Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Missouri v. Seibertgreen2 sentences2022See id. at 1052- 54. 14 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence, having required deliberateness, does not engage in a comprehensive inquiry into effectiveness but asks only whether curative measures were taken. 542 U.S. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 21 should suppress the confession.”); United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2015) (reading the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence as “recogniz[ing] that Miranda warnings usually will be ineffective in a successive interrogation that is ‘close in time and similar in content’ to the pre-Mirand 2015But the detective’s coercive statements also—first— undermined the effectiveness of the warning itself. 11 While Justice Kennedy agreed with the Seibert plurality that Miranda warnings may not be delivered in a manner that vitiates their effectiveness, he was of the view that whether the police violated Miranda additionally turned on whether the interrogating officer deliberately subverted the warnings. 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Abu Khatallahgreen1 sentence2022Detective Queen’s stated reason for delaying the Miranda warnings is consistent with an intent to undermine the warnings. 10 She testified at the 9 Nor has the government argued that the questioning was “for a purpose distinct from criminal prosecution,” cf. United States v. Abu Khatallah, 275 F. Supp. 3d 32, 63 (D.D.C. 2017), a category of cases we need not address today. 10 The officer’s account is not, of course, the only factor to be considered in assessing deliberateness. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alvin Raygreen1 sentence2022See id. at 1052- 54. 14 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence, having required deliberateness, does not engage in a comprehensive inquiry into effectiveness but asks only whether curative measures were taken. 542 U.S. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 21 should suppress the confession.”); United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2015) (reading the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence as “recogniz[ing] that Miranda warnings usually will be ineffective in a successive interrogation that is ‘close in time and similar in content’ to the pre-Mirand | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Tashiri Wayne Williamsgreen1 sentence2022See id. at 1052- 54. 14 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence, having required deliberateness, does not engage in a comprehensive inquiry into effectiveness but asks only whether curative measures were taken. 542 U.S. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 21 should suppress the confession.”); United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2015) (reading the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence as “recogniz[ing] that Miranda warnings usually will be ineffective in a successive interrogation that is ‘close in time and similar in content’ to the pre-Mirand | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Maynard Francis Hayesgreen1 sentence1976As one court has stated : Just as the mere signing of a boilerplate statement to the effect that a defendant is knowingly waiving his rights will not discharge the - government’s burden, so the mere absence of such a statement will not preclude as a matter of law the possibility of an effective waiver. [United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1006 , 88 S.Ct. 1250 , 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968).] 4 Coupled with this lack of factors supporting appellant’s contention of involuntariness is the fact that the trial judge had both the benefit of hearing and evaluatin | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Neuman v. Neumangreen1 sentence1995See Neuman v. Neuman, 377 A.2d 393, 398 (D.C. 1977) ("rules of discovery are limited by Rule 26(b), which imposes a relevancy standard upon any matter that a party seeks to discover") (citations and footnote omitted). [11] In Arthur Treacher's, the court criticized this view on the basis that (1) it would be elementary to hone the questions to require greater and greater specificity regarding the matter discussed so as to avoid altogether the effectiveness of the privilege; and (2) the responses would be of little benefit to an opponent or the court if they were limited to the most general ter | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hawkins v. United States
green
2 sentences1985Singer; Adams, 317 U.S. at 277-78 , 63 S.Ct. at 240-41 ; Patton, 281 U.S. at 312 , 50 S.Ct. at 263 ; Hawkins v. United States, 385 A.2d 744 , 746 n. 4 (D.C.1978); D.C. 1985Singer ; Adams, 317 U.S. at 277-78 , 63 S.Ct. at 240-41 ; Patton, 281 U.S. at 312 , 50 S.Ct. at 263 ; Hawkins v. United States, 385 A.2d 744 , 746 n. 4 (D.C.1978); D.C. | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Patton v. United States
red
2 sentences1985Singer; Adams, 317 U.S. at 277-78 , 63 S.Ct. at 240-41 ; Patton, 281 U.S. at 312 , 50 S.Ct. at 263 ; Hawkins v. United States, 385 A.2d 744 , 746 n. 4 (D.C.1978); D.C. 1985Singer; Adams, 317 U.S. at 277-78 , 63 S.Ct. at 240-41 ; Patton, 281 U.S. at 312 , 50 S.Ct. at 263 ; Hawkins v. United States, 385 A.2d 744 , 746 n. 4 (D.C.1978); D.C. | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCann
green
2 sentences1985Singer; Adams, 317 U.S. at 277-78 , 63 S.Ct. at 240-41 ; Patton, 281 U.S. at 312 , 50 S.Ct. at 263 ; Hawkins v. United States, 385 A.2d 744 , 746 n. 4 (D.C.1978); D.C. 1985Singer; Adams, 317 U.S. at 277-78 , 63 S.Ct. at 240-41 ; Patton, 281 U.S. at 312 , 50 S.Ct. at 263 ; Hawkins v. United States, 385 A.2d 744 , 746 n. 4 (D.C.1978); D.C. | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Ford v. United States
green
1 sentence2022The government has not argued that the delay in Mirandizing Mr. Kinney was unintentional—that, for example, Detective Queen forgot, or that she reasonably thought he was not in custody, cf., e.g., Ford, 931 A.2d at 1053 .9 The government thus must counter a presumption of illegitimacy and show that the delay was not intended to undermine the effectiveness of the warnings. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Gray v. Citizens Bank of Washington
green
1 sentence1995Arthur Treacher's, 92 F.R.D. at 435 . [12] See note 10, supra. [1] See D.C.Code §§ 1-616.3 (1992); 1-2525, -2556; 11-1913 (1989); 36-220.9, -220.10 (1993); 36-342; 36-1217; 36-1307, -1310. [2] It is impossible to read Gray and reasonably conclude, as the dissent would, that a majority there intended future divisions to be free to adopt new exceptions to the doctrine. [1] In Gray, one member of the panel (concurring in affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of a complaint) agreed it would be "more seemly" to act en banc, 602 A.2d at 1099 ; another, relying on the specific factual allegations | 1 | 1995–1995 |
In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litigation
green
2 sentences1995Arthur Treacher's, 92 F.R.D. at 435 . . 1995Arthur Treacher's, 92 F.R.D. at 435 . [12] See note 10, supra. [1] See D.C.Code §§ 1-616.3 (1992); 1-2525, -2556; 11-1913 (1989); 36-220.9, -220.10 (1993); 36-342; 36-1217; 36-1307, -1310. [2] It is impossible to read Gray and reasonably conclude, as the dissent would, that a majority there intended future divisions to be free to adopt new exceptions to the doctrine. [1] In Gray, one member of the panel (concurring in affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of a complaint) agreed it would be "more seemly" to act en banc, 602 A.2d at 1099 ; another, relying on the specific factual allegations | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Singer v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 , 85 S.Ct. 783 , 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965). 1978Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 , 85 S.Ct. 783 , 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Angarano v. United States
green
1 sentence1977App., 312 A.2d 295 (1973), petition for reconsideration denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974) (en banc), which adopted the effectiveness standard of Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336 , 379 F.2d 113 (1967). 3 Al *4 though the Bruce standard was set in a collateral attack proceeding, this court has used that test in disposing of issues of counsel’s effectiveness raised on direct appeal. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Arthur Bruce v. United States
green
2 sentences1977App., 312 A.2d 295 (1973), petition for reconsideration denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974) (en banc), which adopted the effectiveness standard of Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336 , 379 F.2d 113 (1967). 3 Al *4 though the Bruce standard was set in a collateral attack proceeding, this court has used that test in disposing of issues of counsel’s effectiveness raised on direct appeal. 1977App., 312 A.2d 295 (1973), petition for reconsideration denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974) (en banc), which adopted the effectiveness standard of Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336 , 379 F.2d 113 (1967). 3 Al *4 though the Bruce standard was set in a collateral attack proceeding, this court has used that test in disposing of issues of counsel’s effectiveness raised on direct appeal. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Angarano v. United States
green
1 sentence1977App., 312 A.2d 295 (1973), petition for reconsideration denied, 329 A.2d 453 (1974) (en banc), which adopted the effectiveness standard of Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336 , 379 F.2d 113 (1967). 3 Al *4 though the Bruce standard was set in a collateral attack proceeding, this court has used that test in disposing of issues of counsel’s effectiveness raised on direct appeal. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority
green
1 sentence1976As one court has stated : Just as the mere signing of a boilerplate statement to the effect that a defendant is knowingly waiving his rights will not discharge the - government’s burden, so the mere absence of such a statement will not preclude as a matter of law the possibility of an effective waiver. [United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1006 , 88 S.Ct. 1250 , 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968).] 4 Coupled with this lack of factors supporting appellant’s contention of involuntariness is the fact that the trial judge had both the benefit of hearing and evaluatin | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.