effectiveness waiver in California

2025I, § 15; People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 508 (Nieves); People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344 , 348 (Cutting).) A defendant may waive that constitutional right, “ ‘as long as [their] waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.’ ” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531 (Davis).) Our Supreme Court has described the effectiveness of a defense counsel’s waiver of a defendant’s right to be present at resentencing as “unsettled” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899 ); but has explained such a waiver is effective “only if there is evidence that the defendant consented to

2024(Cutting, at p. 347; see People v. Quan (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524 , 533 [“The defendant’s presence is required when the court must make fact-bound determinations as it exercises its sentencing discretion”].) Under the federal and state constitutions, the defendant “can waive his right to be present, but the waiver must be ‘ “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” ’ ” (People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46 , 57.) According to our Supreme Court, the effectiveness of a defense’s counsel’s waiver of this right is “unsettled.” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899 .) But, “ ‘[a]t a minim

2025I, § 15; People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 508 (Nieves); People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344 , 348 (Cutting).) A defendant may waive that constitutional right, “ ‘as long as [their] waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.’ ” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531 (Davis).) Our Supreme Court has described the effectiveness of a defense counsel’s waiver of a defendant’s right to be present at resentencing as “unsettled” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899 ); but has explained such a waiver is effective “only if there is evidence that the defendant consented to

2024(Cutting, at p. 347; see People v. Quan (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524 , 533 [“The defendant’s presence is required when the court must make fact-bound determinations as it exercises its sentencing discretion”].) Under the federal and state constitutions, the defendant “can waive his right to be present, but the waiver must be ‘ “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” ’ ” (People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46 , 57.) According to our Supreme Court, the effectiveness of a defense’s counsel’s waiver of this right is “unsettled.” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899 .) But, “ ‘[a]t a minim

2025I, § 15; People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 508 (Nieves); People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344 , 348 (Cutting).) A defendant may waive that constitutional right, “ ‘as long as [their] waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.’ ” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531 (Davis).) Our Supreme Court has described the effectiveness of a defense counsel’s waiver of a defendant’s right to be present at resentencing as “unsettled” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899 ); but has explained such a waiver is effective “only if there is evidence that the defendant consented to

2022(Cf. Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare (2004) 32 Cal.4th 910, 934 (Dowhal) [“a truthful warning of an uncertain or remote danger may mislead the consumer into misjudging the dangers stemming from use of the product, and consequently making a medically unwise decision”]; Nicolle-Wagner v. Deukmejian (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 652, 661 (Nicolle-Wagner) [avoiding warnings regarding substances that pose insignificant risk of cancer “will further the statutory purpose [of Prop. 65] in safeguarding the effectiveness of warnings which are given”].) CERT argues that the warnings were require

2022(Cf. Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare (2004) 32 Cal.4th 910, 934 (Dowhal) [“a truthful warning of an uncertain or remote danger may mislead the consumer into misjudging the dangers stemming from use of the product, and consequently making a medically unwise decision”]; Nicolle-Wagner v. Deukmejian (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 652, 661 (Nicolle-Wagner) [avoiding warnings regarding substances that pose insignificant risk of cancer “will further the statutory purpose [of Prop. 65] in safeguarding the effectiveness of warnings which are given”].) CERT argues that the warnings were require

2021(See People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698 , 737–738 [absent an objection to the discharge of the jury or commencement of court trial, a defendant is precluded from asserting on appeal, a claim of ineffectual waiver of the statutory right to jury trial on the fact of a prior conviction in connection with recidivist enhancement allegations]; People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580 , 589–590; see also People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276 [“It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easil

2021(See People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698 , 737–738 [absent an objection to the discharge of the jury or commencement of court trial, a defendant is precluded from asserting on appeal, a claim of ineffectual waiver of the statutory right to jury trial on the fact of a prior conviction in connection with recidivist enhancement allegations]; People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580 , 589–590; see also People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276 [“It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easil

2002(See People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 23 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 , 18 P.3d 2 ["The right, if any, to a jury trial of prior conviction allegations derives from [Penal Code] sections 1025 and 1158, not from the state or federal Constitution" and the erroneous denial of that right is one of state law]; cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 486-491 , 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2360-2363 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 452-456 ["[ o ] ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

2002(See People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 23 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 , 18 P.3d 2 ["The right, if any, to a jury trial of prior conviction allegations derives from [Penal Code] sections 1025 and 1158, not from the state or federal Constitution" and the erroneous denial of that right is one of state law]; cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 486-491 , 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2360-2363 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 452-456 ["[ o ] ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

