generally applicable rule in Colorado

2026While legislative acts are based on broad policy grounds, "executive acts are . . . based on . . . 'individualized, case-specific considerations.'" Id. at ¶ 47, 295 P.3d at 507 (quoting Carter v. Lehi City , 269 P.3d 141, 154 (Utah 2012)).

2026While legislative acts are based on broad policy grounds, "executive acts are . . . based on . . . 'individualized, case-specific considerations.' " Id. at ¶ 47 , 295 P.3d at 507 ( quoting Carter v. Lehi City , 269 P.3d 141, 154 ( Utah 2012 ) ) .

2026When the government legislates, we continued, "it establishes a generally applicable rule that sets the governing standard for all cases coming within its terms." Id.

2026When the government legislates, we continued, "it establishes a generally applicable rule that sets the governing standard for all cases coming within its terms." Id.

2021Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

2021In this circumstance, the plaintiff must prove that the attorney’s negligence “caused him or her to suffer some financial loss or harm by applying the generally applicable test for cause in fact in negligence actions: that the plaintiff would not have suffered the harm but for the attorney’s negligence.” Id. ¶ 34 The test for proximate cause is whether “a reasonably careful person, under the same or similar circumstances, would have anticipated that injury to a person in the plaintiff’s situation might result from the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at ¶ 51 (quoting Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp., 50 P.

2016See FDIC v. Williams, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1209 , 1214 & n.7 (D.

2016See FDIC v. Williams, 60 F.Supp.3d 1209 , 1214 & n. 7 (D.

2013Id. at ¶¶ 34, 36, 269 P.3d at 151-52 ; see also Margolis, 638 P.2d at 304 (observing that a zoning act is legislative in character because it "involves a general rule or policy").

2006See Citizens Progressive Alliance v. Southwestern Water Conservation District, 97 P.3d 308, 313 (Colo.App.2004) (records custodian was entitled to seek declaration that plaintiffs' records request did not comply with custodian's records access policy and could not be complied with within time limits mandated under open records laws; however, narrowness of holding is recognized in division's statement that it did not "foreclose future challenges to [the custodian's] reliance on the policy in cireumstances different from those presented here"); Bodelson v. City of Littleton, 36 P.3d 214 (Colo.Ap

2002See Jackson, 39 P.3d at 1184 (identifying the demand/request distinction as an important factor in determining whether a police-citizen contact is a seizure); People v. Melton, 910 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo.1996) (no seizure where, inter alia, police “asked rather than demanded” defendant’s name and address); Wayne R.

2002See Jackson, 39 P.3d at 1184 (identifying the demand/request distinction as an important factor in determining whether a police-citizen contact is a seizure); People v. Melton, 910 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo.1996) (no seizure where, inter alia, police "asked rather than demanded" defendant's name and address); Wayne R.

2002See Jackson, 39 P.3d at 1184 (identifying the demand/request distinction as an important factor in determining whether a police-citizen contact is a seizure); People v. Melton, 910 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo.1996) (no seizure where, inter alia, police “asked rather than demanded” defendant’s name and address); Wayne R.

2002See Jackson, 39 P.3d at 1184 (identifying the demand/request distinction as an important factor in determining whether a police-citizen contact is a seizure); People v. Melton, 910 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo.1996) (no seizure where, inter alia, police "asked rather than demanded" defendant's name and address); Wayne R.