personal jurisdiction analysis in Colorado

2026See Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th 6 Cir. 1990) (concluding that, although the defendants raised a personal jurisdiction defense in their answer, they waived it by proceeding with the litigation without reasserting the issue), cited with approval in Giduck, ¶ 27.

2026See Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th 6 Cir. 1990) (concluding that, although the defendants raised a personal jurisdiction defense in their answer, they waived it by proceeding with the litigation without reasserting the issue), cited with approval in Giduck, ¶ 27.

2021“In fact, ‘the personal jurisdiction inquiry under Colorado law collapses into the traditional due process inquiry.’” Rome, ¶ 22 (quoting Grynberg Petroleum Co. v. Evergreen Energy Partners, LLC, 485 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222-23 (D.

2017See World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 297 -98 , 100 S.Ct. 559 ; Goettman , 176 P.3d at 66 . ¶31 To make a prima facie showing under World-Wide Volkswagen , a plaintiff *172 must allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a defendant placed goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the products will be purchased in the forum state.

2017See World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 297 -98 , 100 S.Ct. 559 ; Goettman , 176 P.3d at 66 . ¶31 To make a prima facie showing under World-Wide Volkswagen , a plaintiff *172 must allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a defendant placed goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the products will be purchased in the forum state.

2016A nonresident company “is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is incorporated, has its principal place of business, or is ‘essentially at home.’” Id. at ¶ 19; accord Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, ¶ 22 , 379 P.3d 1033 (“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (quoting Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 746 , 762 n.20, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014))).

2016A nonresident company “is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is incorporated, has its principal place of business, or is ‘essentially at home.’” Id. at ¶ 19; accord Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, ¶ 22 , 379 P.3d 1033 (“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (quoting Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 746 , 762 n.20, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014))).

2016A nonresident company “is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is incorporated, has its principal place of business, or is ‘essentially at home.’” Id. at ¶ 19; accord Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, ¶ 22 , 379 P.3d 1033 (“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (quoting Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 746 , 762 n.20, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014))).

2016A nonresident company “is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is incorporated, has its principal place of business, or is ‘essentially at home.’” Id. at ¶ 19; accord Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, ¶ 22 , 379 P.3d 1033 (“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (quoting Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 746 , 762 n.20, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014))).

2015Ozer, P.C. , 923 P.2d 166, 171 (Colo. App. 1995) (“To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make a timely objection which is specific enough to provide the trial court with a meaningful opportunity to correct the error.”), rev’d in part on other grounds , 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997). ¶18       However, we need not decide whether this reference alone was sufficient to preserve the personal jurisdiction defense because other, later occurring events also provide support for our conclusion that husband did not waive the defense. ¶19       After the district court entered

2014Given that a defendant must assert a compul sory counterclaim or risk forfeiting it, Gryn-berg v. -.Phillips, 148 P.3d 446, 448 (Colo.App. 2006), we conclude that the assertion of a compulsory counterclaim alone is insufficient to waive a personal jurisdiction defense.

2014See C.R.C.P. 12(b) (“No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more .other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading.”); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir.1984) (concluding that the filing of counterclaims does not constitute a waiver of a personal jurisdiction defense asserted in the same pleading).

1992Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14, 20 , 424 P.2d 110, 112-13 (1967). [E]ven though the “last act,” such as the signing of a contract, for example, may have occurred outside the geographical confines of the forum state, nevertheless the statutory test of a claim arising out of the transaction of any business within the state may still be met by the showing of other “purposeful acts,” performed within the forum state by the defendant in relation to the contract, even though such acts were preliminary, or even subsequent, to the execution of the contract itself.

1992Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14, 20 , 424 P.2d 110, 112-13 (1967). [E]ven though the “last act,” such as the signing of a contract, for example, may have occurred outside the geographical confines of the forum state, nevertheless the statutory test of a claim arising out of the transaction of any business within the state may still be met by the showing of other “purposeful acts,” performed within the forum state by the defendant in relation to the contract, even though such acts were preliminary, or even subsequent, to the execution of the contract itself.

1992Scheuer v. District Court, 684 P.2d 249, 251-52 (Colo.1984) (jurisdiction asserted under commission of tortious act standard of § 13-l-124(l)(b)).