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14 California opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of S.F. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.green2 sentences2024(Compare with Hastings, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 555 [“Courts may invalidate an otherwise valid charter city measure only where, ‘under the historical circumstances presented, the state has a more substantial interest in the subject than the charter city’ ”— as demonstrated through a “ ‘fact-bound justification’ ”].) In other words, no additional facts are necessary to adduce the Regents’ entitlement to immunity. 2024(Compare with Hastings, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 555 [“Courts may invalidate an otherwise valid charter city measure only where, ‘under the historical circumstances presented, the state has a more substantial interest in the subject than the charter city’ ”— as demonstrated through a “ ‘fact-bound justification’ ”].) In other words, no additional facts are necessary to adduce the Regents’ entitlement to immunity. | 2 | 2 |
Ake v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2013(Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 83 (Ake); People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 661 .) “[A] criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.…” (Ake, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 77 .) The constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel has been found to provide additional support for the entitlement to defense experts. 2013(Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 83 (Ake); People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 661 .) “[A] criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.…” (Ake, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 77 .) The constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel has been found to provide additional support for the entitlement to defense experts. | 1 | 2 |
Delaney v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2023Code, § 1070, subd. (c).) Once the entitlement to immunity is shown, “[t]he burden then shifts to the criminal defendant seeking discovery to make the showing required to overcome the shield law.” (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 806, fn. 20 .) At the threshold, the defendant “must show a reasonable possibility the information will materially assist his defense.” (Id. at p. 808.) “[T]he defendant’s showing need not be detailed or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation.” (Id. at p. 809.) The concept of material assistance does not require that the information could lead to exo | 1 | 1 |
Newton v. County of Napagreen2 sentences2015(Compare Newton v. County of Napa (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1561-1562 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 682 ] [county was immune for conduct relating to investigation of reported child abuse] with § 11172, subd. (a) [absolute immunity for mandated reporters who comply with duties], and § 11166, subd. (c) [criminal liability for mandated reporters who do not comply with duties].) But there is no reason why more than one set of legal duties and immunities cannot govern an officer’s conduct in this context at the same time. 2015(Compare Newton v. County of Napa (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1561-1562 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 682 ] [county was immune for conduct relating to investigation of reported child abuse] with § 11172, subd. (a) [absolute immunity for mandated reporters who comply with duties], and § 11166, subd. (c) [criminal liability for mandated reporters who do not comply with duties].) But there is no reason why more than one set of legal duties and immunities cannot govern an officer’s conduct in this context at the same time. | 1 | 1 |
Scott Co. of California v. Blount, Inc.green1 sentence2014(Ibid.; see Scott Co. v. Blount, Inc., supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1109 [trial court exercises discretion where neither party achieves a complete victory on all the contract claims]; De La Cuesta v. Benham, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293 [simple, unqualified win on the contract takes a case out of the discretion clause of section 1717 and puts it into the entitlement clause].) Because defendants' result fell short of a complete victory, the trial court could not reasonably find defendants to be the prevailing party without exercising any discretion as to the parties' relative success or failure | 1 | 1 |
de la Cuesta v. Benhamgreen1 sentence2014(Ibid.; see Scott Co. v. Blount, Inc., supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1109 [trial court exercises discretion where neither party achieves a complete victory on all the contract claims]; De La Cuesta v. Benham, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293 [simple, unqualified win on the contract takes a case out of the discretion clause of section 1717 and puts it into the entitlement clause].) Because defendants' result fell short of a complete victory, the trial court could not reasonably find defendants to be the prevailing party without exercising any discretion as to the parties' relative success or failure | 1 | 1 |
Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyangreen2 sentences2009In exercising its discretion the court shall take into consideration all factors it deems relevant, including but not limited to the character of the action or proceeding, the nature of the beneficiary, whether public or private, and the potential harm to the beneficiary if the provision for the bond is waived.” (See also Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyan, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 (Baltayan) [“[w]here the plaintiff establishes indigency, a trial court has discretion to waive the posting of security under [§] 1030”].) The public policy underlying an indigent’s entitlement to a waiver of se 2009In exercising its discretion the court shall take into consideration all factors it deems relevant, including but not limited to the character of the action or proceeding, the nature of the beneficiary, whether public or private, and the potential harm to the beneficiary if the provision for the bond is waived.” (See also Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyan, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 (Baltayan) [“[w]here the plaintiff establishes indigency, a trial court has discretion to waive the posting of security under [§] 1030”].) The public policy underlying an indigent’s entitlement to a waiver of se | 1 | 1 |
Knight v. McMahonred2 sentences1997Appellant also relies upon Knight v. McMahon (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 747, 757 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 832 ] (Knight), which was disapproved in American Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. 1997Appellant also relies upon Knight v. McMahon (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 747, 757 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 832 ] (Knight), which was disapproved in American Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Eugene Mason v. State of Arizona, A. E. Gomes, Superintendent, Arizona State Prison Atflorence
green
2 sentences2013(People v. Stuckey (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 898, 917 .) The California Supreme Court has held that “the right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel [citations], and thus also includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services. [Citations.]” (Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319 , fns. omitted (Corenevsky); Mason v. Arizona (9th Cir. 1974) 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 .)30 As we have explained, however, we cannot say that the court’s ruling in this case was prejudicial, based on t 2009For example, the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that appointment was necessary under the right to counsel because “the effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when *918 necessary, the allowance of investigative expenses or appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.” (Mason v. State of Arizona (9th Cir. 1974) 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 .) So too, the California Supreme Court has held that “[i]t cannot be doubted that the right to counsel guaranteed b | 2 | 2009–2013 |
People v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2026There is nothing to support defendant’s argument other than his professed inability to recall killing the decedent. 13 Defendant emphasizes that the Supreme Court in Rogers observed: “nor did defendant himself testify he was unconscious, but only that he could not later recall the killings.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 887 .) Defendant therefore seeks to distinguish this case from Rogers because here, defendant not only stated that he did not recall the killing, but also that he blacked out, which, defendant states, “is synonymous with unconsciousness under the law.” We conclude, however, | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2026Defendant relies on People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749 for the proposition that a trial court errs in failing to instruct on unconsciousness even where “the only evidence of unconsciousness came from the defendant.” (Id. at p. 762.) However, unlike the circumstances here, the defendant in Wilson, while claiming that he could not recall shooting the two murder victims, did not offer detailed descriptions of the actions he took while purportedly unconscious that contradicted his claimed inability to recall events. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. H.W. (In Re H.W.)
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 980, 989 .) “When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the law.” (In re H.W. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1068, 1073 .) “ ‘We must look to the statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’ ” (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177 .) Section 1172.6 permits the parties to “offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Morrison
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 980, 989 .) “When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the law.” (In re H.W. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1068, 1073 .) “ ‘We must look to the statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’ ” (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177 .) Section 1172.6 permits the parties to “offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Arias
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 980, 989 .) “When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the law.” (In re H.W. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1068, 1073 .) “ ‘We must look to the statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’ ” (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177 .) Section 1172.6 permits the parties to “offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Marilyn H
green
1 sentence2022DISCUSSION Under section 388, a parent may petition “for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made” on the grounds of a “change of circumstance or new evidence.” To prevail on the petition, the parent must establish that the changed circumstances or new evidence are such that the proposed change in the court’s order would promote the child’s best interests. (§ 388, subds. (a)(1), (b); In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295 , 309-310.) The petition is liberally construed in favor of granting an evidentiary hearing, but the parent must still establish an entitle | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Currie v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.
