claimed Doyle violation (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
← Connecticut issues

claimed Doyle violation in Connecticut

8 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Jolygreen
conn · 1991 · cited in 6 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1993–2006
2 sentences

2006After being given Miranda warnings, the defendant clearly chose to [forgo] his right to remain silent.” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 295 , 497 A.2d 35 (1985); id. (defendant cannot use selective silence to tell police only exculpatory parts of story); see also State v. Joly, 219 Conn. 234, 256-57 , 593 A.2d 96 (1991) (“[t]he factual predicate of a claimed Doyle violation is the use by the state of a defendant’s postarrest and postMiranda silence either for impeachment or as affirmative proof of his guilt,” and concluding that “the state offered [a police officer’s] testimony for the permiss

2006After being given Miranda warnings, the defendant clearly chose to [forgo] his right to remain silent.” State v. Talton, 197 Conn. 280, 295 , 497 A.2d 35 (1985); id. (defendant cannot use selective silence to tell police only exculpatory parts of story); see also State v. Joly, 219 Conn. 234, 256-57 , 593 A.2d 96 (1991) (“[t]he factual predicate of a claimed Doyle violation is the use by the state of a defendant’s postarrest and postMiranda silence either for impeachment or as affirmative proof of his guilt,” and concluding that “the state offered [a police officer’s] testimony for the permiss

16
State v. Hullgreen
conn · 1989 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999"With respect to post-Miranda warning . . . silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted." Wainwright v. Green, 474 U.S. 284 , 295 , n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986); see also State v. Hull, 210 Conn. 481 , 489 , 556 A.2d 154 (1989); State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289 , 294 , 696 A.2d 347 (1997). "`The factual predicate of a claimed Doyle violation is the use by the state of a defendant's postarrest and postMiranda silence either for impeachment or as affirma

1999"With respect to post-Miranda warning . . . silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted." Wainwright v. Green, 474 U.S. 284 , 295 , n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986); see also State v. Hull, 210 Conn. 481 , 489 , 556 A.2d 154 (1989); State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289 , 294 , 696 A.2d 347 (1997). "`The factual predicate of a claimed Doyle violation is the use by the state of a defendant's postarrest and postMiranda silence either for impeachment or as affirma

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Talton green
conn · 1985
2 sentences

2017As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." In State v. Talton , 197 Conn. 280 , 292-93, 497 A.2d 35 (1985), our Supreme Court noted for purposes of evaluating a claimed Doyle violation that there is a distinction between a defendant who remains silent after he is arrested and advised of his rights, and a defendant who, after being given Miranda warnings, chooses to forgo such rights.

2017As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." In State v. Talton , 197 Conn. 280 , 292-93, 497 A.2d 35 (1985), our Supreme Court noted for purposes of evaluating a claimed Doyle violation that there is a distinction between a defendant who remains silent after he is arrested and advised of his rights, and a defendant who, after being given Miranda warnings, chooses to forgo such rights.

22006–2017
State v. Montgomery green
conn · 2000
2 sentences

2002“The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 713 , 759 A.2d 995 (2000).

2002“The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 713 , 759 A.2d 995 (2000).

22002–2002
State v. Kuranko green
connappct · 2002
2 sentences

2003The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kuranko, 71 Conn. App. 703, 709 , 803 A.2d 383 (2002).

2003The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kuranko, 71 Conn. App. 703, 709 , 803 A.2d 383 (2002).

12003–2003
State v. Hughes green
connappct · 1997
2 sentences

1999"With respect to post-Miranda warning . . . silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted." Wainwright v. Green, 474 U.S. 284 , 295 , n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986); see also State v. Hull, 210 Conn. 481 , 489 , 556 A.2d 154 (1989); State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289 , 294 , 696 A.2d 347 (1997). "`The factual predicate of a claimed Doyle violation is the use by the state of a defendant's postarrest and postMiranda silence either for impeachment or as affirma

1999"With respect to post-Miranda warning . . . silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted." Wainwright v. Green, 474 U.S. 284 , 295 , n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986); see also State v. Hull, 210 Conn. 481 , 489 , 556 A.2d 154 (1989); State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289 , 294 , 696 A.2d 347 (1997). "`The factual predicate of a claimed Doyle violation is the use by the state of a defendant's postarrest and postMiranda silence either for impeachment or as affirma

11999–1999
Wainwright v. Greenfield green
scotus · 1986
2 sentences

1999"With respect to post-Miranda warning . . . silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted." Wainwright v. Green, 474 U.S. 284 , 295 , n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986); see also State v. Hull, 210 Conn. 481 , 489 , 556 A.2d 154 (1989); State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289 , 294 , 696 A.2d 347 (1997). "`The factual predicate of a claimed Doyle violation is the use by the state of a defendant's postarrest and postMiranda silence either for impeachment or as affirma

1999"With respect to post-Miranda warning . . . silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted." Wainwright v. Green, 474 U.S. 284 , 295 , n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986); see also State v. Hull, 210 Conn. 481 , 489 , 556 A.2d 154 (1989); State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289 , 294 , 696 A.2d 347 (1997). "`The factual predicate of a claimed Doyle violation is the use by the state of a defendant's postarrest and postMiranda silence either for impeachment or as affirma

11999–1999

Where else courts name it

CT 8 (1993–2017) KS 2 (2008–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check