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11 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Inlet Associates v. Assateague House Condominium Ass'ngreen1 sentence2020Ass’n., 313 Md. 413, 429 (1988) (stating that when a municipal action is “one of general application prescribing a new plan or policy, it is considered legislative and therefore must be accomplished by ordinance”). | 1 | 1 |
P/T Ltd. II v. Friendly Mobile Manor, Inc.green2 sentences2013In other words, in the absence of an express manifestation of intention to accept the assignor’s duties along with his rights and benefits, the assignee is presumed not to assume those duties, and they remain the obligation of the assignor. 79 Md.App. at 238 , 556 A.2d 694 . 2013In other words, in the absence of an express manifestation of intention to accept the assignor’s duties along with his rights and benefits, the assignee is presumed not to assume those duties, and they remain the obligation of the assignor. 79 Md.App. at 238 , 556 A.2d 694 . | 1 | 1 |
Anne Arundel County v. Halle Development, Inc.green2 sentences2011See id. at 565 , 971 A.2d at 229 (stating that to discover their injury, the plaintiffs would have had to "file a Public Information Act request seeking ... documents and information!,]” and then reviewed those documents to determine whether the government had complied with the statute). 5 . 2011See id. at 565 , 971 A.2d at 229 (stating that to discover their injury, the plaintiffs would have had to "file a Public Information Act request seeking ... documents and information!,]” and then reviewed those documents to determine whether the government had complied with the statute). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonadogreen1 sentence2010We shall make express today what was implicit in Bender . 10 *501 The Zapata independent business judgment standard calls upon the trial court to review the demand committee’s conclusions not only for fairness of process, but also for substance so that, even when the requirements of the business judgment rule — independence and good faith of the demand committee, reasonableness of the committee’s investigation, and reasonableness of the committee’s conclusions — have been satisfied, the trial court may substitute its own judgment for that of the corporation. 430 A.2d at 789 (“This means, of co | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CBS Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury
green
2 sentences2002With respect to the policy change at issue, we concluded that the effect of the Comptroller’s audit was “to announce a substantially new generally applicable policy with respect to apportionment of network advertising income of national broadcasting corporations” and that the change, “for practical purposes, amounted to a change in a generally applicable rule.” Id. at 699 , 575 A.2d at 330 . *37 These cases, which all deal with when the application of new standards through the adjudicatory process is permissible, do not assist the PSC here. 2002With respect to the policy change at issue, we concluded that the effect of the Comptroller’s audit was “to announce a substantially new generally applicable policy with respect to apportionment of network advertising income of national broadcasting corporations” and that the change, “for practical purposes, amounted to a change in a generally applicable rule.” Id. at 699 , 575 A.2d at 330 . *37 These cases, which all deal with when the application of new standards through the adjudicatory process is permissible, do not assist the PSC here. | 2 | 1996–2002 |
Consumer Protection Division Office of the Attorney General v. Consumer Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences1999Unlike the agency action in Consumer Protection , it was an effective ‘change [in] existing law5 and did ‘formulate rules of widespread application.’ 304 Md. at 756 , 501 A.2d at 61. 1990Unlike the agency action in Consumer Protection , it was an effective “change [in] existing law” and did “formulate rules of widespread application.” 304 Md. at 756 , 501 A.2d at 61. | 2 | 1990–1999 |
Thomas v. State
green
1 sentence2014In so holding, the Court articulated the following generally applicable standard for purposes of applying Rule 5-802.1(b): “[i]f the prior consistent statements were made at a time prior to the existence of any fact which would motivate bias, interest, or corruption on the part of the witness then the prior consistent statements are admissible to rebut the alleged bias or interest,” but, “[c]onversely, statements made when the declarant had an alleged motive to falsify are not relevant [and thus not admissible] to rebut a charge of fabrication.” 429 Md. at 104-105 , 55 A.3d 10 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Department
green
1 sentence2006The most prominent change, for purposes of the Coleman decision and for our purposes, was that by ch. 59, § 1, of the Acts of 1993, the General Assembly had promulgated what is now State Government Article, § 10-217, “establish[ing], for the first time, preponderance of the evidence as the generally applicable standard of proof to be used by covered state administrative agencies in contested case hearings.” 369 Md. at 136, 797 A.2d 770 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Estelle v. Williams
green
2 sentences1981Ed. 1461 (1938), for example, the United States Supreme Court, in deciding whether a defendant relinquished his sixth amendment right to counsel, set forth the generally applicable standard for waiver of what has become known as "fundamental” constitutional rights: It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. [Emphasis added.] *621 On the o 1981Ed. 1461 (1938), for example, the United States Supreme Court, in deciding whether a defendant relinquished his sixth amendment right to counsel, set forth the generally applicable standard for waiver of what has become known as "fundamental” constitutional rights: It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. [Emphasis added.] *621 On the o | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
green
2 sentences1981Ed. 1461 (1938), for example, the United States Supreme Court, in deciding whether a defendant relinquished his sixth amendment right to counsel, set forth the generally applicable standard for waiver of what has become known as "fundamental” constitutional rights: It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. [Emphasis added.] *621 On the o 1981Ed. 1461 (1938), for example, the United States Supreme Court, in deciding whether a defendant relinquished his sixth amendment right to counsel, set forth the generally applicable standard for waiver of what has become known as "fundamental” constitutional rights: It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ A waiver is ordinarily an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. [Emphasis added.] *621 On the o | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.