clause cannot ‘simply rely upon the procedural guarantees of state law or local ordinance.’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2002See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 , 251 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1741 , 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (“an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d. 758, 768 (6th Cir.2000) (“What the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects is ‘life, liberty [and] property,’ not the procedures designed to protect life, liberty and property.”); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Law *1027 rence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the m | 1 | 1 |
Cain v. Larsongreen1 sentence2002P’Ship v. Plan and Zoning Comm’n, 218 Conn. 65 , 588 A.2d 624, 631 (1991) (citing Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir.1989)) (“A party seeking to demonstrate a property interest entitled to protection under the due process clause cannot ‘simply rely upon the procedural guarantees of state law or local ordinance.’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
No. 89-3082green1 sentence2002See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 , 251 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1741 , 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (“an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d. 758, 768 (6th Cir.2000) (“What the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects is ‘life, liberty [and] property,’ not the procedures designed to protect life, liberty and property.”); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Law *1027 rence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the m | 1 | 1 |
cluster 770420green1 sentence2002See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 , 251 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1741 , 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (“an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d. 758, 768 (6th Cir.2000) (“What the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects is ‘life, liberty [and] property,’ not the procedures designed to protect life, liberty and property.”); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Law *1027 rence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the m | 1 | 1 |
Lester Slotnick v. Harold Staviskeygreen1 sentence2002See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 , 251 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1741 , 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (“an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d. 758, 768 (6th Cir.2000) (“What the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects is ‘life, liberty [and] property,’ not the procedures designed to protect life, liberty and property.”); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Law *1027 rence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the m | 1 | 1 |
Olim v. Wakinekonagreen2 sentences2002See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 , 251 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1741 , 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (“an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d. 758, 768 (6th Cir.2000) (“What the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects is ‘life, liberty [and] property,’ not the procedures designed to protect life, liberty and property.”); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Law *1027 rence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the m 2002See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 , 251 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1741 , 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (“an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d. 758, 768 (6th Cir.2000) (“What the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protects is ‘life, liberty [and] property,’ not the procedures designed to protect life, liberty and property.”); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Law *1027 rence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the m | 1 | 1 |
State v. Meadorsgreen1 sentence1997See Meadors, 908 P.2d at 735 . | 1 | 1 |
Moody v. Ungerergreen1 sentence1996Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original); see also Moody v. Ungerer, 885 P.2d 200, 202 (Colo.1994) (“The purpose of qualified immunity is to shield a government employee from the burdens associated with trial which include distraction from governmental responsibilities, inhibiting discretionary decision making, and the disruptive effects of discovery.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences1986Qualified immunity provides a governmental official performing a discretionary function with an entitlement to immunity from liability upon a showing that the challenged conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 ; see Mitchell v. Forsyth, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2811 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). 1986Qualified immunity provides a governmental official performing a discretionary function with an entitlement to immunity from liability upon a showing that the challenged conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 ; see Mitchell v. Forsyth, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2811 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007Nor does it seem likely that the Supreme Court would so emphatically criticize the practice of subjecting a defendant's confrontation right to the "open-ended balancing tests" that preceded its announcement of Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , only to similarly subject a defendant's entitlement to the privilege of confrontation to a judicial determination whether his own conduct could be considered, in some ill-defined way and by some unspecified degree of proximity, a cause of the declarant's absence from trial. 2007Nor does it seem likely that the Supreme Court would so emphatically criticize the practice of subjecting a defendant's confrontation right to the "open-ended balancing tests" that preceded its announcement of Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , only to similarly subject a defendant's entitlement to the privilege of confrontation to a judicial determination whether his own conduct could be considered, in some ill-defined way and by some unspecified degree of proximity, a cause of the declarant's absence from trial. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 585 U.S. 81 , 122 S.Ct. 1155 , 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002). 2003Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 585 U.S. 81 , 122 S.Ct. 1155 , 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Rivera
green
2 sentences1997Although the Skinner court cited our decision in People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24 , 525 P.2d 431 (1974), in support of its statements, our comments in Rivera regarding the prosecution’s entitlement to such an instruction were likewise dicta. 1997Although the Skinner court cited our decision in People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24 , 525 P.2d 431 (1974), in support of its statements, our comments in Rivera regarding the prosecution’s entitlement to such an instruction were likewise dicta. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Cooke
green
2 sentences1997We first dealt with the tension between the prosecution’s entitlement to an instruction on a lesser offense over a defendant’s objection and a defendant’s due process right to notice of the charges against him in People v. Cooke, 186 Colo. 44 , 525 P.2d 426 (1974). 1997We first dealt with the tension between the prosecution’s entitlement to an instruction on a lesser offense over a defendant’s objection and a defendant’s due process right to notice of the charges against him in People v. Cooke, 186 Colo. 44 , 525 P.2d 426 (1974). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.