1993Justice Powell concurred, but also discussed the "more difficult question ... whether the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence can ever constitute `prejudice' under Strickland . " ( Kimmelman, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 391 [ 91 L.Ed.2d at p. 330 ] (conc. opn. of Powell, J.).) Justice Powell did not decide the question because it was never raised by the parties or discussed by the lower courts in the case, but he doubted that the erroneous admission of reliable evidence could ever be deemed prejudicial in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

1993Justice Powell concurred,, but also discussed the “more difficult question . . . whether the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence can ever constitute ‘prejudice’ under Strick land.” ( Kimmelman, supra, All U.S. at p. 391 [ 91 L.Ed.2d at p. 330 ] (conc. opn. of Powell, J.).) Justice Powell did not decide the question because it was never raised by the parties or discussed by the lower courts in the case, but he doubted that the erroneous admission of reliable evidence could ever be deemed prejudicial in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

1992(See the cases cited below; 18 see also North Carolina v. Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 31 [ 27 L.Ed.2d at p. 167 ]; Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. at pp. 747-748 & fn. 4 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 755-756]; Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 242, 244 [23 L.Ed.2d at pp. 279-280].) Because the effectiveness of a waiver of federal constitutional rights is governed by federal standards (Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 243 [ 23 L.Ed.2d at p. 279 ]), we adopt the federal test in place of the rule that the absence of express admonitions and waivers requires reversal regardless of prejudice.

1992(See the cases cited below; 18 see also North Carolina v. Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 31 [ 27 L.Ed.2d at p. 167 ]; Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. at pp. 747-748 & fn. 4 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 755-756]; Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 242, 244 [23 L.Ed.2d at pp. 279-280].) Because the effectiveness of a waiver of federal constitutional rights is governed by federal standards (Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 243 [ 23 L.Ed.2d at p. 279 ]), we adopt the federal test in place of the rule that the absence of express admonitions and waivers requires reversal regardless of prejudice.

1992(See the cases cited below; 18 see also North Carolina v. Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 31 [ 27 L.Ed.2d at p. 167 ]; Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. at pp. 747-748 & fn. 4 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 755-756]; Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 242, 244 [23 L.Ed.2d at pp. 279-280].) Because the effectiveness of a waiver of federal constitutional rights is governed by federal standards (Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 243 [ 23 L.Ed.2d at p. 279 ]), we adopt the federal test in place of the rule that the absence of express admonitions and waivers requires reversal regardless of prejudice.

1992(See the cases cited below; 18 see also North Carolina v. Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 31 [ 27 L.Ed.2d at p. 167 ]; Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. at pp. 747-748 & fn. 4 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 755-756]; Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 242, 244 [23 L.Ed.2d at pp. 279-280].) Because the effectiveness of a waiver of federal constitutional rights is governed by federal standards (Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 243 [ 23 L.Ed.2d at p. 279 ]), we adopt the federal test in place of the rule that the absence of express admonitions and waivers requires reversal regardless of prejudice.

1990Since we are required to affirm the trial court’s ruling as correct based on the immunity provisions (see D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]), the ruling’s accuracy with respect to other possible grounds becomes somewhat irrelevant. 13 Although the supremacy clause ordinarily invalidates state laws which purport to limit federally granted rights, where Congress has specifically authorized state legislation on a subject, state laws (which would otherwise be preempted) will survive because Congress’s express enabling legislation va

1990Since we are required to affirm the trial court’s ruling as correct based on the immunity provisions (see D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]), the ruling’s accuracy with respect to other possible grounds becomes somewhat irrelevant. 13 Although the supremacy clause ordinarily invalidates state laws which purport to limit federally granted rights, where Congress has specifically authorized state legislation on a subject, state laws (which would otherwise be preempted) will survive because Congress’s express enabling legislation va

1978Furthermore, the limitations imposed on the offer of immunity, being limited to the greater or lessor [ sic ] recollections of the various witnesses, are not so clearly set forth as to preclude the Court from considering that the motivating cause for the Defendant's incriminating statements was in fact the original offer of immunity." I (2) We acknowledge and affirm that when there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether a confession has been freely and voluntarily made, the determination of the trial court, when supported by substantial evidence, is binding upon the appellate court. ( Peo

1978Furthermore, the limitations imposed on the offer of immunity, being limited to the greater or lessor [ sic ] recollections of the various witnesses, are not so clearly set forth as to preclude the Court from considering that the motivating cause for the Defendant's incriminating statements was in fact the original offer of immunity." I (2) We acknowledge and affirm that when there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether a confession has been freely and voluntarily made, the determination of the trial court, when supported by substantial evidence, is binding upon the appellate court. ( Peo