jury regarding presumption in Connecticut

2019See Practice Book § 42-29 (‘‘[t]he verdict shall be gen- eral unless otherwise directed by the judicial authority, but if the judicial authority instructs the jury regarding the defense of mental disease or defect, the jury, if it so finds, shall declare the finding in its verdict’’); State v. Anderson, 158 Conn. App. 315 , 333, 118 A.3d 728 (‘‘we will not probe into the logic or reasoning of the jury’s deliberations or open the door to interminable speculation’’), cert. granted, 319 Conn. 907 , 123 A.3d 438 (2015) (appeal withdrawn on May 5, 2015), and cert. granted on other grounds, 319 Conn

2019See Practice Book § 42-29 (‘‘[t]he verdict shall be gen- eral unless otherwise directed by the judicial authority, but if the judicial authority instructs the jury regarding the defense of mental disease or defect, the jury, if it so finds, shall declare the finding in its verdict’’); State v. Anderson, 158 Conn. App. 315 , 333, 118 A.3d 728 (‘‘we will not probe into the logic or reasoning of the jury’s deliberations or open the door to interminable speculation’’), cert. granted, 319 Conn. 907 , 123 A.3d 438 (2015) (appeal withdrawn on May 5, 2015), and cert. granted on other grounds, 319 Conn

2019See Practice Book § 42-29 (‘‘[t]he verdict shall be gen- eral unless otherwise directed by the judicial authority, but if the judicial authority instructs the jury regarding the defense of mental disease or defect, the jury, if it so finds, shall declare the finding in its verdict’’); State v. Anderson, 158 Conn. App. 315 , 333, 118 A.3d 728 (‘‘we will not probe into the logic or reasoning of the jury’s deliberations or open the door to interminable speculation’’), cert. granted, 319 Conn. 907 , 123 A.3d 438 (2015) (appeal withdrawn on May 5, 2015), and cert. granted on other grounds, 319 Conn

2019See Practice Book § 42-29 (‘‘[t]he verdict shall be gen- eral unless otherwise directed by the judicial authority, but if the judicial authority instructs the jury regarding the defense of mental disease or defect, the jury, if it so finds, shall declare the finding in its verdict’’); State v. Anderson, 158 Conn. App. 315 , 333, 118 A.3d 728 (‘‘we will not probe into the logic or reasoning of the jury’s deliberations or open the door to interminable speculation’’), cert. granted, 319 Conn. 907 , 123 A.3d 438 (2015) (appeal withdrawn on May 5, 2015), and cert. granted on other grounds, 319 Conn

2021The court instructed the jury regarding that defense with the following instruction as the defendant had requested: If you unanimously find that the state has proven each of said elements of the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and if you also unanimously find that the defendant has proven by the preponder- ance of the evidence each of the elements of the affirma- tive defense of extreme emotional disturbance, you shall find the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm by reason of extreme emo- tional disturbance and not guilty of murder.’’ (Internal quotat

2016Id., at 786, 931 A.2d 383 .

2009State v. Schiappa, supra, 171-73 ; State v. Francis, supra, 135-36 . 12 Initially, we observe that the instruction at issue in the present case is materially distinct from those challenged in Schiappa and Francis .

2009State v. Schiappa, supra, at 171-73 , 728 A.2d 466 ; State v. Francis, supra, at 135-36 , 635 A.2d 762 . [12] Initially, we observe that the instruction at issue in the present case is materially distinct from those challenged in Schiappa and Francis .

2009State v. Schiappa, supra, at 171-73 , 728 A.2d 466 ; State v. Francis, supra, at 135-36 , 635 A.2d 762 . [12] Initially, we observe that the instruction at issue in the present case is materially distinct from those challenged in Schiappa and Francis .

2001“We have long held that [c]riminal statutes are not to be read more broadly than their language plainly requires . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Crowell, 228 Conn. 393, 400 , 636 A.2d 804 (1994).

2001“We have long held that [c]riminal statutes are not to be read more broadly than their language plainly requires . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Crowell, 228 Conn. 393, 400 , 636 A.2d 804 (1994).

1998Because “we presume, absent a fair indication to the contrary, that the jury followed the instruction of the court as to the law”; State v. Lasky, 43 Conn. App. 619, 629 , 685 A.2d 336 (1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 959 , 688 A.2d 328 (1997); we conclude that the burden of proof properly remained on the state to prove each and every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

1998Because “we presume, absent a fair indication to the contrary, that the jury followed the instruction of the court as to the law”; State v. Lasky, 43 Conn. App. 619, 629 , 685 A.2d 336 (1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 959 , 688 A.2d 328 (1997); we conclude that the burden of proof properly remained on the state to prove each and every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

1998Because “we presume, absent a fair indication to the contrary, that the jury followed the instruction of the court as to the law”; State v. Lasky, 43 Conn. App. 619, 629 , 685 A.2d 336 (1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 959 , 688 A.2d 328 (1997); we conclude that the burden of proof properly remained on the state to prove each and every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

1998Because “we presume, absent a fair indication to the contrary, that the jury followed the instruction of the court as to the law”; State v. Lasky, 43 Conn. App. 619, 629 , 685 A.2d 336 (1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 959 , 688 A.2d 328 (1997); we conclude that the burden of proof properly remained on the state to prove each and every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.