green
2 sentences2017The delays inherent in this system are not, however, tantamount to a 'wrongful withholding' of benefits giving rise to a right to section 3287(a) prejudgment interest once the Board rules in favor of the claimant ." ( Id. , at p. 1026, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 920 P.2d 1314 , italics added.) Only if the Board wrongfully denies benefits, we explained, would the claimant be entitled to section 3287(a) interest as part of a court award of "compensation for the egregious delay in receiving benefits caused by the necessity of filing a mandamus action challenging the Board's denial." ( American Federati 2017The delays inherent in this system are not, however, tantamount to a 'wrongful withholding' of benefits giving rise to a right to section 3287(a) prejudgment interest once the Board rules in favor of the claimant ." ( Id. , at p. 1026, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 920 P.2d 1314 , italics added.) Only if the Board wrongfully denies benefits, we explained, would the claimant be entitled to section 3287(a) interest as part of a court award of "compensation for the egregious delay in receiving benefits caused by the necessity of filing a mandamus action challenging the Board's denial." ( American Federati | 1 | 2017–2017 |
American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
green
2 sentences2017The delays inherent in this system are not, however, tantamount to a 'wrongful withholding' of benefits giving rise to a right to section 3287(a) prejudgment interest once the Board rules in favor of the claimant ." ( Id. , at p. 1026, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 920 P.2d 1314 , italics added.) Only if the Board wrongfully denies benefits, we explained, would the claimant be entitled to section 3287(a) interest as part of a court award of "compensation for the egregious delay in receiving benefits caused by the necessity of filing a mandamus action challenging the Board's denial." ( American Federati 2017The delays inherent in this system are not, however, tantamount to a 'wrongful withholding' of benefits giving rise to a right to section 3287(a) prejudgment interest once the Board rules in favor of the claimant ." ( Id. , at p. 1026, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 920 P.2d 1314 , italics added.) Only if the Board wrongfully denies benefits, we explained, would the claimant be entitled to section 3287(a) interest as part of a court award of "compensation for the egregious delay in receiving benefits caused by the necessity of filing a mandamus action challenging the Board's denial." ( American Federati | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Stuckey
green
1 sentence2013(People v. Stuckey (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 898, 917 .) The California Supreme Court has held that “the right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel [citations], and thus also includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services. [Citations.]” (Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319 , fns. omitted (Corenevsky); Mason v. Arizona (9th Cir. 1974) 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 .)30 As we have explained, however, we cannot say that the court’s ruling in this case was prejudicial, based on t | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Corenevsky v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2013(People v. Stuckey (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 898, 917 .) The California Supreme Court has held that “the right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel [citations], and thus also includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services. [Citations.]” (Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319 , fns. omitted (Corenevsky); Mason v. Arizona (9th Cir. 1974) 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 .)30 As we have explained, however, we cannot say that the court’s ruling in this case was prejudicial, based on t | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. San Nicolas
green
1 sentence2013(Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 83 (Ake); People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 661 .) “[A] criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.…” (Ake, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 77 .) The constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel has been found to provide additional support for the entitlement to defense experts. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Williams v. State of California
green
1 sentence1999(Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18 , 22-23 ; Ronald S. v. County of San Diego (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 887 , 893 .) "The existence of a duty `is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law. . . .' [Citation.]" (Stout v. City of Porterville (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 937 , 941 .) Does a CHP officer have a duty to the operator of an overweight vehicle with respect to reducing the weight safely? | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Ronald S. v. County of San Diego
green
1 sentence1999(Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18 , 22-23 ; Ronald S. v. County of San Diego (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 887 , 893 .) "The existence of a duty `is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law. . . .' [Citation.]" (Stout v. City of Porterville (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 937 , 941 .) Does a CHP officer have a duty to the operator of an overweight vehicle with respect to reducing the weight safely? | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Stout v. City of Porterville
green
1 sentence1999(Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18 , 22-23 ; Ronald S. v. County of San Diego (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 887 , 893 .) "The existence of a duty `is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law. . . .' [Citation.]" (Stout v. City of Porterville (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 937 , 941 .) Does a CHP officer have a duty to the operator of an overweight vehicle with respect to reducing the weight safely? | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Caldwell v. Montoya
green
1 sentence1999Code, §§ 810 - 998.3 ; "Act"). 2 The Act governs actions at law for civil liability against public agencies, including state agencies, and their officers and employees. ( 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 331 , 332 (1998).) The Act specifically addresses "the substantive liabilities and immunities of (§§ 810 - 895.8 ), the procedures for initiating claims against (§§ 900 - 935.6 ), and the entitlement to defense of (§§ 995 - 996.6 ) and indemnification for (§§ 825 - 925.6 ) public employees." ( 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 199 , 199-200 (1998), fn. omitted.) A public entity is not generally liable for an injury ex | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Iverson v. Muroc Unified School District
green
1 sentence1999Code, §§ 810 - 998.3 ; "Act"). 2 The Act governs actions at law for civil liability against public agencies, including state agencies, and their officers and employees. ( 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 331 , 332 (1998).) The Act specifically addresses "the substantive liabilities and immunities of (§§ 810 - 895.8 ), the procedures for initiating claims against (§§ 900 - 935.6 ), and the entitlement to defense of (§§ 995 - 996.6 ) and indemnification for (§§ 825 - 925.6 ) public employees." ( 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 199 , 199-200 (1998), fn. omitted.) A public entity is not generally liable for an injury ex | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.