generally applicable rule in California

2023Courts have not settled on which of these standards is correct (Edwards, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 732 ) or indeed whether it may be said that there is a generally applicable standard.

2023Courts have not settled on which of these standards is correct (Edwards, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 732 ) or indeed whether it may be said that there is a generally applicable standard.

2021(Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc. v. Western Farm Service, Inc. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1526 .) Ordinance No. 151,411 satisfies neither of these prerequisites.

2021(Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc. v. Western Farm Service, Inc. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1526 .) Ordinance No. 151,411 satisfies neither of these prerequisites.

2021Ordinance No. 151,411 was not designed to protect invitees against injuries suffered from parking off site Even if a statute or ordinance is designed to embody and effectuate fundamental public policy by setting forth a generally applicable rule of conduct, it can give rise to a duty of care actionable in negligence only if (1) the plaintiff invoking the statute is “‘a member of the class of persons the statute [or ordinance] . . . was designed to protect,’” and (2) the “‘harm’” the plaintiff suffered was “‘one the statute [or ordinance] . . . was designed to prevent.’” (Ramirez v. Nelson (200

2021Ordinance No. 151,411 was not designed to protect invitees against injuries suffered from parking off site Even if a statute or ordinance is designed to embody and effectuate fundamental public policy by setting forth a generally applicable rule of conduct, it can give rise to a duty of care actionable in negligence only if (1) the plaintiff invoking the statute is “‘a member of the class of persons the statute [or ordinance] . . . was designed to protect,’” and (2) the “‘harm’” the plaintiff suffered was “‘one the statute [or ordinance] . . . was designed to prevent.’” (Ramirez v. Nelson (200

2021Ordinance No. 151,411 was not designed to protect invitees against injuries suffered from parking off site Even if a statute or ordinance is designed to embody and effectuate fundamental public policy by setting forth a generally applicable rule of conduct, it can give rise to a duty of care actionable in negligence only if (1) the plaintiff invoking the statute is “‘a member of the class of persons the statute [or ordinance] . . . was designed to protect,’” and (2) the “‘harm’” the plaintiff suffered was “‘one the statute [or ordinance] . . . was designed to prevent.’” (Ramirez v. Nelson (200

2021Ordinance No. 151,411 was not designed to protect invitees against injuries suffered from parking off site Even if a statute or ordinance is designed to embody and effectuate fundamental public policy by setting forth a generally applicable rule of conduct, it can give rise to a duty of care actionable in negligence only if (1) the plaintiff invoking the statute is “‘a member of the class of persons the statute [or ordinance] . . . was designed to protect,’” and (2) the “‘harm’” the plaintiff suffered was “‘one the statute [or ordinance] . . . was designed to prevent.’” (Ramirez v. Nelson (200

2019Instead, as in Allegheny, the generally applicable rule applies: In the face of a silent record, a trial court "is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty and acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction." 10 (Allegheny, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 718 .) Accordingly, we presume that Juma was present in court on August 5, 2016, and that the trial court was therefore not required to declare a forfeiture.

2019Instead, as in Allegheny, the generally applicable rule applies: In the face of a silent record, a trial court "is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty and acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction." 10 (Allegheny, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 718 .) Accordingly, we presume that Juma was present in court on August 5, 2016, and that the trial court was therefore not required to declare a forfeiture.

2024For example, in OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111 (OTO), we applied the generally applicable standard of unconscionability to an arbitration agreement, observing that “the doctrine’s application to arbitration agreements must rely on the same principles that govern all contracts.” (Id. at p. 125.) Similarly, when considering an unconscionability argument in Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 , we noted that “although we have spoken of a ‘strong public policy of this state in favor of resolving disputes by arbitration’ [citation], Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 makes clear that an arb

2024For example, in OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111 (OTO), we applied the generally applicable standard of unconscionability to an arbitration agreement, observing that “the doctrine’s application to arbitration agreements must rely on the same principles that govern all contracts.” (Id. at p. 125.) Similarly, when considering an unconscionability argument in Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 , we noted that “although we have spoken of a ‘strong public policy of this state in favor of resolving disputes by arbitration’ [citation], Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 makes clear that an arb

2024For example, in OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111 (OTO), we applied the generally applicable standard of unconscionability to an arbitration agreement, observing that “the doctrine’s application to arbitration agreements must rely on the same principles that govern all contracts.” (Id. at p. 125.) Similarly, when considering an unconscionability argument in Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 , we noted that “although we have spoken of a ‘strong public policy of this state in favor of resolving disputes by arbitration’ [citation], Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 makes clear that an arb

2023(People v. Bolian, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1420-1421.) He relies on the generally applicable rule that “[w]hen a trial court revokes and declines to reinstate probation after having imposed sentence but suspended its execution during the period of probation, the court ‘must order that exact sentence into effect.’ ” (In re Renfrow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1253 , quoting People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1088 (Howard); § 1203.2, subd. (c).) Achane fails to appreciate that Esquivel, the authority he relies on in arguing his case is not final for purposes of retroactivity of the s

