generally applicable rule in Michigan

1996Similarly, cross-examination’ cannot be used to revive the right to introduce evidence that could have been, but was not, introduced in the prosecutor’s case in chief.” People v Losey, 413 Mich 346, 352 ; 320 NW2d 49 (1982), citing People v Bennett, 393 Mich 445, 449 ; 224 NW2d 840 (1975).

1996Similarly, cross-examination’ cannot be used to revive the right to introduce evidence that could have been, but was not, introduced in the prosecutor’s case in chief.” People v Losey, 413 Mich 346, 352 ; 320 NW2d 49 (1982), citing People v Bennett, 393 Mich 445, 449 ; 224 NW2d 840 (1975).

1996Similarly, cross-examination’ cannot be used to revive the right to introduce evidence that could have been, but was not, introduced in the prosecutor’s case in chief.” People v Losey, 413 Mich 346, 352 ; 320 NW2d 49 (1982), citing People v Bennett, 393 Mich 445, 449 ; 224 NW2d 840 (1975).

1996Similarly, cross-examination’ cannot be used to revive the right to introduce evidence that could have been, but was not, introduced in the prosecutor’s case in chief.” People v Losey, 413 Mich 346, 352 ; 320 NW2d 49 (1982), citing People v Bennett, 393 Mich 445, 449 ; 224 NW2d 840 (1975).

1994It is also consistent with our conclusion in People v Perlos, 436 Mich 305, 326 ; 462 NW2d 310 (1990), that an expectation of privacy in blood-alcohol results under subsection 9 is not an expectation the Legislature considers "reasonable.” The majority correctly observes that in Perlos we recognized that the Legislature had not created a generally applicable exception to the physician-patient privilege.

1994It is also consistent with our conclusion in People v Perlos, 436 Mich 305, 326 ; 462 NW2d 310 (1990), that an expectation of privacy in blood-alcohol results under subsection 9 is not an expectation the Legislature considers "reasonable.” The majority correctly observes that in Perlos we recognized that the Legislature had not created a generally applicable exception to the physician-patient privilege.

1985After noting that the generally applicable standard of review for instructional error is the harmless error rule as provided in GCR 1963, 529.1, 8 the Court opted nevertheless to "put its supervisory authority behind the consistent and uniform application of the sji” by adopting "a strict standard for sji errors,” Javis, supra, p 699 , mandating automatic reversal, without regard to any showing of any unfair prejudice, whenever a trial court declines to give an accurate and applicable sji which is properly requested by a party.

1985The automatic reversal rule was adopted despite the plain language of Rule 529.1 that the standard for review of a claim of error arising from "anything done or omitted by the court” requires that no verdict should be set aside or new trial granted unless the refusal to do so would be "inconsistent with substantial justice.” The Court was able to reconcile adoption of a presumption of prejudice standard of review for sji errors despite the fact that Rule 529.1 establishes a harmless error standard for reviewing discrepancies in civil proceedings because [s]uch a result (presumption of reversib

1958This Court is fully mindful of the cases defendant relies upon (headed by Malone v. Vining, 313 Mich 315 ; and Ludwick v. Hendricks, 335 Mich 633 ) and is aware of its rulings that a pedestrian in specific circumstances must “look and keep on looking.” The trouble with citation of such authorities, and with their attempted fitment to the case at bar, lies in the false assumption that a generally applicable rule was therein declared; whereas, and as we have just seen, a pedestrian in given circumstances may not be obligated — as a matter of law — to keep on looking-in the same direction.

1958We must keep in mind the rules of Restatement to which allusion was made in Dokey v. Carpenter, 300 Mich 648 ; likewise the circumscribing declaration made in that case (p 650 of report), viz., “Under ordinary conditions, it is the rule that the pedestrian must look and keep on looking, see what it is plain to see, and thus avoid being struck by a car coming in a straight line towards him.

1958This Court is fully mindful of the cases defendant relies upon (headed by Malone v. Vining, 313 Mich 315 ; and Ludwick v. Hendricks, 335 Mich 633 ) and is aware of its rulings that a pedestrian in specific circumstances must “look and keep on looking.” The trouble with citation of such authorities, and with their attempted fitment to the case at bar, lies in the false assumption that a generally applicable rule was therein declared; whereas, and as we have just seen, a pedestrian in given circumstances may not be obligated — as a matter of law — to keep on looking-in the same direction.