2023As in Esquivel, “[t]he question in this case arises because ameliorative legislation took effect after the initial time for defendant to challenge his [original] sentence had elapsed, but before the conclusion of his appeal from the [subsequent] decision ordering that sentence into effect.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 676 .) Esquivel held the defendant was entitled to retroactive application of the ameliorative 9 legislation because “a case in which a defendant is placed on probation with execution of an imposed state prison sentence suspended is not yet final for [the] purpose [of Estr

2023(People v. Bolian, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1420-1421.) He relies on the generally applicable rule that “[w]hen a trial court revokes and declines to reinstate probation after having imposed sentence but suspended its execution during the period of probation, the court ‘must order that exact sentence into effect.’ ” (In re Renfrow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1253 , quoting People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1088 (Howard); § 1203.2, subd. (c).) Achane fails to appreciate that Esquivel, the authority he relies on in arguing his case is not final for purposes of retroactivity of the s

2022Instead, he cites a series of cases, all of which we find to be inapposite. 10 The generally applicable rule is that “an appellate court should defer to the factual determinations made by the trial court when the evidence is in conflict,” regardless of whether “the trial court’s ruling is based on oral testimony or declarations.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479 (Shamblin).) “[T]hat the trial court’s findings were based on declarations and other written evidence does not lessen the deference due those findings.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711, fn. 3 (Har

2022In the absence of any argument for a higher standard, we apply People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , which is the generally applicable standard of prejudice for state law error.2 We therefore 2 Hilliard appears to argue that the trial court’s error is reversible per se.

2020In Arreola the Supreme Court rejected the contention that there is a generally applicable rule of admissibility for prior testimony upon a showing of “sufficient indicia of reliability.” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1156 .) While it is possible to say categorically that there is no significant utility to a defendant’s confrontation right when a document that simply records data is involved—since a document cannot be cross-examined or its demeanor observed—the same cannot be said of former testimony (e.g., Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 717 ; Arreola, supra, at pp. 1156–1157) or other evide

2020In Arreola the Supreme Court rejected the contention that there is a generally applicable rule of admissibility for prior testimony upon a showing of “sufficient indicia of reliability.” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1156 .) While it is possible to say categorically that there is no significant utility to a defendant’s confrontation right when a document that simply records data is involved—since a document cannot be cross-examined or its demeanor observed—the same cannot be said of former testimony (e.g., Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 717 ; Arreola, supra, at pp. 1156–1157) or other evide

2020In Arreola the Supreme Court rejected the contention that there is a generally applicable rule of admissibility for prior testimony upon a showing of “sufficient indicia of reliability.” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1156 .) While it is possible to say categorically that there is no significant utility to a defendant’s confrontation right when a document that simply records data is involved—since a document cannot be cross-examined or its demeanor observed—the same cannot be said of former testimony (e.g., Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 717 ; Arreola, supra, at pp. 1156–1157) or other evide

2020In Arreola the Supreme Court rejected the contention that there is a generally applicable rule of admissibility for prior testimony upon a showing of “sufficient indicia of reliability.” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1156 .) While it is possible to say categorically that there is no significant utility to a defendant’s confrontation right when a document that simply records data is involved—since a document cannot be cross-examined or its demeanor observed—the same cannot be said of former testimony (e.g., Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 717 ; Arreola, supra, at pp. 1156–1157) or other evide

2020In Arreola the Supreme Court rejected the contention that there is a generally applicable rule of admissibility for prior testimony upon a showing of “sufficient indicia of reliability.” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1156 .) While it is possible to say categorically that there is no significant utility to a defendant’s confrontation right when a document that simply records data is involved—since a document cannot be cross-examined or its demeanor observed—the same cannot be said of former testimony (e.g., Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 717 ; Arreola, supra, at pp. 1156–1157) or other evide

2020(Lopez, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at 317 .) We review the court’s factual conclusions under the substantial evidence standard.

2015(See People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1089 (Howard).) People v. Brown (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1502 (Brown), considered the role of Romero in the context of a petition for recall of sentence under section 1170.126.

2015In contrast to the rules that apply to sentencing, however, the rules governing resentencing provide that an inmate will be denied recall of his or her sentence if ‘the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’ ” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) Penal Code1 section 1170.126, which codifies the resentencing provisions of the Act, is a statutory exception to the generally applicable rule of law, which holds that a court loses jurisdiction to modify a defendant’s sentence after execution of the senten

2014In Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 113 P.3d 1100 ] (Discover Bank), the California Supreme Court was asked to apply the doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate a clause in an arbitration agreement prohibiting class arbitration.

2014In Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 113 P.3d 1100 ] (Discover Bank), the California Supreme Court was asked to apply the doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate a clause in an arbitration agreement prohibiting class arbitration.

2013The general rule that section 1717 permits only one prevailing party per dispute was established at least as far back as La Pietra v. Freed (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 1025 , in which the plaintiffs filed an action for breach of a contract containing an arbitration clause.